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By way of their geographic range and financial spend, South Africa’s national parks have the 
potential for significant economic impact in the country’s rural and urban areas. The research used 
three small-cap case studies to examine government’s Public Private Partnership (PPP) Toolkit for 
Tourism for its ability to deliver economic benefit to communities around South African National 
Parks.  
The study identified areas of disjuncture between policy intention and policy implementation and 
suggests that the measures used to assess the contribution of small-cap PPPs be revised if the 
Toolkit is to become a meaningful instrument for small business growth and economic 
transformation.  Findings reveal that simplifying the Toolkit bidding process is not likely to 
broaden entry for small businesses as the due diligence elements embedded in it are necessary to 
restrict corruption and abuse. Instead, it concluded that the ecosystem in which small businesses 
are required to operate is more important for creating economically sustainable small businesses. 
The most significant feature of this ecosystem would be the empowerment culture of the recipient 
institutions and  the contractual binding of big business to enterprise development targets. The 
barriers to entry do not necessarily arise from the design of the Toolkit itself, but from the support 
institutions that have not transformed sufficiently to become the fertile grounds for the mentoring 
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AGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth initiative for South 
Africa 
ANC  African National Congress 
BER  Bureau for Economic Research  
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NDT  National Department of Tourism  
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annum.  
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme  
SANParks South African National Parks 
SCM Supply Chain Management  
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SLP  Sustainable Livelihoods Programme  
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Small-cap PPP Capital investment of less than 10 million rand 
SME Small and Medium Enterprises 
SMME Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises 
SPAID  Support Programme for Accelerated Development  
SPfC Strategic Plan for Commercialisation 
TEP  Tourism Enterprise Programme  
TSC Tourism (B-BBEE) Sector Code  
 
Glossary of Terms 
Corporate/Big Business  ‘an economic group consisting of large profit-making 
corporations especially with regard to their influence on 
social or political policy’ – Merriam-Webster 
Vulnerable Groups Sector Part of the South African population that experience a 
higher risk of poverty and social exclusion than the 
general population as defined by Stats SA. 
Transformation Sustainable transformation that promotes an equitable 
society where opportunities are not defined by race, 
gender, class or religion. (NDP) 
Tourism Toolkit or The 
Toolkit 
Public Private Partnership Toolkit for Tourism – 
National Treasury 2005 
Tourism Charter or 
Tourism Code  
The Amended Tourism B-BBEE 
Sector Code of 2015 
The Country  Republic of South Africa 
Preferential Procurement  Procurement aimed at Small, Medium and Micro 
Enterprises (SMMEs) owned by previously 
disadvantaged persons to achieve wealth redistribution  
PPP Manual and 
Standardised Provisions 
Provisions released by National Treasury that prescribes 
how key issues in PPP projects  must be dealt with    
Partnerships UK Private sector company, with UK government holding a 
substantial minority stake. Its role is to provide expertise 
and resources necessary to build partnerships and to help 
public sector development of PPPs 
Gini coefficient  Indicates the gap between the wealthiest and the least 
wealthy from perfectly equal (0 – no gap) to perfectly 
unequal (1 – the widest gap). 
Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystem  
Describing conditions in which the individual, business, 
governments, civil society and development partners 
come together to support entrepreneurial activities with 
the objective of generating economic wealth and 
prosperity. Prahalad (2005) and Cohen (2006)  
Concessionaire/ Operator  A private company, Joint Venture or Special purpose 
Vehicle that is awarded a concession to run a state asset. 
The terms are used interchangably.  
CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources 
3A Public Entities An entity with the mandate to fulfil a specific economic 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
1.1. Research Area 
In 1999 the South African National Treasury developed the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
regulations as part of the Public Finance Management Act No 29 of 1999 (PFMA). Section 76 of 
the PFMA, along with Treasury Regulation No.16, details the aims and workings of PPPs.  Due to 
the fact that the PPP Manual and Standardised Provisions could not easily be adopted for tourism, 
Treasury’s PPP Unit developed the Tourism PPP Toolkit in 2005 to more directly effect the release 
of economic opportunities in the Nature and Heritage sectors.  
To date PPP research in South Africa has largely focused on Large-Cap High-Return investments 
in such infrastructure projects as hospitals, tolls, construction, transport and sanitation. Little 
research has been done in ecotourism and few studies have gone down to the lowest level of entry 
as has the current study (Lewis, 2015; Bruchez, 2014; Tshehla, 2018; Mabuza, 2016). The current 
research study investigates the extent to which the existing Toolkit is applicable and appropriate 
in a political climate that is now focussed on economic transformation and inclusivity, (Department 
of Small Business Development, 2017; National Department of Tourism, 2018; NDP, 2011) given 
that it was developed under a policy orientation that advanced market principles that emphasized 
productivity, exclusiveness and profit sustained by a corporatized public sector.   
A founding proposition of the research is that the neoliberal macroeconomic framework, GEAR, 
that the government adopted in 1996 and under which the Toolkit was formulated, does not support 
the socio-political realities and developmental demands of South Africa today. At the time heavily 
modelled on the experiences of the OECD countries and funded by the World Bank and the UK 
Partnership (Fearnhead, 2003), the Toolkit’s design advantaged established white-owned 
businesses that had the capital, skills and experience to meet the qualification demands. The policy 
shift from RDP to GEAR was pivotal to the orientation of the Toolkit as it established the Toolkit’s 
purpose and success measures, which were overwhelmingly to maximise the investment potential 
of private capital.  
A second proposition of the study is that the measures that are used to gauge success need to be 
different for small and large cap PPPs. While the Toolkit creates a distinction between small and 
large cap capital investments, its requisite demands are the same for both. It simplistically assumes 
small businesses to be smaller versions of large enterprises. Wong (2005) cautioned against this, 
arguing that SMMEs have vastly different access to resources such as time, financial, markets and 
human resources. Large and Small concessions should therefore not be assessed against the same 
criteria as they do not offer the same contributions to the national economic transformation agenda 
as do large enterprises. Small-cap concessions should principally be considered grassroots drivers 
of transformation with their ability to reach into multiple corners of the local economy and in doing 
so contribute to collective entrepreneurial confidence in a region. They should be measured 
according to their social impacts at a local level. These would include the ability to create and 
sustain entry-level jobs, develop the skills and talents of entry-level workers, and stimulate 
innovation, rather than by the dominant measure of financial returns to the State that is the existing 
primary success measure of the Toolkit. The assertion is that, while big business (large-cap PPPs) 
should rightfully be measured on financial returns and on their ability to propagate new business, 
big business is too much a product of the neoliberal design to inherently drive transformation of 
the economy towards greater inclusivity and social value. 
In 1999 SANParks adopted what it called its ‘Commercialisation as a Conservation Strategy” 
(Fearnhead, 2003). The rationale for the strategy was to generate additional revenue and shift the 
focus of SANParks’ existing resources to its core business of managing biodiversity. The strategy 
set out the regulatory framework for tourism and recreation in SANParks and provided alternatives 
to the organisation having to perform commercial operations that fell outside of its core mandate. 
The commercialisation strategy followed from research that exposed the organisation’s  inefficient 
delivery of tourism products, its poor service standards, limited market segmentation, inadequate 
pricing and product differentiation, all of which were compounded by ineffective corporate 
policies and procedures.  Although the commercialisation strategy was designed primarily for 
revenue-generation, it had strong empowerment objectives attached. The concession process was 
designed to establish partnerships with businesses that offered an acceptable mix of financial 
strength, experience and empowerment commitments, with empowerment specifically targeting 
historically disadvantaged entrepreneurs from local communities living adjacent to national parks. 
(Fearnhead 2003). From the earliest introduction of its commercialisation strategy SANParks 
defined economic empowerment as being comprised of three principal elements, namely, 
“Shareholding, Affirmative Action and Training and the development of Small, Medium and 
Micro-enterprises” (Fearnhead, 2003:3). The empowerment obligations were set out in concession 
contracts and specified that the concessionaire would be in breach if the agreed empowerment 
commitments were not met. By 2003 eleven concessions had been awarded, seven in the Kruger 
National Park, two in Addo Elephant National Park and two in the Cape Peninsula National Park 
(later renamed the Table Mountain National Park). In the process of developing the PPP Tourism 
Toolkit, National Treasury used the experience of SANParks in tourism concessioning as the most 
relatable local reference.  It was therefore significant, in terms of the transformative objectives of 
the Toolkit, when the feedback from SMMEs was that the process was too onerous and 
cumbersome. Small businesses found the application process complex and expensive, while 
SANParks found that the resources required to release small and large-cap projects to be equally 
burdensome. This resulted in the organisation’s resources being directed to large-cap projects 
where greater financial returns would be realised (Official 6 - Interview 2018).  SANParks 
advanced the argument in the mid 2000s that there may be a missing tier in the Toolkit for Micro 
PPPs that required a simplification of the process to reduce the complexity and transaction costs 
and broaden the base of entry for emerging business. An abridged Toolkit for micro PPPs was 
developed but not adopted by the organisation because of what it considered to be additional risks 
that would result from easing the qualification and assessment criteria. (Official 2 - Interview 2018).  
 
1.2. Research Aims and Objectives  
 
The  objective of the study was to examine National Treasury’s PPP Tourism Toolkit to identify 
barriers to entry for small business and to advise on changes that may broaden the release of 
opportunities to SMMEs. The research aimed to focus on, and be of direct benefit to, entry-level 
entrepreneurs who may possess the technical skills and experience to provide the service but who 
are not equipped with the skills and resources to compete in the bidding process.  
 
Specifically the research sought to :  
 Identify barriers to entry for small business in the PPP Tourism Toolkit bidding process.  
 Analyse the concessioning experience from the perspective of current small-cap 
concessionaires in SANParks  
 Formulate recommendations on how these barriers may be overcome so as to advance 
SMME’s entry into Tourism PPP opportunites and promote their sustainability.  
  
The research was based on the assumption that the greater inclusion of small business would 
accelerate socio-economic beneficiation at local level. As a 3A Public Entity, South African 
National Parks (SANParks) is governed by National Treasury Regulation No.16 and as the largest 
operator of public tourism facilities in South Africa is the primary implementer of the Toolkit and 
in a strong position to facilitate this change (SANParks, 2018).  
 
In developing the Tourism PPP Toolkit in 2005, National Treasury defined two categories of PPPs, 
namely Large-Cap, where the capital investment is above R10m and Small-Cap, where the capital 
investment is below R10m (National Treasury, 2005). This distinction was made with the intention 
to make it possible for small enterprises with relatively low investment capital to benefit from the 
tourism economy. Where ‘lower-value’ public assets were to be commercialised through PPPs, it 
was intended that the Small-Cap route would encourage SMMEs to competitively participate in 
the process. Since its introduction in 2005, the Tourism PPP Toolkit has yielded many millions of 
Rands into state coffers. However, this revenue has come largely from a small pool of established 
large ecotourism businesses rather than from SMMEs. PPPs have the potential to bring meaningful 
benefit to tourism businesses. The benefits of PPPs include building local capacity and expertise, 
cost efficiencies, increasing competition and broadly creating opportunities for economic growth. 
To yield such extended benefits for the country, the involvement and participation of SMMEs in 
PPPs is unquestionable.  However, PPPs are often structurally and bureaucratically complex, 
making it hard for SMMEs to compete. SMMEs find it costly, time-consuming or otherwise 
challenging to respond to complex prequalification criteria and bidding documents (SANParks, 
2018).  
One of the consequences of small businesses being unable to access tourism concessions is that 
transformation in the Tourism Sector has stalled (Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), 2013; 
NDT, 2018). The design of the Toolkit has failed to deliver the anticipated ‘trickle-down’ benefits 
because, where big business has the potential to be a force for economic transformation, it has no 
innate incentive to be more inclusive or empowering. The Toolkit places no obligation on big 
business to support and mentor small businesses but relies on other empowerment legislation, in 
particular B-BBEE and the Preferential Procurement Framework to advance empowerment and 
economic growth. As there were no contractual obligations built into PPP agreements to deliver a 
transformation agenda, B-BBEE was treated by big business as a compliance requirement than a 
mechanism through which it could demonstrate redress. (Luiz, 2016).  
 
1.3. Rationale for the Study  
 
The literature on PPPs has largely focussed on the mechanistics of the procurement process and 
less on the power relations between the partners. (Miraftab, 2004). The premise of neoliberal 
economics is that the creation of wealth through decentralisation will be distributed in a way that 
will benefit the poor and reduce inequality. However, the profit-driven interests of the private 
sector are inherently in conflict with the welfare-driven interests of communities (Miraftab, 2004). 
In a PPP these interests manifest in an unequal power dynamic that is biased toward shareholder 
value rather than poverty alleviation and where communities subsequently fail to experience the 
job creation and economic growth that was promised. To counter the excessive power of big 
business, it is necessary for governments to introduce bold redistributive policies that redirect the 
benefits of the PPP to the poor, while at the same time maintaining investor interest (Schiller, 
2008). Such policies need to be drafted taking into consideration a country’s social, economic, 
cultural and political realities while remaining cognisant of the power imbalances that exists 
between the various sectors of a country’s population. Governments’ striving for less unequal 
societies have to act on their responsibility to strengthen the weaker partners so that the socio-
economic playing fields are levelled (Bately 1996 in Miraftab, 2004; Schiller, 2008).        
 
1.3.1. Poverty, Inequality and Unemployment 
“Nearly half of the population of South Africa is considered chronically poor.” 
(World Bank, 2018:). 
Twenty five years into democracy and South Africa continues to suffer from low economic growth 
and diminishing prospects of better living conditions for the poor.  The high levels of structural 
poverty, inequality and unemployment in South Africa remain a legacy of apartheid, colonisation 
and ineffective post-apartheid leadership, all of which continue to leave vulnerable black South 
Africans at the lowest rung of the economic ladder.  
Vulnerable Groups are those sectors of the population that collectively experience a higher risk of 
poverty and exclusion than the greater population (StatsSA, 2016). The Vulnerable Groups 
Indicator Report 2016 (StatsSA, 2016) defines vulnerable groups as children aged 17 years and 
below; youth aged 15-34 years; women; older persons aged above 60 years and persons with 
disabilities. Two of these target populations, namely women and youth, are prioritized by the 
Tourism B-BBEE Charter for empowerment.  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2017 report puts the figure 
of South Africans who are defined as chronically poor at 53.8% of the population (OECD,  2017). 
The reality worsens when the three poverty segments of those considered ‘chronically poor’, 
‘transient poor’ and ‘non-poor but vulnerable’ are combined. It is then estimated that about 76 
percent of the country’s population experience poverty daily in the country (World Bank, 2018). 
To understand the challenges faced by vulnerable groups and in an effort to more accurately and 
specifically target the beneficiaries of a revised Toolkit, these groups require special focus. In this 
regard SANParks acknowledges its several responsibilities:  
“SANParks’ responsibilities include not only conservation and tourism but, through 
social and economic programmes, assisting with the development of communities 
neighbouring national parks. The Parks’ strategic locations in rural areas mean 
that they can play a critical role as catalysts and drivers of local economic 
empowerment” (SANParks Annual Report, 2018:148)   
The narrow conceptualisation of national parks as having a biodiversity conservation mandate 
related only to the management of flora and fauna has been contested since the early 1970s (Pelser 
et al., 2013). And the role of national parks in manifesting social impact in neighbouring 
communities was affirmed at The World Parks Congress in 2003, in particular their role in 
alleviating poverty in rural livelihoods:   
“Protected Areas do not exist in vacuums and therefore incorporate issues that 
looked outside of traditional boundaries. ” (DeRose, 2004) 
 
 
1.3.2. Black Youth  
Empowering young people is widely recognised as a global imperative as countries need their 
youth to be the drivers of change to ensure society’s socio-economic sustainability (Bhorat et al., 
2014; DSBD, 2017). In 2012 the International Labour Organisation Conference developed “The 
Youth Employment Crisis – A Call for Action” Plan 2012-2019 that placed youth  employment at 
the top of national development agendas. This followed the ILO’s  estimation that at a global level, 
73.4 million  young people who want to work and are actively looking for a job were unable to 
(ILO, 2013). The same ILO report indicated that young people are three times more likely to be 
unemployed than adults. (ILO 2013; Republic of South Africa, 2009).  
According to StatsSA’s 2019 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS, 2019), South Africa’s 
unemployment rate increased to 29% in the second quarter of the year. Unemployed youth (aged 
between 16 and 35 years) were considered the most vulnerable in the labour market at a rate of 
55,2% (National Development Plan 2011; Jugmohan, O et al., (2017); Centre for Development and 
Enterprise, 2017). The youth-to-adult unemployment ratio in South Africa was 1:3, meaning that 
for every unemployed adult, there were three unemployed youth. Among graduates in this age 
group the unemployment rate was found to be 31,0% compared to 19,5% in 2018. This was an 
increase of 11,4 % quarter-on-quarter. At the same time the percentage of youth who were ‘Not in 
Employment, Education or Training’ (NEET) increased to 40,7%. More than four in every ten 
young females were found to be in the NEET category (StatsSA QLFS Q1,2019).  
The frustrations of unemployed youth represents a high-risk for any country. This group, holding 
no prospects of absorption into the corporate sector, has spurred many countries to put substantial 
efforts into the growth of the small business sector. South Africa is no different, with the National 
Development Plan suggesting that 90% of jobs will be generated from the small business sector by 
2030 (NDP, 2012). Rankin (2013) however, found that the ability of small enterprises, those who 
employ below 10 people, to create jobs is declining. Businesses employing between 10 and 49 
employees remain stagnant and, in ‘proportional terms’, are in decline in terms of their ability to 
generate employment (Rankin, 2012:16). Youth constitute 41,2% of the South African population, 
of which more than 55 % are unemployed and only 6% are involved in entrepreneurial activity. It 
is further significant and a cause for concern that two-thirds have never worked and almost 86% 
do not have formal or tertiary education. (StatsSA QLFS Q1, 2019). 
 
1.3.3. Black Women 
Apartheid’s migrant labour system, Homelands Policy and Influx Control were among the  
legislation and policies that forced black women into remote rural areas where they had little 
opportunity to obtain an education or explore entrepreneurial opportunities. The ideology 
underpinning Bantu Education meant that secondary education was considered unnecessary for 
black woman as they were not encouraged to aspire beyond fundamental career prospects. In 
remote villages in the Homelands, women had to raise children relying on remittances from family 
members in the cities or on poorly paid domestic work where that was available. Where it wasn’t,  
many resorted to small scale vending. (World Bank, 2018; Lemon, 2004; Poonan, 2004)  
Visa’s 2013 International Barometer of Women’s Financial Literacy ranked South African women 
23 out of 27 countries, marking them as one of the least financially literate in the world. This, along 
with the cultural oppression that women experienced and continue to experience in many 
‘traditional’ patriarchal societies, has resulted in generations of black South African women being 
unable to develop a capital base from which to develop financial independence. (Visa, 2013). 
The dismantling of the Homelands in the 1990s did little for women’s economic emancipation, as 
many women continued to carry the responsibilities as primary caregivers and breadwinners in 
rural and urban communities (Khan, 2000; Pelser, 2013; Lemon, 2004). Given this historical and 
political legacy, special focus needs to be given to the development of women entrepreneurs in 
South Africa as a neglected and under-utilised resource with extensive access to, and knowledge 
of, the fundamentals of the grassroots workings of the economy.  
 
The case studies used for this research draw on the experiences of three businesses all owned by 
women. One is jointly owned by three women. Four of the women are black South Africans and 
one a white South African.  While not specifically exploring the path that brought them to become 
entrepreneurs, the researcher found that in their interviews they spontaneously referred to and 
described their social and political journeys and revealed the inherent challenges they face as 
women in business. 
 
1.4. Structure of the Research  
The South African government has placed considerable emphasis on the development of small 
business as a stimulus for economic growth. This is expressed in the NDP and evidenced by the 
establishment of the Ministry of Small Business Development in 2014. Given that the Tourism 
PPP Toolkit is an instrument developed by National Treasury to create public benefit through the 
release of state assets, it is important that we understand its origin, objectives and design in order 
to assess its ability to effectively deliver these benefits. A political economy lens was used in the 
literature review to contextualise the socio-economic and political environment in South Africa at 
the time that the Toolkit was developed. The literature review places the development of the 
Toolkit within the macroeconomic framework in the early years of democratic South Africa. 
Through the different historical lenses of the South African Government, the Ecotourism Sector, 
the National Parks Board (South African National Parks) and the Small, Medium and Micro 
Enterprise Sector, the formulation of the Toolkit can be considered within its historical socio-
political context. 
 
Initial exploratory research was undertaken to arrive at the primary research questions. This 
included exploring existing literature, conducting informal discussions with subject experts (who 
were also colleagues), and the referencing of journals, online articles and SANParks literature. The 
set of research questions was developed with the purpose of focusing the research topic to delimit 
responses and through semi-structured interviews to gather spontaneous responses from the 
concessionaires, the implementer (SANParks) and the policy maker (National Treasury) 
respectively. The primary guiding questions were : 
 
 
1. What was the origin and the policy intention of the Toolkit?  
2. Has the policy intention changed ? If so, in what specific ways? 
3. What were the success measures and targets of the Toolkit and have those 
targets been met or not ?  
4. Are there barriers to entry to small business in the Toolkit? If so, what are 
they and can they be revised to allow greater access to small businesses? 
The research presents three small-cap PPP case-studies in SANParks in order to understand first-
hand how a sampled group of entry-level concessionaires experience the Tourism Toolkit through 
its formulaic application processes and its subsequent development support structures. Aspects 
analysed include the bidder’s experience with the Toolkit for its user friendliness (complexity); 
understanding what skills and competencies are required to effectively submit a bid (resources); 
the nature of the negotiation and contracting phase (engagement) and post–contract support 
(mentoring). The case studies cover two tourism product types, namely lodge management and 
restaurant management. This selection of types allows assessment of the Toolkit across two of the 
most lucrative products in the ecotourism sector.  The case studies provide in-depth insight into 
the entrepreneurs’ experience of the Toolkit and reveal their own particular realities functioning 
inside the entrepreneurial ecosystem and alongside the support institutions that aide their 
development.  Quantitative data was gathered from SANParks on the financial performance of the 
concessions awarded since the start of the commercialisation programme in 2000. This data 
collection process provided performance data that allowed for comparisons to be made between 



















Chapter 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review chapter is comprised of two sections.  
The first section presents a discussion of the four key players within the ecosystem that need to be 
engaged in order to effectively release and sustain a Public Private Partnership in a national park 
in South Africa. These players are firstly National Government through National Treasury, who 
are the custodians of the Tourism Toolkit, secondly South African National Parks, who are 
mandated by government to manage all national parks, thirdly the Ecotourism sector that sets and 
monitors the standards and values of responsible tourism that the country subscribes to and fourthly 
the small business sector in the tourism industry, that, in a concession, are solicited to invest capital 
and expertise that improves the visitor experience and yields revenue to the state. Their respective  
historical contexts pre-and post- democracy are discussed so that their roles in fulfilling the 
expectations of the Tourism Toolkit can be assessed.  
The second section describes the specific ways in which the Toolkit is structured and has been 
applied since its inception, particularly in SANParks. The section also critically analyses the 
Toolkit’s key functional elements and processes.  This analysis includes the ways in which PPPs 
are defined, how the Toolkit functions, the legislative environment in which it resides, the 
procurement assessment process and the nature of the process for awarding concessions. 
Defining the political economy pre- and post- apartheid for four key role-players in the 
development and implementation of the Toolkit.  
2.1. The South African Government  
2.1.1. Introduction 
Conceived in Kliptown in 1955, the Freedom Charter defined the founding principles of South 
Africa’s new Constitution, emphasizing corrective action and guaranteeing a ‘rapid and 
irreversible redistribution of wealth’ (ANC, 1989). The Charter expressly declared the wealth of 
the country as being for the collective benefit of its citizens. These principles that called for a more 
equitable redistribution of wealth guided the development of Cosatu’s Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) that formed the basis of the ANC’s 1994 election manifesto 
(Visser, 2005). The RDP became the aspirational vision for the fundamental transformation of 
South African society (RDP White Paper, 1994). It was underpinned by the Bill of Rights that 
specified that all social institutions take steps to eradicate the economic and social inequalities 
produced by racial discrimination (ANC, 1989). As a ‘growth through redistribution’ policy the 
RDP envisioned as a first priority the meeting of the basic needs of citizens: “jobs, land, housing, 
water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health 
care and social welfare” (Terreblanche 2003, p. 89). The RDP became the rallying cry of the ANC 
and, supported by their powerful alliance partners Cosatu and the Communist Party, helped launch 
the organisation into power in 1994. The RDP promised an economy crafted on Keynesian 
principles that would through strong government intervention guarantee the creation of jobs, the 
redistribution of land and wealth and the provision of basic services.  
 
However, the new government’s poorly developed administrative and implementation skills meant 
that the Reconstruction and Development Programme was soon in trouble (Visser, 2005). 
Compounded by tensions between government departments as to the clear objectives of the RDP 
as well as the budgetary competition for resources, projects both flailed and failed. By March 1996 
only R5 billion of the R15 billion allocated to reconstruction and development programmes had 
been spent (Visser, 2005). In 1996 the government replaced the RDP with the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR).  
 
GEAR was a macroeconomic strategy that all but abandoned the social welfare goals of the RDP 
for the neo-liberal framework favoured by western economies and big corporations. Adelzadeh 
(1996) describes this decision as “a panic response to the recent exchange-rate instability and a 
lame succumbing to the policy dictates and ideological pressures of the international financial 
institutions” (p. 67). He goes on to highlight that this new policy framework based fiscal stimulus 
almost entirely on government’s ability to stimulate private investment (Adelzadeh, 1996). Thus, 
government ensured that big businesses continued its powerful economic status while reducing 
government’s role to the formulation of policy and introduction of systems that ensured the 
wellbeing of big business. GEAR’s macroeconomic framework envisioned that economic 
development would be driven by the private sector and set out that “the state should play a smaller 
role in the economy, state-owned assets should be privatized, there should be deep cuts in 
government spending, international competitiveness, and that an export-orientated economy 
should be encouraged.” (Visser, 2004, p. 9). Luiz (2016) sums GEAR up as “a negotiated 
settlement between elite groups that left the majority of the population without ‘voice’” (p.12).  
 
2.1.2. The Washington Consensus 
The Washington Consensus considered the free market to be the driver of growth and development. 
The term was coined by the economist John Williamson in 1989 and advocated policy for 
underdeveloped countries that included “trade liberalization, competitive interest rates, tax reform 
and liberalization of foreign investment” (Schilcher, 2007).  It was enthusiastically supported by 
US-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  
 
The Washington Consensus became the dominant Western belief that the state is inherently 
inefficient and corrupt and that a free-market is more efficient. Koelble (2004) refers to the 
Washington Consensus as “a dictate to economies around the globe that is enforced…through the 
institutions of finance and politics” (p. 73). It is this global dictate that framed South Africa’s 
policies in the early years of its democracy and resulted in the surrender of much of the 
government’s autonomy in decision-making and the subsequent formulation of its bureaucratic 
systems and processes. It is therefore appropriate that this research revisit these systems and 
processes for their contemporary relevance and in the process identify limitations in the ability of 
these systems to meet present-day economic and social objectives. The Washington Consensus set 
the agenda for development and, through agencies like the World Bank and the IMF, established 
what were considered non-negotiable conditionalities that prescribed the policies and economics 
of poor countries (Saad-Filho 2010; Gore, 2000; Williamson, 2004) 
 
Adeldezah (1996) foretold that the South African government’s new policy “will fail in 
meaningfully addressing, let alone transforming, the inherited inequities of the apartheid system”’ 
(p. 3). Koelble (2004) explores reasons behind the shift in policy direction and concludes that 
essentially domestic policy-makers have very little room to implement what they deem to be their 
country’s priorities outside of these Washington Consensus dictates.  
 
In the 1990s the dominance of the Washington Consensus paradigm and its prescriptions was 
challenged by the rise of the East Asian economies. Saad-Filho (2010) puts this down to, firstly, 
the ‘Asian Tigers’ making an ideological shift that prioritized the developmental state rather than 
continuing along the neo-liberal free market path they were following.  He lists as indisputable 
examples Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Vietnam, all countries where the state was seen to intervene through protectionism, 
directed finance and other departures from the free market (Saad- Filho 2010, p. 5). Secondly, the 
Washington Consensus’ conditionalities that extended into and prescribed, countries’ political and 
economic policies were challenged for what seemed to be obvious unrealized trickle-down benefits 
that were intended to reduce inequality, alleviate poverty and reduce unemployment. These were 
instead shown to be defaulting towards dependence on Washington Consensus institutions such as 
the World Bank and International Monitory Fund (IMF). Thirdly and most significantly for South 
African post 1994, the Washington Consensus represented the paradox between the inclusive 
democratic political system it was trying to establish and the traditional exclusionary economic 
policies that advanced the interests of a minority (Saad-Filho 2010; Berg & Melamed 2012).  
 
2.1.3. New Public Management  
Around the same time, in the early 1990s, the New Public Management (NPM) ideology favoured 
by Anglophone countries began to take hold in South Africa. It replaced the traditional public 
administration model of Max Weber that posits that bureaucratization in capitalism is a natural 
product of competition. NPM placed its emphasis on management approaches derived from the 
private sector, approaches that were designed around efficiencies, performance management and 
“greater use of market mechanisms, such as privatisation and public-private partnerships in 
service provision” (Cameron 2009, p. 2). Like the neoliberal orientation of GEAR, NPM 
emphasised strong markets and a non-dominant state (Cameron 2009, p.7). Public Private 
Partnership as a market mechanism is acknowledged by theorists as a product of the NPM 
movement, consistent with the philosophy that the private sector is more efficient and cost effective 
than institutionalised public sector bureaucracy (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003; Hood, 1991; 1995). 
It was during this period of public sector reform that the PFMA (1999) was legislated and under 
which the PPP regulations reside.  
The NPM was enthusiastically adopted by South African government departments who used the 
approach to shift from an apartheid bureaucracy to a democratic public service (Cameron, 2009). 
South Africa took its lessons mostly from Britain, the USA, Australia and New Zealand (Miller, 
2005).  The introduction of new political and economic policies alongside the NPM paradigm of 
corporatisation exposed the forces vying for influence over the new administration to determine  
how the country’s future would be shaped. Civil service reform based on a philosophy of 
‘outsourcing’ competencies was the dominant narrative and made for a sound rationale in the 
context of the dysfunctional civil service that the ANC had inherited. Espousing the aims of 
increased efficiencies and cost reduction, NPM provided a framework for the restructuring of a 
fragmented civil service that had been conceived to serve racial categories of South Africans 
separately, with the accompanying unequal resources, skills and infrastructure. The new 
government’s administration found the transition to role-modelling global economic systems 
appealing and was not too concerned about the extent that management consultancies from the 
OECD nations insinuated themselves into policy formulation across government departments. 
(McDonald & Ruiters 2012; Hall 2013). 
 
2.1.3.1. Institutional Isomorphism 
“Highly structured organisational fields provide a context in which individual 
efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead to homogeneity 
in structure, culture and output” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of corporate and 
State is driven by the perceived need for efficiency rather than competition, which is why we see 
organisations becoming more similar to one another rather than more diverse. According to 
Beckert (2010), this homogeneity, or ‘Institutional Isomorphism’, occurs through three 
mechanisms, namely, power (coercive isomorphism), mimesis (mimetic processes) and attraction 
(normative pressures). Two of these isomorphic processes, mimetic and normative, are said to be 
managerial choices , while coercive isomorphism may be compliance-driven, where, for example, 
government introduces legislation that compels organisations to adapt their behaviour in line with 
the imposed mandatory managerial model.  
In hierarchical systems such as where the State has public entities, government bodies and 
institutions, the combination of unequal power relations and resource-dependency leads to 
organisations adopting the rules and rituals of the larger system and become homogenised over 
time. The subordinate entities become bound by a group identity adopting standard operation 
procedures, reporting systems and budgeting, among others. Coercive isomorphism may also be 
in the form of non-formal coercive pressure that is more subtle. It could, for example, be the kind 
of pressure that takes the form of aligning structures and titles in order to engage formally between 
organisations with representatives of equal authority. (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, in DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  In 2000 SANParks experienced what the organisation termed “Operation Prevail”, 
a cash-flow crisis that was brought on by a combination of financial mismanagement, revenue 
losses in the Kruger National Park and the reduction of its state subsidy due to new social delivery 
priorities of government (Maguranyanga, 2009). The organisation was therefore during this time 
vulnerable to coercive formal and non-formal pressure.   
In cases of mimetic isomorphism, organisations in an environment of uncertainty begin to model 
themselves, intentionally or unintentionally, on competitors who appear to be successful (Beckert 
2010). An example of unintentional modelling could be in the contracting of consultancy firms 
who are brought in to advise on organisational strategy. Consultancy firms are powerful for reasons 
of their international reach and are capable of widely spreading organisational-design trends under 
the banner of business efficiency and revenue maximisation (Beckert 2010; Dimaggio  & Powell, 
1983; 1991).  
Normative Isomorphism pressure relates to the professionalization of occupations. Dimagio & 
Powell (1983) identify two main sources of this pressure: universities and professional networks. 
Together these institutions formulate the cognitive norms and the appropriate professional 
behaviour that ensures that individuals who occupy similar positions in organisations “are virtually 
indistinguishable” (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 153).  
These authors take the analysis further to present two levels of analysis for the prediction of 
Isomorphic Change, one being ‘organisational-level’ predictors and the other ‘field-level’ 
predictors. For each level they present a series of hypothesis on which to base predictions of 
homogenous change. Beckert (2010) challenges these hypotheses as being limited to isomorphic 
change, when they could be employed to predict institutional divergence as well. The isomorphic 
leanings of Dimaggio and Powell (1983), Beckert argues, has given isomorphism undue analytic 
weight in the field of Sociological Institutionalism (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999 in Beckert, 2010, p. 
151). Beckert (2010) cites examples of comparative institutional development that did not start 
from the premise of isomorphism. One of the examples of divergent institutional development is 
the New Economic Sociology that posits that economic action cannot be understood outside of, or 
divorced from, the social environment in which it occurs.  
2.1.3.2. New Economic Sociology 
Classic economic sociology as defined by the works of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Parsons 
and Smelser provided the sound theoretical foundation that sought to explain how the economy 
works (Swedberg et al.,1997). Classic economic sociology developed over time into New 
Economic Sociology when theorists began to ask social questions of economists who were 
previously uncontested due to the ‘rationality’ of their theories versus what was described as the 
‘abstract’ theorising of sociologists and political scientists (Swedberg et al., 1997). The ‘new 
institutionalists’ can be categorised by three broad paradigms, namely ‘rational choice 
institutionalists’, ‘sociological institutionalists’ and ‘historical institutionalists’. They were defined 
by their respective positions on the relationship of individuals with the institution and, in turn, 
within the social and cultural context in which the institution finds itself. (Koelble, 2016). 
The Economic Sociology paradigm has substantially evolved since Polanyi (1944) introduced the 
concept of the ‘embeddedness’ of economics in social relations (Granovetter, 1985).  
 “… economic action without the ‘societal element’ would be bare bones; it would 
have no ‘unity’ or ‘stability’ whatsoever” (Swedberg, 1987, p. 7). 
‘Embeddedness’ is understood in association with the ‘Substantivist’ school in Anthropology and 
with the ‘Moral Economy’ in Political Science, where Marx and Weber in particular are the most 
well-known theorists of embedded economics in sociological studies (Swedberg, 1987;  Hirsch, P 
et al, 1987). These fundamental theories were enhanced in the 1960’s and 1970’s by a range of 
theoretical developments from economic, political and organizational theorists that introduced new 
topics for analysis. Some prominent works included Block (1997) and Makler et al, (1982) on the 
international economy, Kanter (1977) and Tilly and Scott (1978) on the role of women in the 
economy, Berg (1981) on the labour market and Stinchcombe (1983) on economic sociology 
(Swedberg, 1987). The new economic sociology approaches introduced the concepts of social 
value and shared value along with social return on investment (SROI) methodologies to determine 
a monetary value for social value initiatives (Porter and Kramer, 2011; Barman, 2016). This shifted 
the profit-yield focus from shareholders to stakeholders, where stakeholders include the customers, 
employees, suppliers, government and local communities, as well as the traditional investment 
shareholders, an  orientation that Barman (2016) refers to as ‘Caring Capitalism’ (Hall et al., 2015; 
Barman, 2016).   
These theoretical frameworks are referenced in Chapter 5 as they provide  an understanding both 
of post-apartheid institutional behaviour and the entrepreneurial ecosystem created by institutions 
of government and big business after 1994.  
2.1.3.3. Transitioning in the 1990s  
Pre-1994 the South African economy had been in stagnation for a decade (Handley et al., 1996). 
Trevor Manuel (in Bhorat, et al, eds., 2015) compared the South African economy under apartheid 
to a typical colony based on the extraction of minerals except that the beneficiaries of the extraction 
lived inside the country. Business under apartheid was a self-preserving, insular entity that had 
begun to feed off itself. Due to international boycotts and trade blockades, the country’s total gross 
domestic production was in decline and the government was making huge foreign debt payments 
(Stal, 1996 in Handley & Mills, 1996). After 1994, with international sanctions lifted, the 
government announced that the future would be driven by a social and political mandate 
underpinned by the RDP that promised a ‘people first’ agenda. This agenda would redraw the lines 
of racial and economic separation that was the foundation of the apartheid state (Bhorat et al., 
2014). Democracy initially brought dramatic economic change. The rate of inflation dropped from 
15,3% in 1991 to 8.7% in 1995, followed by an inflow of international capital from mid-1994 to 
the end of 1995 of more than R30 billion; this compared to an average of R5b per annum for the 
previous decade (Handley & Mills, 1996). The Government of National Unity was therefore 
understandably buoyant about its macroeconomic strategy, as all indications were that its social, 
political and economic reforms were being favorably received by international investors. Chris 
Stals, the Governor of the Reserve Bank, enthusiastically endorsed GEAR and believed it would 
ensure an inflation limit of 7 % and a growth rate of 6 %  (Handley & Mills, 1996).  
 
Pillay (in Handley & Mills, 1996) took the opposite view, arguing that, instead of releasing the 
economy to the promise of global market forces, South Africa needed a strong political hand to 
manage its own destiny so that it could target the macroeconomic objectives of inequality, poverty 
and unemployment by allocating strategies and resources directly. Pillay (1996) argued that 
through GEAR the government was surrendering the centralist welfare ‘nation-state’ vision of the 
RDP as a result of the seduction of globalization and in the face of the overwhelming economic 
power of the OECD countries. Bhorat et al. (2014) highlight the confusing rhetoric coming from 
the ANC that claimed on the one hand to support the developmental state, while on the other hand 
advocating for globalization. This resulted in regulatory uncertainty and reduced investor 
confidence (Bhorat et al., 2014). More sinister was the fact that the new macroeconomic orientation 
disguised the fact that it was allowing an elite group of black politically-connected and rapidly 
economically mobile to participate in a trade-off with white capital who were happy to avoid 
nationalisation and radical redistribution as policy options (Koelble, 1998; Luiz, 2016; Streak, 
2004).  
 
The reality for the man on the street was that inflation rose to catastrophic levels, reaching a 20 
year peak of 9.9% in 2008 (IDC, 1994). Coupled with a historically poor savings culture, a 
stubbornly persistent high rate of unemployment, low level of skills and redundant technologies, 
the new euphoria failed to deliver tangible improvements to ordinary South Africans. 
2.1.4. Conclusion 
Spies refers to ‘embodied capital’ as the value of knowledge and information that people possess 
as drivers of the future (Spies, in Handley & Mills, 1996, p. 201). Democracy in South Africa 
coincided with a radical change in the way global economies operated. Digital technology had 
advanced across multiple platforms with communication and manufacturing sectors in particular 
experiencing huge changes. The notion of international boundaries that required physical crossing 
in order for trade to take place had been broken. Trading was no longer restricted to working hours, 
physical spaces or fixed telephones. New trading and communication platforms opened South 
Africa up to a global market that left its long-isolated economy far behind in international 
competitiveness. After many years as a pariah state, trade sanctions had also left the majority of 
South African workers far behind the rest of the competitive world.  There was substantial pressure 
from external agencies for South Africa to follow international economic policy trends and adopt 
systems and skills that would raise its competitiveness. However, after 25 years of democracy the 
latter has not yet materialised for the majority of black workers; they remain on the fringes of the 
economy and make up the bulk of vulnerable South Africans (Stats SA – The Fieldworker, 2014). 
 
2.2. South African National Parks  
2.2.1. Introduction 
 “Built through forced locations, protected with military techniques, financed 
through heavy government subsidies and run with political and social blinders, South 
Africa’s Parks became some of the most luxurious and racially exclusive playgrounds 
in the world. They are today among the bitterest legacies of apartheid’ (Honey, 1999, 
p. 341).  
 
The early national parks in South Africa were created as a result of the forced relocation of 
thousands of African families from their land. The disempowerment of black South Africans from 
their land under the guise of environmentalism began in the colonial era and intensified though 
legislated dispossession after the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and with the 
passing of the Native Land Act in 1913. The development of a national park ‘ethic’ can be traced 
back to the late colonial era when the first conservation agencies were created (Khan, 2000). 
Having been progressively dispossessed of their land and the economic opportunities associated 
with ownership of land, the narrative that indigenous blacks were ‘environmentally destructive’ 
found fertile ground (Khan, 2000, p. 158). It echoed the alienation and dispossession of indigenous 
peoples in the USA with the establishment of the Yellowstone National Park, as well as many parts 
of Africa where Europeans had subjugated indigenous people and dispossessed them of their land. 
The establishment of national parks, or Game Reserves as they were known then, took place under 
the guise of a preservationist ideology that argued that because large populations of wildlife were 
being destroyed through hunting and poaching, the county’s natural heritage needed to be 
preserved through legislation that made it possible for land to be alienated and its occupants 
removed. What this ideology and legislation in fact did was to secure pristine playgrounds for the 




2.2.2. National Parks Act of 1926 and the Resurgence of Afrikaner Nationalism  
Carruthers (1989), in her review of the history of research on national parks in South Africa, 
criticized the existing literature on the establishment of national parks as too simplistic, inaccurate 
and proselytizing, and called for a more objective and critical study that would take into 
consideration the political economy of South Africa at the time (Carruthers, 1989).  
 
“Fundamentally the founding of a National Park concerns the allocation of certain 
natural resources and for this reason it is a political, social and economic issue more 
than a moral one” (Carruthers, 1989, p. 188). 
 
Carruthers argued that the National Parks Act of 1926 had successfully been passed because the 
early twentieth centry was a highly politicised time following the Anglo-Boer War and World War 
I. Afrikaner nationalism was aggressively asserting the Afrikaner group’s political and social 
identity and Afrikaners were looking to consolidate their gains from their resistance to the British. 
This was a time of a passionate revival of Voortrekker traditions, embodied in an iconic leader 
Paul Kruger who had come to symbolize Afrikaner unity and the successful resistance against the 
colonizers (https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/rand-rebellion-1922). 
 
The establishment of the Kruger National Park in 1926 and the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park 
in 1931 gave South Africa a chance to be part of the process of internationalization of natural areas 
that had taken hold in Western countries with the establishment of the Yellowstone National Park 
in 1872. It became a moral rallying point for disparate white South African society to build cultural 
bridges. Their uniting around National Parks narrowed divisions between Afrikaans and English-
speaking whites, underpinned by a common understanding that blacks were either ‘poachers or 
labourers’ but not partners (Carruthers, 1989; Kepe 2009).  
 
“No Africans became partners in the protectionist enterprise: they were tolerated 
either as squatters or 'courageous and loyal native rangers', or they were cast in the 
role of 'evil, cruel poachers' who avoided wage labour by living off the land”’ – 
Carruthers (1989, p.189) 
As a result of these protectionist and racialised apartheid ideologies and narratives, national parks 
became more firmly established and legitimised through whites-only ownership and custodianship 
policies and a raft of apartheid legislation passed between 1923 and 1953. For example, the Natives 
Urban Areas Act of 1923, the Group Areas Act of 1950 and the Separate Amenities Act of 1953,  
combined to legally alienate black people from their rural and urban land and rationalized the 
prioritization of game areas above social concerns such as housing, education and health services.  
 
Khan (1994) believes a vacuum exists in protected area research, the filling of which would open 
up the history of conservation to be utilised “as a repository of historical information of value to 
both the present and the future” (p. 500). She concurs with Carruthers about the inadequacy of the 
available body of work on national park development and identifies three shortcomings. Firstly, 
she sees park history as having been romanticized under the hero figure of the brave and manly 
game ranger while ignoring the self-interest, opportunism and political expediency of public and 
private figures and groups. Secondly, this history avoids controversial socio-political issues such 
as the exclusion of the environmental and cultural attitudes and beliefs of black people and the 
resentment of black South Africans towards conservation as a result of their exclusion and 
dispossession. Thirdly, the deliberate misrepresentation of black South Africans as 
environmentally destructive and responsible for excessive game killing even in the face of records 
of the excessive and unregulated sport of hunting by whites and the “pro-hunting stance of 
government”. (Khan, 1994).  
 
Novellie (2018) in his review of Carruthers (1989) highlights the long-standing absence of 
historical and social science research in national parks that would provide us with a more 
comprehensive understanding of human interaction with the natural world. A Social Science 
research lens would go beyond the narrow bounds of natural science research to include an 
understanding of the political and economic drivers of strategy and decision-making.  Novellie 
(2018) muses that “natural scientists assume that the present includes all pasts and tend to be 
impatient with historical context, whereas environmental historians must read all papers to unpack 
intellectual journeys in light of their political and social contexts” (2018, p. 1).  
 
Ramutsindela’s (2005) analysis of the origins of national parks in the Southern African Region 
adds another layer to our understanding. He argues that national parks were created through the 
western dualistic lens that separated society and nature “maintaining the dichotomy between human 
and physical geography”(p.3.) He suggests that it was the notion of nature not being intrinsically 
linked to identity or to survival that fueled the justification of exclusivity of black people that 
prevailed. Creating ‘natural’ playgrounds for white people therefore justified the mass removal of 
indigenous people from their land.  
2.2.3. Apartheid era militarisation of Parks 
During apartheid the South African government engaged in pre-emptive military destabilization of 
its neighbours by creating a defence against what they saw as the communist ‘rooigevaar’ (red 
threat). In Mozambique, the pro-Marxist, anti-apartheid FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique) election victory in 1975 signalled to the South African government that the border 
had to be secured to keep the perceived communist threat away from the political and economic 
centres of Johannesburg and Pretoria (Lundstrum, 2015). South Africa aligned itself with the 
opposing RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) forces and set up a substantial military 
presence inside the Kruger National Park from which raids into Mozambique were launched. These 
raids went beyond military engagements to include destroying villages and livelihoods 
(Lundstrum, 2015). Kruger National Park was in effect a strategic militarized buffer zone (Ellis, 
1994) holding substantial artillery, with troops moving through the park and across the border. 
It is argued that the militarization of the Kruger National Park, where guns and ammunition were 
in ready supply to RENAMO guerillas is still being felt, or is being duplicated in the new war 
against rhino poaching. Dressler et al. (2010) highlight the alarming rapidity with which the park’s 
current anti-rhino war has fallen back onto a familiar military strategy, forgoing the democratic 
stakeholder engagement and adaptive management approaches the park advocates. These authors 
believe that once again the Kruger park rangers have been para-militarised and the strategy chosen 
in the anti-poaching wars is that of the guerilla tactics of the 1970s (Dressler, 2010). 
 
As further evidence of the problematic role of national parks in recent history, Ellis, (1994) reveals 
that in the late 1970s and 1980s the South African government, through its networks of military 
insurgencies and international allegiances, was the main illegal exporter of elephant and rhino horn 
to the Far East. Soldiers were often the first to come across dead or wounded animals and because 
they had the equipment and the transportation networks, began the illicit trade. Ellis (1994) goes 
further to suggest that the scale and sophistication of the operation could not have occurred without 
the approval of the Apartheid Military Intelligence who had found a convenient funding source for 
the war against FRELIMO in Mozambique and MPLA in Angola. According to Ellis (1994), 
because it was generously subsidized by the government and co-funded by powerful interest groups 
like WWF and Afrikaner businessmen, the National Parks Board as it was known at the time, did 
not have to pay much mind to tourism revenue as a means to support conservation nor, with the 
paramilitary might it had at its disposal to protect its boundaries, did it have to consider its political 
relevance or its developmental responsibilities to the black communities surrounding it. 
 
The Kruger National Park was not the only park being used for military purposes. The apartheid 
state also subverted the conservation mandate in the South African Border War supporting UNITA 
in Angola as well as infiltrations into Zimbabwe as part of the Rhodesian Bush War. (Poonan, 
2015, Lundstrum, 2015; Kepe, 2009;  Cock & Fig, 2000) 
 
It was unsurprising therefore, that when the ANC came into power, the economic and 
transformation potential of national parks was not a priority as parks had historically operated 
exclusively for a select market of local and foreign whites. Environmental issues were on the whole 
met with either apathy or hostility (Honey, 1999). The reality was that the national park system 
that the new government inherited was alienated from the majority of its citizens who had been  
dispossessed of their land, deprived of their livelihoods, denied the right to visit their traditional 
cultural and sacred spaces and who struggled to understand national parks as a place where 
‘animals roam free while Africans who enter to collect firewood or hunt an antelope to feed their 
family are arrested” (Honey 1999, p. 340). The National Parks Board in 1994 therefore had a 
severe credibility gap with black citizens, as it carried with it images of an uncaring past. Its 
promises of beneficiation to local communities through its commercialization programme and 
empowerment through PPPs were met with great skepticism (Fearnhead, 2003). This was an 
important period during which the organisation needed to establish trust with constituencies it had 
not before considered worthy. It was vital therefore that the promises of economic benefit to 
communities from the existence of national parks needed to be realized. (Poonan, 2015; 
Maguranyanga, 2009). 
 
2.2.4. Conclusion  
With the end of apartheid and the stabilization of the SADC region in the 1990s, national parks 
had to develop legitimacy as a national asset with valuable political, environmental, cultural and 
economic significance to South Africans. The strategy of South African National Parks was 
twofold : the establishment of a Social Ecology Unit to proactively engage with communities to 
attempt to create shared value, and the adoption of market-driven ecotourism as a means towards 
financial self-sustainability and related tangible benefits to communities (Honey, 1999, ; Poonan, 
2015). This became the dominant strategy and was captured in the philosophy of ‘Benefits beyond 
Boundaries’ emanating from the 5th World Park Congress of 2003. Cock and Fig (2000) referred 
to this period for SANParks as an organisation in transition “away from a colonial model of 
conservation focused on preservationism to an indigenous, community-based model of 
conservation which focuses on human benefits and sustainable utilisation” (Cock & Fig, 2000, 
p.24) 
 
This is a path the organisation still struggles to navigate. Notwithstanding the painful history of the 
economic and recreational exclusion of the majority of the population from national parks, there 
exists a body of advocates for the return to ‘protectionist conservation” (Khan, 2000). These 
advocates argue that conservationists are not equipped for, nor should they be burdened by, social 
development objectives and that the responsibility for job creation and poverty alleviation is a 
separate agenda that needs to be addressed through a different strategic platform (Pelser, 2012, p. 
4;  Pelser, 2001; Brechin et al., 2007; Brockington et al., 2008; Roe & Walpole, 2010; Kepe, 2009). 
 
The ongoing transition of National Parks into an inclusive, transparent and accountable public 
entity requires the unravelling of multiple layers of socio-political history to understand what  these 
parks need to do to heal generations of trauma that their creation left on the psyche of both black 
and white South Africans. The commercialisation programme that SANParks embarked on in the 
early 2000s declared its transformation mission as : 
 
“Effective transformation both within SANParks and the broader society and economy 
through the implementation of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment”. 
(SANParks, 2013, p. 9) 
 
The Tourism Toolkit has been one of the mechanisms for this transformation for 15 years and it is 
therefore appropriate that this research evaluates the extent to which the Toolkit is enabling the 
mission.  
 
2.3. The Tourism Sector in South Africa  
2.3.1. Introduction 
In 2006 the Small Business Project (SBP) reflected on the consequence of a South African tourism 
industry that was anti-developmental and exclusionary during apartheid:   
“SA’s tourism sector is dominated financially by a small group of large, well- 
established, mostly locally-owned tourism enterprises. These include major travel 
and tour agencies, transport operations, hotels, casinos and conference centres. 
Large players at the top end of the market include Tourvest; Thompsons Travel; car 
rental firms such as Avis, Imperial, Budget and Hertz; hotel groups such as Southern 
Sun, Sun International, Protea hotels and City Lodge; and air carriers such as South 
African Airways, Nationwide and British Airways”(SBP–Strategic Business 
Partnership, 2006, p. 11) 
Visser and Rogerson (2004) confirm that before 1994 tourism in South Africa was the domain of 
whites, with black people legislatively prohibited from sharing public spaces with whites.  The 
reality of this exclusion continues to echo today, with,  for example beaches that were formally 
exclusively for white people becoming the battle grounds for transformation and cultural 
recognition (Thamm, 2018). The authors describe tourism under apartheid as ‘anti-developmental’ 
(2004, p. 1) and quote Baskin (1995) who referred to the history of tourism in the country as the 
“economics of white leisure” (Baskin, 1995 cited in Visser and Rogerson, 2004). They describe 
the ecotourism sector at the time as a closed network for selected white businesses and the reason 
why white-owned businesses have been able to entrench their market share.  
 
2.3.2. Tourism in GEAR 
The peaceful transition to democracy in 1994, along with the iconic statesmanship of Nelson 
Mandela, turned a hitherto internationally decried South Africa into the curiosity of the world, a 
must-see for former anti-apartheid activists, politicians, business and ordinary local and overseas 
people. Even though it took a while to be recognised by government, tourism became a key 
economic driver in post-apartheid South Africa. The country’s international visitor rate rose from 
50 000 in the 1980s to 10 million in 2016 (Ahmed et al., 1998), with revenue growing by 10.8% 
to R75 billion in 2016 and contributing 2,9% to the country’s GDP, a larger contributor than 
agriculture (SA Tourism Annual Report, 2016). 
Why was the government slow in recognizing the potential of tourism ? Saarinen, et al. (2013) 
suggests that between the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio and the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002 the debate was dominated by the Green Agenda that put 
conservation first. Tourism was considered merely a means to fund conservation (Rogerson, 2013).  
The change in focus in the late 1990s towards sustainable development fuelled discussions on ways 
in which tourism could benefit the poor as a “potential engine for growth, capable of energizing 
and rejuvenating other economic sectors” (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
[DEAT], 2003 cited in Rogerson 2011, p. 45). In 1998 DEAT published “Tourism in GEAR’ 
intended as a framework for the implementation of the new developmental approach to tourism 
(DEAT, 1998b). In 2002 the Local Economic Development Policy document ‘Refocussing 
development on the Poor’ was released. This document emphasised a community-based approach 
to Local Economic Development (LED) with what Bond (2002) described as “a bottom-up  
approach  to  LED  that challenges  the  Washington  Consensus  and  offers a  community-based  
approach  associated  with  a  new,  more  sustainable  paradigm”  (Bond,  2002 cited in Rogerson 
2011, p.41). 
This paradigm essentially took the ANC back to the core elements of the RDP to address issues 
relating to economic redistribution and poverty alleviation. It was during this period of contested 
policy direction and a new unfolding vision for tourism in South Africa that the Tourism PPP 
Toolkit was developed.  
The political and economic isolation of apartheid South Africa spawned huge multinational hotels 
and casinos that manifested under the umbrella of the independent Bantu Homelands. The siting 
of these were dictated by the Homelands being that, at least theoretically, they were able to skirt 
the prohibitions that came with apartheid legislation. A consequence of this has been significant 
spatial imbalances and product homogeneity in South Africa’s tourism offerings. The restrictions 
on the movement of black people left South Africa with a legacy of narrowness of the tourism 
product and with spatial anomalies that limited tourism expansion and growth (Viljoen, Kruger & 
Saayman, 2018). This is evident in the concentration of high-volume tourism in and around big 
cities where apartheid infrastructure-spend was highest. The apartheid government had little 
incentive to invest in bulk infrastructure in rural areas where the sole legitimate beneficiaries were 
Afrikaner farming communities and the investment return was low. This legacy continues to 
disadvantage many rural towns today. (Acheampong & Tichaawa, 2015). Many rural towns are 
unable to capitalise on their heritage and natural assets as many of them suffer not only from actual 
distance as a disincentive to tourists, but from the inadequacy of the infrastructure to meet tourist 
expectations when they do get visitors. The apartheid government chose instead to invest heavily 
in resorts and spas that created recreation destinations for white South Africans (Viljoen, Kruger 
& Saayman, 2018). This is why we have wildlife tourism concentrated in National Parks, resort 
tourism in hotels and casinos as typified by Sun City, and the beach tourism of Cape Town and 
Durban. 
2.3.3. The Tourism Entrepreneur 
Government and support organisations have tended to see tourism as a singularly defined sector 
and thus designed generic financing and support tools to serve the tourism industry as a whole. 
However, there are differentiating characteristics between tourism SMMEs. Rogerson (2005) 
highlights the importance of understanding these differences and developing target-specific 
support initiatives. There are three categories of tourism entrepreneurs that need to be understood 
for the contributions they make and the specific developmental and policy support they require. 
The highest category is the growth-oriented elite businesses that have established themselves and 
their products and are looking to increase their market share. Examples of these would be large 
hotels, casinos, conference centres and travel agencies. The second category is the economically 
comfortable ‘lifestyle’ entrepreneurs who are generally supplementing their current lifestyle 
through, for example, providing visitor accommodation in their homes or farms, or running travel 
and touring companies. The lower end is the entry level ‘marginalised’ or survivalist entrepreneur. 
Included in this category are majority black-owned tourism businesses, classified as micro-
enterprises that operate services such as township tours, homestay bed and breakfasts and arts and 
crafts. They operate on marginal profits, have very little investment capital and low prospects for 
expansion or new job creation (Rogerson, 2005).   
In a sector-specific study on tourism SBP (2006) came to a similar understanding of the categories 
and survivalist nature of SMME tourism entrepreneurs:  
 “Tourism SMMEs are of two very different types, largely stratified along racial lines. At 
one end of the scale are well-established, mainly white-owned small businesses. Many have 
moved into tourism from other sectors, often motivated by lifestyle choices. At the other end 
of the scale is the emerging black-owned tourism economy, consisting mainly of formally 
registered micro enterprises as well as informal enterprises. Many, though not all, of these 
enterprises are survivalist in nature” (SBP, 2006, p. 13).  
Rogerson (2008) graphically depicts the structure of South Africa’s Tourism economy in Figure 
1 below :  
 
 
Figure 1- The structure of the South African Tourism Sector (Rogerson, 2008) 
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2.3.4. Pro-Poor Tourism  
The pro-poor tourism approach grew out of a recognition that the trickle-down benefits that neo-
liberalism promised was doing little to reduce inequality. The profits that came from tourism was 
monopolised by neo-liberal economics that places little value on equality. Many developing 
nations use their natural and cultural attractions to diversify their economies and private sector 
investment presents a convenient option to improve tourism infrastructure and to gain foreign 
earnings. However, these investors consist largely of multinational companies whose shareholders 
are not local. This means that the profits serve a local elite while the rest is repatriated (Ashley et 
al., 2000). Thus, while tourism can be lucrative and critical to the economic health of a developing 
nation, neo-liberal macroeconomics ensures that the benefits derived are exponentially different 
for the poor and the non-poor.  The pro-poor movement is an attempt to put poverty at the heart of 
tourism by attempting to ensure that redistribution is biased towards the local poor (Ashley et al., 
2000; Schiller, 2008). 
Conceptual weaknesses in the pro-poor approach were identified by a number of scholars. They 
noted, firstly, that the local benefits were restricted to the micro-level and benefitted some groups 
and excluded others. Secondly, because the approach was generally focussed on community-based 
tourism projects, it did not have the scale to make a substantive difference at national level.  
Thirdly, it focussed on infrastructure improvements and skills training and neglected the creation 
of those market linkages that would lead projects to be financially sustainable. Fourthly, it lacked 
mechanisms to monitor change (Ashley & Goodwin, 2007). In order for pro-poor tourism to 
narrow the inequality gap governments would need to make policy decisions that are bold enough 
to introduce protective redistributive policies that interfere with market forces and bias tourism 
gains towards the poor (Schiller, 2008). ‘Inclusive’ tourism would go beyond pro-poor tourism’s 
aim of creating employment to include “uncompromising resource transfers e.g. skills, land and 
political ‘voice” (Schiller, 2008, p. 8). Inclusive tourism is thus about “widening the size of the 
economy and not about redistributing existing resources as pro-poor growth sometimes is” 
(Bakker & Messerli, 2016, p. 3). 
The advent of the pro-poor tourism movement put pressure on governments to create the policy 
environment that would encourage local businesses that place emphasis on authentic cultural 
products and experiences, to enter the industry.  In South Africa a conceptual shift took place in 
tourism after 1994 with the adoption of an approach that positioned neglected communities at the 
forefront of economic opportunities associated with tourism. The new government enthusiastically 
adopted the pro-poor philosophy which purported to encourage township and heritage tourism, 
adventure tourism, food tourism and handicrafts with the intention that benefits from these might 
extend beyond existing markets to poor communities (Rogerson, 2002; Visser & Rogerson, 2004). 
Tourism niches began to develop in accordance this philosophy, for example ‘dark tourism’ related 
to the history of punishment and incarceration, echoing Alcatraz in the USA and marketed around 
Robben Island (Strange & Kempa, 2003).  
 
Ecotourism strategies in other developing countries such as Kenya pointed to lessons for South 
Africa in how tourism could become part of redressing the apartheid past. One example was the 
effectiveness of Community Based Enterprises (CBEs) that told a tale familiar to rural South 
Africans. The fundamentals of the approach were that the ownership of the tourist enterprise rests 
in a Community Trust managed by a board. The enterprise is run by the members and dividends 
distributed according to a Trust agreement. 
 
Research found that the establishment of protected areas by colonial powers under the guise of 
protecting wildlife had so severely disadvantaged indigenous people that “the incidence of poverty 
is comparatively greater where tourist activity is highest” (Manyara & Jones, 2007, p 629). The 
reason for this is that the establishment of protected areas not only dispossessed people of their 
land, it also affected their ability to make a living. For example, the ban on hunting and on the sale 
of wildlife products in the 1970s eliminated industry-related jobs such as guiding, porting and 
skinning. Communities came to resent protected areas as wild animals destroyed crops and 
livestock in their search for food and water. The authors conclude that the effectiveness of CBEs 
should be measured based on three outcomes. Firstly, that income is increased at the household 
level, secondly, that community services such as infrastructure, education and health are improved 
and thirdly, that beneficiaries have a diversity of livelihood options and are not totally dependent 
on tourism (Manyara & Jones, 2007; Honey, 1999).  
Another noteworthy example of pro-poor tourism is the Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. CAMPFIRE represents an 
alternative view to the preservationist philosophy of traditional conservation by placing economic 
value on wildlife. The programme started in 1989 out of the disenfranchisement of indigenous 
people from their land in order for the Zimbabwean government to create protected areas that 
subsequeently alienated them from the productive capacity of the land (Child, 1993; Taylor,  2009). 
Proactive legislation allowed the sale of wildlife by the game ranching industry to hunters and 
tourists. In making wildlife a tradable commodity it also made the protection of game a greater 
imperative for farmers thereby enhancing the conservation of wildlife species. Between 1989 and 
2006 income from CAMPFIRE totalled nearly USD$30million of which 52% went into 
community beneficiation. In their study of community perceptions in communities around Hwange 
National Park in Zimbabwe, Tichaawa and Mhlanga (2015) found that the highest perception score 
was for the delivery of infrastructure advancement, for example for schools and clinics, while the 
lowest perception score was for economic beneficiation of the community. 
2.3.5. Value Chain Analysis 
South Africa’s contribution to tourism theory and tourism policy development grew as it pursued 
its objective to transform the industry through the creation of economic opportunities for local 
people and through the prescripts of B-BBEE related to black shareholding, enterprise 
development and skills transfer. The growing body of domestic case studies employing the pro-
poor approach began to spread and to create new thinking about the empowerment of lower-level 
tourism businesses. 
Rogerson (2005) argues that, with tourism being identified as a priority sector for economic growth 
and its expectations for transformation and job creation (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004), 
tourism deserves its own academic focus. There ought to be a particular focus on tourism SMMEs 
given that they form the entry point for job creation and are often the stimulus sites for innovation. 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 2004) highlighted its concern that the SMME sector 
tends to be debated in a sectorially undifferentiated manner with the tendency to see it as an 
homogenous group of entrepreneurs who compete equally for custom (Rogerson, 2005). 
Over the years researchers and industry players have sought to unpack the competitive value of 
SMMEs in the sector, particularly in developing countries where local communities often derive 
their livelihoods from natural and cultural resources and experiences. The value chain framework 
raises important issues about the role of government and state support programmes in assisting 
SMMEs to integrate into industry sectors (Acheampong & Tichaawa, 2015; Rogerson, 2008). The 
B-BBEE scorecard was intended as the mechanism by which local producers and suppliers would 
be brought into government procurement systems and local supply chains. SANParks has four 
mechanisms to deliver on this obligation :  
• The PPP process 
• SCM procurement 
• Socio Economic Transformation projects 
• Expanded Public Works Projects  
Within the context of the competitive value of SMMEs, SANParks has to counter the impression 
that its concessions are too expensive, that their products are aimed at the rich and that they exclude 
small business and the poor from the value chain. Concession owners are often accused of 
procuring goods from recognised suppliers rather than from local manufacturers and of employing 
management from outside the area.  There is also the concern that where there is beneficiation it 
remains at wage level rather than in ownership or shareholding (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 
2012). 
 
2.3.6. Red Tape and regulatory constraints  
In their 2006 report SBP estimated that regulatory compliance at the time was costing South 
African business approximately R79 billion (SBP, 2006), of which the cost of tourism compliance 
was disproportionately higher than than that of other sectors. This they ascribed to the diversity of 
enterprises, services and products in tourism, all of which have specific compliance demands with 
various regulators. The diversity in tourism often means that multiple levels of certification and 
authorisation across government departments are required.  In relation to this requirement, the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) identified “excessive or unnecessary” regulations 
imposed by national, provincial and local authorities as a constraint on the growth of firms in the 
tourism industry (DTI, 2006, p. 15). Rankin’s 2006 study that examined the impact of government 
regulation on SMMEs found that the Department of Labour, the DTI and local authorities had the 
most cumbersome procedures (Rankin, 2006). The author concluded that internal administrative 
barriers would be one of the simplest places to start in order to support the sector as responses 
indicated strongly that it was the time and administrative burden, and not the monetary costs, that 
SMME’s found most restrictive. (SBP 2006). 
 
2.3.7. Conclusion  
Tourism in developing economies has become the employment lifeline for many in a sector where 
entry-level jobs do not require extensive training or high levels of formal education. The post-
apartheid government took a while to appreciate the opportunity that tourism presented being that 
the economy was previously structured around extractive minerals and agriculture (Koelble 2004; 
Handley and Mills, 1996). The sector it inherited was dominated by white enterprises servicing a 
white clientele centred around nature-based and resort tourism. Tourism as a potential engine of 
growth, and the pro-poor tourism movement in particular, appealed to the developmental 
objectives of government as it presented opportunities to reach urban and rural communities and 
to open up the tourism sector value-chain to black businesses. The B-BBEE scorecard was intended 
to serve as the mechanism to facilitate this integration into the value chain. However, assessments 
indicate that targets for the transformation of the sector to advance the development of black 
business have not been achieved and the sector remains dominated by a limited number of largely 
white-owned businesses (NDT, 2018).  
 
2.4. The Small, Medium and Micro-Sized Enterprise Sector in South Africa  
“During the apartheid era, black ownership of SMMEs in townships was 
prohibited and black entrepreneurs faced prosecution for engaging in SMME 
activities (Department of Trade and Industry, 2008, p. 26).” (Mtshali, 2017). 
2.4.1. Introduction 
The Bureau for Economic Research (BER) 2016 Report on the SMME sector confirmed much of 
what we know about the challenges that SMMEs face that affect their sustainability. A few of these 
challenges include restrictive access to credit because lenders are less inclined to finance startups 
than they are established enterprises and are more likely to finance enterprises in urban than in 
rural areas. SMMEs struggle with securing support infrastructure for communications, utilities and 
transport. They experience low levels of research and development. Labour laws, designed to 
protect workers, are not flexible in response to economic downturns, and the country suffers from 
an historically inadequately educated workforce that increases training costs (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2014). Government bureaucracy and duplication across departments 
cause delays in obtaining permits and the registration of businesses while high levels of crime 
increase spending on security that increases the cost of insurance. SMMEs also suffer a lack of 
access to markets, where rural and entry-level businesses in particular have difficulty with 
penetration and struggle to coordinate as collectives in order to increase their bargaining power 
(BER, 2016, p. 11). 
 
SBP (2009) found that compliance costs that include tax and labour registration, municipal licences 
and regulations, Theta and B-BBEE, constituted on average 8,3% of the turnover for business that 
have an annual turnover of less than R1m. Besides the financial impact on their profitability, 
ensuring timeous compliance so that they avoid penalties, requires time, resources and skill. Where 
large firms employ specialists to do this, in small firms it is often the responsibility of the owner, 
taking them away from their more productive managerial and leadership obligations. (SBP, 2009). 
2.4.2. Informal vs Formal sector  
“… there was simply no existing public small, medium and microenterprise 
support infrastructure for the country” (Bloch & Daze, 2000 in Rogerson, 2015, 
p 769). 
 
The Small Business Development Agency (SEDA, 2018) reported that there were around 
2,4million SMMEs in South Africa, of which 700 000  are formal SMMEs and 1.7m were informal.  
This represented a decline in the number of formal SMMEs of 9.2.% and an increase of 3.4% in 
informal SMMEs between Quarter 1 2017 and Quarter 1 2018. The number of jobs provided by 
the SMME sector declined by 15.9% for the same period. In 2016 the Bureau for Economic 
Research was commisioned by SEDA to evaluate the SMME landscape in South Africa and 
concluded: 
 
“ there is a significant distinction between the formal and informal sectors. The formal sector tends 
to be more educated, white, situated in Gauteng and the Western Cape, with a higher income 
generation. However, most SMMEs are black owned and operate in the informal sector, especially 
in the more rural provinces. The informal sector is what the GEM defined as ‘necessity-driven 
entrepreneurship’ and the DTI defined as ‘opportunity entrepreneurship’ (BER 2016, p 10).  
 
Statistics South Africa defines informal sector businesses as those businesses that are not 
registered, are generally small in nature and are seldom run from business premises (StatsSA, 
2000). Statistics on the informal sector are understandably unreliable as the often survivalist nature 
of the activity result in sudden changes in figures as the fortunes of individuals change. Before 
1994 information on the informal sector was skewed as the figures excluded South Africans living 
in the homelands (StatsSA, 2000). Apartheid policies, enforced through the restriction of trading 
permits and confiscation of goods, served to keep informal traders out of white areas. Until the 
early 1980s, urban traders in particular, were subject to “a well-entrenched tradition of repression, 
persecution and prosecution” (Rogerson & Hart 1989 cited in Horber, 2017 p. 12). The under-
servicing by the apartheid government of black rural and township areas with formal retail facilities 
such as shopping malls and transport infrastructure created the opportunity for spontaneous and 
largely unregulated entrepreneurial development. The result of this can be seen today in the 
ubiquitous spaza shops, shebeens, tuck shops and street vendors that trade in transport hubs, malls, 
walkways, tourist hubs and city centres (Didier et al., 2013).  
 
The reality for South African informal traders is summed up by Cichello et al. (2006), whose 
research into the informal sector in Khayelitsha, Cape Town revealed that the barriers to entry into 
the informal economy include: 
 “ crime, the risk of business failure, poor access to credit, a lack of access to 
start-up capital, high transport costs and jealousy that successful informal 
entrepreneurs face in the local community.” (Cichello et al., cited in Velodia 
(2007), p. 12) 
 
A universal concern related to the informal sector is the perceived inability of businesses to 
transition from the informal to the formal economy (Acheaompong & Tichaawa, 2015). This is a 
reality for SMMEs who do not fall into the small percentage of those who have access to the capital 
required to exploit growth opportunities. For survivalist businesses the informal sector is often 
their only option due to the fact that many entrepreneurs are limited by the high costs of ‘formality’ 
(De Soto, 1986; Woodward et al., 2011). De Soto (1986) placed the responsibility on government 
to find ways to incentivize the informal sector to enter into and become integrated in, the formal 
economy so that they could comply with standards and pay their dues. It may however be that 
survivalists are operating at a level where all options to access formal employment or to develop 
as formal entrepreneurs, are closed (Velodia, 2007).  Altman (2007) suggests that, for those trying 
to evade legislation, the regulatory net should be tightened and incentives created. He argued that 
if one accepts that the informal sector is predominantly survivalist, policy should focus on creating 
the support to enable the “accumulation of assets, skills and productivity” (Altman, 2007:7, in 
Velodia 2007, p.187). 
 
2.4.3. Government strategy for small business   
A new framework for the development of SMMEs was defined in the ‘White Paper on National 
Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business in South Africa’ in 1995. This 
policy document signified a major shift in the orientation towards SMMEs from the apartheid era 
that had legislatively disempowered black business (Rogerson, 2015). It set as a primary objective 
that the patterns of economic ownership be redressed and that small business be introduced into 
the economy as equal partners in all economic sectors (DTI, 1996). The White Paper specifically 
established two national support institutions, the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency and Khula 
Enterprise Finance to aid the development of SMMEs. Government introduced new initiatives to 
streamline the support to small business, introducing the Ministry of Small Business in 2014, along 
with its implementation arm the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) and collapsing 
finance support agencies such as Khula into the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA). It also 
introduced the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) and the National Empowerment 
fund (NEF), all with the aim of facilitating and promoting small business (Bureau for Economic 
Research, 2016).  
 
The DSBD has as its vision “a radically transformed economy through the effective development 
and increased participation of SMMEs and cooperatives in the mainstream economy” (DBSA 
2016/17 annual report, p. 22). As a new Ministry, the DSBD has been in a period of consolidation 
having been established in 2014 and for the most part operating without its own budget under the 
DTI. The first year that it operated independently was 2016. The Ministry has two agencies, the 
Small Enterprise Finance Agency and the Small Enterprise Development Agency. The two 
agencies function as the DSBD’S implementing arms. With the far-reaching goal of the NDP being 
to create 11 million jobs by 2030, of which 90% will be through small business, the department’s 
mandate is extensive and challenging.  
 
In her presentation to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG, 2017), Minister Lindiwe Zulu 
indicated that 90 % of the DSBD’s budget goes to the two agencies. In 2017 SEDA received R769 
million and SEFA R228 million. It is reasonable to ask what impact this spend has had on the 
expansion of the sector, considering how poorly the country has done in achieving its development 
targets. In 2008 the New Growth Path set out to create five million jobs and reduce the country’s 
unemployment level from 25% to 15% over ten years. Today unemployment sits at 27% and this 
figure is increasing. The Director General of the DSBD, Edith Vries, emphasised the department’s 
aim toward “easing regulatory burdens and support mechanisms which include : strengthening 
partnerships with stakeholders, access to finance, improving training and capacity building 
programmes, market access, and simplifying business registration processes”. (PMG, 2016, p.3). 
She tellingly noted that the provision of support to small business is a crowded and contested space, 
with departments and corporates making substantial investments but often duplicating and diluting 
each other’s efforts. The department therefore has the difficulty of coordinating various 
departments who all set their own priorities and targets. As part of its strategy the DSBD has 
rationalized its offerings by creating a single point of entry that links the DSBD, SEFA and SEDA 
functions into a one-stop service and strengthening the interaction between the multiple arms of 
government that operate in this space in order to be able to offer a comprehensive developmental 
service to small business. The DSBD acknowledged that the government’s red tape is constraining 
and that the current regulatory environment discourages investment and impedes innovation and 
job creation (PMG, 2016).  As an illustration of this the DSBD highlighted the fact that in other 
African countries, while it takes 4, 13 and 25 days respectively to register a business in Rwanda, 




2.4.4. Entrepreneurial ecosystem  
The entrepreneurial ecosystem is a conceptual approach to understanding what is essential for 
entrepreneurs to succeed. Cavallo et al. (2017) point out that to date the literature on 
entrepreneurship has tended to focus on the individual or on the firm,  rather than on the holistic 
and multi-faceted context within which multiple players have interrelated functions, duties and 
responsibilities that need to be synchronised. The authors believe that entrepreneurial activity has 
till recently not been analysed from a systemic and interdisciplinary perspective. However, there 
is a growing momentum among researchers who argue that the culture of an organisation can have 
a significant impact on the nature, quality and sustainability of entrepreneurship (Acs et al.,  2014; 
Quin et al., 2012; Stam & Spigel, 2016; Feld, 2012; Spigel, 2017; Mack & Qian, 2016).   
Isenberg (2011, p, 13), who is considered one of the pioneers in entrepreneurial ecosystems, argues 
that leaders and policy makers who want entrepreneurs to succeed need to create a “virtuous cycle 
of entrepreneurship” made up of “an independent team with the training, power, mandate, capacity 
and resources to holistically impact the ecosystem” (p.13). He asserts that, while entrepreneurial 
success can develop naturally, as evidenced by the growth of small business as in, for example, 
China and Chile, we know enough about what entrepreneurs in reality need to be successful, to 
leave it to chance (Isenberg, 2011). Isenberg (2011) defines the entrepreneurial ecosystem as 
consisting of thirteen factors aggregated into six themes (Figure 2), namely, “a conducive culture, 
enabling policies and leadership, availability of finance, quality human capital, venture-friendly 
markets and institutional and infrastructural support” (2011, p. 1).   
 
Figure 2. Isenberg’s model of an entrepreneurship ecosystem (Source: Isenberg 2011)  
The World Economic Forum (WEF) identified Eight Pillars in the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem as 
shown in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3 : World Economic Forum 8 pillars of entrepreneurial ecosystems (WEF- 2014)  
These two descriptions of the interrelated factors in an entrepreneurial ecosystem do not differ 
substantially: the WEF’s  eight pillars can be found within the Isenberg model. The model provides 
a useful frame of reference for an analysis of the ecosystem identified in the case studies used in 
this research study. 
Isenberg (2011) formulated the entrepreneurial ecosystem model based on the complex links 
between the various elements that need to interact in order to create an environment for the 
sustainability of an enterprise. The entrepreneurial ecosystem is the entrepreneur’s perception of 
the world in which their business is attempting to succeed and it is this perception that influences 
the decisions they make (Isenberg, 2011). The elements of the ecosystem are not presented as 
having causal links as their impacts and dependencies on each other are complex and intrinsically 
linked. There are sufficient heuristics, however, to conclude that the elements are mutually 
dependent and mutually reinforcing. While their components are generic, entrepreneurial 
ecosystems are unique to the particular socio-political environment in which the enterprise is 
situated and cannot be copied or replicated.  The case study approach of this study combines the 
entrepreneur’s perception of the ecosystem together with the perceptions of the policy maker and 
the implementer that allows a holistic picture to be drawn.  
 
2.4.5. Conclusion  
Internationally, the importance of investing in the SMME sector in developing countries supports 
the South African strategy as set out in the National Development Plan (2011) and DTI (1996).  
 
Hussain, Farooq and Akhtar (2012) estimate that in Bangladesh SMMEs contribute 50% of 
industrial GDP and provide employment to 82% of the industrial sector. In Nepal SMMEs 
constitute more than 98% of all enterprises and in India, where the growth rate averages 6%, the 
contribution of SMMEs to GDP is 30%. (p.1582). However, SMMEs in developing countries share 
the same constraints as those in South Africa, namely, their poor access to markets, information, 
finance and institutional support with particular vulnerability in the form of human resource 
capacity and technological capability (Mead & Lindholm, 1998 in Hussain et al., 2012). The 
authors go on to make the case for Public Private Partnerships as a means to develop and ensure 
sustainability for SMMEs through mentorship relationships, where the established business buffers 
the resource deficiencies of the emerging business. Their definition of PPPs as “an approach to 
addressing SMME growth problems through the combined efforts of public, private and 
development organizations” shifts the emphasis to one of empowerment that is not evident in the 
South African Treasury definition (Hussain et al., 2012, p.1584).  
 
Empowerment and transformation are two elements that recur throughout the research findings, 
that combine to suggest a common national concern that, while tourism PPPs have the potential to 
be powerful agents of change,  to date they have not delivered adequately.    
 
2.5. How the Toolkit Works.  
 
2.5.1. Introduction  
 
The cornerstone of South Africa’s procurement system can be found in Section 217 of the 
Constitution of 1996 that states that when government contracts for goods and services it must do 
so in a way that is “fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective” (p.112). Together 
with the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA) that decentralised the management of funds to authorities and accounting officers, the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 gave effect to Section 217(3) of the 
Constitution by providing a framework for the implementation of a fair public preferential 
procurement policy. Public sector supply chain management is meant to empower managers to 
make decisions efficiently while preferential procurement must provide for the advancement of 
persons, or categories of persons, who are disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Apartheid 
government procurement favoured big white-owned businesses and deliberately kept black 
business out of government’s supply chain. Given constitutional status in section 217, procurement 
became a means to empower large and small black businesses (Bolton, 2006). 
 
Transformation was required to nurture the organic growth of black-owned and emerging 
businesses (Taylor & Raga, 2006). The authors argue that the primary aim of the South African 
government's procurement policy was to redress past imbalances by favouring historically 
disadvantaged people in the awarding of state tenders and that the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act 5 of 2000 was a critical element of the public sector procurement reform initiative. 
However, this redress objective created opportunity for widespread fraud and corruption, as 
suggested by the Auditor General Kimi Makwetu’s 2019 report of R62 billion rands of irregular 
government spending, up from R51 billion the previous year. The figure is not necessarily clear 
evidence of corruption but rather an indication that supply chain procurement prescripts were 
broken (AGSA, 2019).  Koelble (2017) explains this as a consequence of the culture of largesse 
cultivated by the governing party, on the one hand holding the keys to public sector employment 
and on the other hand, holding the social welfare benefits to the poor. This reality dissuades a large 
portion of the population from defection to other political parties. It is therefore in the spirit of 
caution that the precept of easing the audit trail in revisiting the PPP Toolkit be considered in light 
of the fact that the South African economy struggles with the consequence of two decades of 
plundering by politicians and officials. In this context, the PPP Toolkit was designed with multiple 
safeguards in place to avoid the manipulation of the process and the corrupt awarding of lucrative 
contracts to both the public and the private sectors.  
2.5.2. The Public Sector regulatory environment  
More than 80 different legal instruments govern public sector supply chain 
management (SCM).  These include: 
 
The Constitution: Section 217 governs the basic constitutional requirements of public procurement, 
Section 33 governs the requirements for constitutionally valid administrative action and Section 
195 governs the constitutional values for the country’s public administration.  
 
Other relevant acts with respect to the Toolkit include : 
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA);  
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 (PPPFA);  
Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (BBBEEA) 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (Corruption Act)  
 
2.5.3. Overview of the Tourism Toolkit 
 
“Through PPPs, the advantages of the private sector, such as dynamism, access to 
finance, knowledge of technologies, managerial efficiency and entrepreneurial spirit, are 
combined with the social responsibility, network of contacts, environmental awareness, 
local knowledge and job generation concerns of the public sector”. (Hussain et al., 2012, 
p. 4). 
 
Some typical ecotourism PPP products would include accommodation in the form of restcamps 
and lodges, conference facilities, facilities for food and beverages in the form of shops or 
restaurants, recreational and adventure activities that could include guided hikes, canoeing, horse-
riding, ziplines, and the hosting of heritage and culture tours. The Toolkit allows for exemptions 
from National Treasury approval processes if the implementer has the institutional capacity and 
experience. Exemptions can be granted to institutions at National Treasury Approval Phases 1 and 
2, but not Treasury Approval Phase 3 (see below 2.5.3.3 Six phases of the PPP Process). Exemption 
has been granted to SANParks but the same Treasury approval requirements apply, with the 
Treasury PPP Unit guiding the process. In instances where an institution performs functions 
through co-management agreements on communal land, the Toolkit allows a co-management 
agreement that aligns with a community-private party agreement.  
 
2.5.3.1. Definition of a PPP 
A Public Private Partnership is defined as:  
a) A contract between a government institution and a private party, where the private party 
performs an institutional function and/or uses state property in terms of output specifications,   
b) Substantial project risk (financial, technical, operational) is transferred to the private party,  
c) The private party benefits through either unitary payments from the government budget 
and/or user fees. 
 
2.5.3.2. The three tests for a PPP 
Treasury regulation 16 to the PFMA establishes three key tests for a PPP :  
 Is it affordable? Where affordibility ‘means that the financial commitments to be incurred 
by an institution in terms of the PPP agreement can be met by funds – 
(a) designated within the institution’s existing budget for the institutional function to 
which the agreement relates; and/or 
(b) destined for the institution in accordance with the relevant treasury’s future 
budgetary projections for the institution;  
 Does it provide value for money? Where ‘value for money’ means that the provision of the 
institutional function or the use of state property by a private party in terms of the PPP 
agreement results in a net benefit to the institution defined in terms of cost, price, quality, 
quantity, risk transfer or a combination thereof.  
 Does it appropriately transfer risk from the institution to the private party? Where ‘risk’ 
means the private party assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risks in 
connection with the performance of the institutional function and/or use of state property.  
 
2.5.3.3. Six phases of the PPP Process 
The PPP process consists of 6 phases as depicted in Figure 4: PPP Project Cycle  
Phase 1 - Inception and Pre-feasibility  
Phase 2 - Feasibility  
Phase 3 - Procurement – (note: the entrepreneur enters at the procurement phase).  
Phase 4 - Development 
Phase 5 - Operation  
Phase 6 - Exit 
 
Figure 4 : PPP Project Cycle (Treasury Regulation 16 to PFMA) 
 
Figure 5 : PPP Project Cycle for Toursm PPP’s 
2.5.3.4. The Toolkit Bid Submission Process.  
Two envelopes are submitted : 
Envelope 1 contains the functionality requirements: 
 Financial Information 
 A Business and Operational plan 
 A Development and Environmental proposal 
 A Risk Matrix 
 A B-BBEE proposal 
Envelope 2 contains the financial offer : 
 the PPP fee offer  
 the draft PPP agreement 
2.5.3.5.The Assessment Process 
The Toolkit has 3 assessment parts to it : i. Functionality, ii. Financial offer and iii. B-BBEE 
rating. In the assessment these are weighted as 70 points, 20 points and 10 points 
respectively.   
i. Functionality requirements – the implementer determines the threshold for 
qualification on functionality (often above 65%) that will allow the bidder to go through 
to the next round. It is at this stage that many entry level and emerging entrepreneurs 
are disqualified from the process. The Functionality assessment is made up of four 
plans: a business, financial, operational and risk management plan, each including 
relevant questions and/or requiring relevant information on which to base the 
assessment: 
o Business plan (35 points), posing the following questions 
 what is the current legal status of the entity? 
 what is its industry experience and track record ?  
 what is the extent of its commercial knowledge of this sector?   
o Financial plan (15 points) 
 is the cash flow model viable? 
 does the bidder have adequate finance? 
 are all members solvent? 
o Operational plan (40 points) 
 environmental plan 
 marketing plan 
 health and safety plan 




 Operational  
 
ii. The financial offer  - The annual concession fee payable by the private party for any 
given concession year is the higher of a minimum rental as determined by the 
agreement for the concession year, or a calculated annual concession fee based on the 
bid percentage of gross revenue for the concession year. These can range widely 
depending on when the contract was signed and the prevailing economic conditions at 
the time.  
 
iii. B-BBEE Company Recognition Levels 
In 2003 the Department of Trade and Industry published the B-BBEE Strategy 
outlining government’s measurement of B-BBEE together with the policy instruments 
to achieve transformation. In the same year, the B-BBEE Act No. 53 of 2003 was 
promulgated that empowered the Minister of Trade and Industry to issue the Generic 
Codes of Good Practice and to publish Sector Charters. In 2005 the Tourism B-BBEE 
Charter was published that committed all the stakeholders in the Tourism Sector to the 
empowerment and transformation of the sector and to work collectively to ensure that 
the opportunities and benefits of the tourism sector are extended to black people 
(National Department of Tourism, 2015). In 2009, the Tourism B-BBEE Sector Code 
was published that set out the principles upon which B-BBEE would be implemented 
in the tourism sector.  The code was amended in 2015 to align with the Amended 
Generic Codes of Good Practice issued by the Minister of Trade and Industry in 
October 2013. The Code is binding on all enterprises operating in the tourism sector 
who are legally obliged to report on their B-BBEE performance annually to the 
Tourism B-BBEE Charter Council. 
There are five B-BBEE categories specified by the DTI measurement strategy for 
purposes of assessment: 1. Ownership; 2. Management Control; 3. Skills 
Development; 4. Enterprise and Supplier Development; and 5. Socio-Economic 
Development.  
The Priority elements :  
 Ownership: The sub-minimum requirement for this category is 40% of Net 
Value (40% of 8 points). 
 Skills development: The sub-minimum requirement for this category is 40% 
of the total weighting points  
 Enterprise and Supplier Development (ESD): The sub-minimum requirement 
for this is 40% of the total weighting points of each of the three measuring 
categories within the ESD element (Preferential Procurement, Supplier 
Development and Enterprise Development). 
Based on the overall performance of the measured entity during verification, using either the Large 
Enterprise Scorecard or the Qualifying Small Enterprise Scorecard, the measured entity will 
receive one of the following B-BBEE statuses with the corresponding B-BBEE Recognition Level 
from a DTI accrediting agency: 
 








Level One Contributor  135% 
Level Two Contributor  but <100 points on the 
Scorecard 
125% 
Level Three Contributor  but <95 points on the 
Scorecard 
110% 
Level Four Contributor  but <90 points on the 
Scorecard 
100% 
Level Five Contributor  but <80 points on the 
Scorecard 
80% 
Level Six Contributor  but <75 points on the 
Scorecard 
60% 
Level Seven Contributor  but <70 points on the 
Scorecard 
50% 
Level Eight Contributor  but <55 points on the 
Scorecard 
10% 
Non-Compliant Contributor <40 points on the Scorecard 0% 
 
 
Figure 6 : Generic PPP Project Cycle. 
Note : A reasonable timeframe for the entire project cycle is considered by Treasury to be 
eighteen months.   
 
2.6. Literature review conclusion 
The research objective was to examine the Tourism PPP Toolkit’s current and potential ability to 
create economic benefits for small businesses surrounding or adjacent to national parks. A 
founding proposition of the research was that the neoliberal macroeconomic framework GEAR, 
under which the Toolkit was formulated, does not support the developmental needs and socio-
political realities of South Africa today. The literature review garnered an understanding of the 
history of four key roleplayers that need to combine for the Toolkit to succeed. These are the 
Government, South African National Parks, the Tourism sector and Small business. The review 
took a political economy approach in support of the belief that economics cannot disconnect from 
politics and that economic policy and societal outcomes are ultimately the result of vying political 
forces (Kapstein, 1996). The interdependency of the four roleplayers can be inelegantly described 
as tourism having the economic reach, SANParks the geographic reach, business the 
transformation reach and government the policy reach, when the Toolkit is functioning optimally.  
South Africa’s desperate economic situation requires that the four entities coordinate closely to 
tackle the country’s triple constraints of poverty, unemployment and inequality. The review 
described  the decline of the country’s economy over the larger part of a decade. With the World 
Bank having recently revised its forecasted GDP growth rate downwards from 1.5% to 0.9% for 
2020 (Daily Maverick, 10 Jan 2020), the country is slipping further away from the 5.4% per annum 
set by the NDP to overcome the triple constraints. The literature review found that more than 70% 
of South Africans can be classified as poor. Unemployment figures estimate that 29% of 
employable adults are unemployed and 55% of youth are unable to find work. The Gini co-efficient 
worsened from 0.61 in 1994 to 0.63 in the World Bank’s last assessment in 2015 (World Bank, 
2015) indicating that the inequality gap has continued to grow. 
The review highlights the vertical and horizontal divisions in society and the complex nature of 
the racial, economic, cultural and political identities that are the legacy of apartheid. Common 
threads in these divisions that repeat throughout the literature include the dispossession of land, 
accumulation of generational wealth, impoverishment of skills and talent, hardening of racial 
identities, the bureaucratisation of institutions, the militarisation of the state, the oppression of 
women and the slow rate of transformation. This background provides the grounding to  
contextualise and interprete the research findings and from this, to make recommendations. The 
literature confirms the relevance of the study in its attempts to find ways to optimise an investment 
mechanism that government created for the purpose of stimulating economic growth and by 
assumption, impacting disadvantaged communities and narrowing the equality divide. With the 
country experiencing the effects of hollowed-out SOEs from state capture, entrenched corruption, 
policy uncertainty and increasing global competition, it is vital that where opportunities for 
economic growth exist they should be identified and optimised. The release of state assets in 
protected areas for investment by the public sector is one such opportunity.  
Chapter 3 - Research Methodology  
3.1. Research Approach  
SANParks is the most successful implementer of the Tourism Toolkit having awarded 50 
concessions since the inception of the Toolkit (Treasury Official interview, 2018). The 
organisation thus offers a rich source of first-hand experiences from officials and concessionaires 
on the workings and effectiveness of the Toolkit. 
 
The research was conducted using three small-cap concessions as case studies inside national parks 
managed by SANParks to gather primary data from the entrepreneurs. The research approach 
included face-to-face interviews with concession owners as well as with implementation and policy 
specialists from SANParks and National Treasury.  It also included the collection of quantitative 
data relating to the historical business performance of PPP’s in SANParks. The quantitative data 
was collected from SANParks documents, records and reports. Combined, these sources presented 
an inclusive picture of the effectiveness of the Toolkit that allowed the researcher to generalise the 
findings and to inform the research question. The researcher’s own history with the organisation, 
the Toolkit subject matter and personal relationship with the respondents were factored into the 
research process. The research approach was formulated on the need for a robust methodology that 
would reveal verifiable and credible data that could with confidence be interpreted as having 
universal meaning. (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 
An inductive research approach was used that allowed for non-linear methods of discovery and 
exploration of fresh iterations during the course of the data collection process, relative to what was 
being discovered (Gioia et al., 2012). The approach is contrary to the deterministic formula 
favoured by natural scientists that sets out to test existing theory and knowledge. This iterative 
approach included allowing flexibility in ‘elaborating or refocussing’ the research question to take 
into consideration redundancies in the early assumptions and for new insights to be incorporated 
into the data collection process as they arose. The approach leans on Maxwell’s (1993) interactive 
model of research design that “does not presuppose any particular order….or any necessary 
directionality of influence” and recognises that components may affect and be affected by one 
another (Maxwell, 1993, p. 215). The research approach thus combined qualitative and quantitative 
data that, when analysed within the context of the research problem, presented a cohesive 
conceptual structure. The case studies revealed the perceptions that entrepreneurs have of the 
ecosystem within which they operate and that frames their strategic business decision-making. The 
quantitative data presented the rand-value contributions made by small concessions to the Toolkit’s 
objective of generating revenue for conservation.  
The research examined the process of the establishment of the small-cap enterprises, how they 
entered the tender process, what mentoring and support they received, their sustainability and 
growth trajectories and the operational challenges they faced. Data was gathered from various 
quantitative data sources that included historical business performance statistics, meeting minutes, 
annual reports and email correspondence. These sources were complemented with qualitative data 
gathered from open-ended, face-to-face interviews with various stakeholders.  This process aligns 
with what Stake (1995) refers to as “‘propositional generalizations”, in which the researcher’s 
interpretations and claims are combined with the researcher’s personal experiences (1995, p. 86). 
This ‘mixed methods’ data collection process used Eisenhart’s 8-Step framework that guides how 
a researcher systematically manipulates raw data to reveal patterns and trends that may result in 
defining theory in a new and different way (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The qualitative data gathered is concluded to have adequately captured the narratives of the 
sampled research population seen to be ‘living’ the research problem. The researcher considered 
these data sets to have provided enough richness and authenticity to allow the researcher to 
formulate new thinking about the research problem. The collection of quantitative data is 
considered to have provided an additional level of legitimacy to what was revealed in the 
interviews and to have assisted in augmenting, if not completing, a holistic picture of both the case 
studies and of the research area. In addition, the combination of data types can be said to have 
allowed for triangulation of information and to have improved the rigour and validity of the 





3.2. Case Study Method 
Yin (1984) describes the case study research method as being of value for use in research “when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1984, p. 23). Case 
study research using an inductive approach is enhanced in reliability when multiple data collection 
methods are used (Eisenhart, 1989; Maxwell, 1993; Goia, 2012; Miles  & Huberman, 1994). A 
case study approach for this research, which combined personal interviews with the business 
owners and performance statistics of the businesses, was considered to enhance both the rigour and 
the validity of the research. The case study method was chosen as the Toolkit procurement process 
is almost entirely an administrative one that does not engage the entrepreneur until a ‘preferred 
bidder’ has been announced and contract negotiations begin. The researcher considers that the 
current study would have been incomplete had it been limited to the prescribed formulaic 
procurement process and neglected the insights, perceptions and recommendations of the 
entrepreneurs.  
 
The case studies revealed concessionaires’ personal insights into the Toolkit both pre-and-post 
award and exposed the actual, lived consequences of bureaucratic decisions taken by officials who 
may or may not properly or sensitively understand the market or the product. This perspective 
informed the researcher’s understanding and interpretation of the data and allowed for more 
insightful and responsive recommendations to be made. The interviews conducted with the 
concessionaires were personal and at times painful, but the process advanced the research beyond 
the Toolkit’s narrow quantitative success measures toward a nuanced and sensitive understanding 
of the functioning of the ecosystem from the concessionaire’s perspective. The concessionaire 
stories were reminders of how deeply entrepreneurs immerse themselves in their business and how  
demoralising it can be for them when their business fails. The case studies allowed an iterative 
approach to the investigation that in turn allowed the uncovering of layers of hidden knowledge 
that may not otherwise have been revealed. The researcher considered this method of enquiry to 
be appropriate in terms of providing an opportunity for the evolution of ideas, observations and 
interpretations without the restrictions of a pre-determined paradigm. This is based on the 
assumption that the three key players in the research (government, implementer and entrepreneur) 
each have their particular perspective of the Toolkit’s purpose, success measures and 
implementation methodology and on the expectation of needing to function collectively for the 
Toolkit to be successful.  
 
3.3. Research Context  
Each case study followed a different procurement process and had different developmental support 
structures. Each operated commercially inside National Parks in the Western Cape.  
Case Studies one and three were located in the West Coast National Park. Case Study 1 was a self-
catering restcamp that operated all year round with a 24 hour guest service. It was selected because 
it was the first Community-PPP that directly sought to appoint black concessionaires to establish 
a business entity and through government-secured funding, received mentoring support for five 
years.  Case Study 3 was a restaurant, chosen because the procurement followed a standard supply 
chain process that appointed the concessionaire on a year-to-year basis with developmental support 
provided by SANParks.  
The research site for Case Study 2, a restaurant,  was the Table Mountain National Park in Cape 
Town. This site was chosen because of a Toolkit process that proactively weighted black 
empowerment higher on the assessment criteria so as to advantage black applicants.  
The reasons these cases were chosen was because each case study showed itself to have been 
unconventional in terms of the procurement processes followed by SANParks. In each case 
innovations were introduced into these processes that provide insights into ways in which the 
Toolkit may be improved so that beneficiation may be advanced.  
3.4. Selection of Cases. 
 
Case studies should be chosen for their replicability so that emergent theory can be consistently 
extrapolated (Eisenhart, 1989). The three case studies were considered sufficiently similar in their 
social, political, economic, gender, sector and contractual profiles to limit extraneous variables and 
to allow for referenceable comparisons to be drawn across the emergent themes. Their generic 
economic and social profiles provided the researcher the confidence to make generalised 
deductions in the interpretation of data emerging from the interviews and of the performance data. 
The case studies were selected based on the following criteria:  
 They were small-cap PPP concessions that had been successfully awarded contracts 
in SANParks and had each followed different procurement and development support 
processes. The businesses were all owned and managed by women. Two of the three 
businesses were solely black-owned. 
 They were owned and managed by entry-level entrepreneurs with little or no 
previous business experience and who started with little or no historical information 
about their potential for market penetration, their product offering, operational 
requirements, resource requirements and infrastructure needs.  
 They were each physically accessible and the entrepreneurs were amenable to be 
interviewed. They were also willing to provide performance statistics and historical 
data about the establishment of their businesses   
3.5. Sampling within and across cases. 
 
The Tourism Toolkit has been utilised to considerable effect in SANParks since its inception. The 
Strategic Plan for Commercialisation (SPfC) was introduced in 2002 and the organisation has built 
up a significant body of knowledge and developed enviable institutional capacity to uniquely 
inform the research.  One senior official was on the original team that developed the Toolkit, while 
others who were interviewed had individually more than ten years’ experience implementing the 
Toolkit. One senior SANParks official had overseen concessionaire revenue management since the 
inception of the SPfC in 2002. The National Treasury representative was a senior official 
responsible for overseeing SANParks projects with more than ten years’ experience of the Toolkit.  
The provincial manager responsible for the Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Programme (SCLP) 
was responsible for the identification of all projects and for overseeing the provincial budget. The 
project manager for the development agency responsible for Case Study 1 remained an active 
mentor to the business unit for five years after the funding ended and moved on to become the 
CEO of a private university.  
All respondents were identified through personal and professional networks following targeted 
purposive as well as convenience sampling.  Each was contacted directly via email or telephone 
and the researcher travelled to where it was most convenient for the participant(s). None of the 
respondents refused an interview or requested questions beforehand. Interview locations were 
almost equally shared between Cape Town, Pretoria and Langebaan and took place between 25th 
of April, 2018 and 13th of May, 2019. 
 
3.6. Data Collection Process  
The research questions emerged out of exploratory research undertaken in 2017 for an estimated 
12 months prior to the first interview. This preliminary, exploratory research provided the 
researcher the opportunity to gather information about the topic from various sources that included 
academic literature, policy documents, reports, records and subject-matter experts. Questions were 
formulated that were intended to elicit responses that were relevant and useful in answering the 
research question (Sreejesh et al., 2014).  Unrecorded pilot interviews were done with randomly 
selected representatives of the target groups. These interviewees included two SANParks officials 
and one concessionaire, both of whom were later included in the formal recorded interviews. The 
pilot interviews consisted of an expanded list of questions formulated from the preliminary 
research. These expanded questions were revised following the pilot interviews and the questions 
were crystallised and condensed to the most salient questions. These questions were  designed to 
progressively elicit, firstly, a baseline perspective from each stakeholder, then an interpretative 
perspective and finally a conceptual perspective of the Toolkit and the ecosystem players around 
it. Trellis (1996) emphasises this as a salient aspect of case studies, that in a multi-perspectival 
analysis the researcher considers not just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also of the 
groups of actors and the interactions between them. 
 
3.6. 1. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted with: 
3.6.1.(a) National Treasury PPP Unit – Subject expert from this unit, in the course of which 
the key questions included: 
 What is the purpose of the Toolkit? Has the purpose changed since it was 
developed?  
 What are the strategic goals of the Toolkit ? 
 What are the success measures ? 
 Have targets been met? If not, why not?  
 What problems or concerns are there about the Toolkit and from whom 
do these concerns originate? 
 If there are any problems and concerns, how, in your opinion, can these 
be resolved? 
3.6.1.(b)South African National Parks  - Subject experts in which the key 
questions included:  
 What, according to you, is the purpose of the toolkit? Has the purpose changed since 
it was developed? 
 What are the strategic goals of the toolkit?  
 How many concessions has SANParks released since its commercialisation strategy 
was approved in 2002? Have targets been met? If not, what in your view are the 
reasons? 
 Have financial targets been met? If not, why not? 
 Have transformation targets been met? If not, why not? 
 What is the ratio of large to small cap concessions awarded? 
 What is the default rate on concessions? What in your view are the reasons for 
defaulting?   
 In your experience and in your view, are there any difficulties in working 
with the Toolkit? If any, in your view, how can these be resolved? 
 
3.6.1.( c)Small-cap concession entrepreneurs in SANParks - Key questions included 
those generic to Treasury above (3.6.1.(a)) as well as the following additional 
questions: 
 How much time did your submission require and how much did it cost? 
 What developmental support did you receive from external sources?  
 What are your primary concerns, complaints and difficulties with the 
Toolkit? 
 Do you have any recommendations for improvements to the Toolkit? 
 
 
3.6.2. Case Study development of three small-cap concessions 
Three small-cap businesses that had been awarded PPP concessions in SANParks were analysed. 
Face-to-face interviews with the business owners were held and their PPP procurement paths 
detailed in order to understand the developmental journey experienced by entrepreneurs within the 
existing ecosystem.  
 
3.7. Data collection procedures 
The first person is used in this section to convey the personal nature of the interviews and the 
intimacy it often solicited.  
3.7.1. Interview protocol 
Face to face semi-structured interviews were conducted in person with each of the study 
respondents.  A total of 16 people were interviewed and were guided by the interview protocol. 
Each interview was recorded with prior permission from the respondent and handwritten notes 
were taken during the interview. Three interviews were conducted in Afrikaans and the remaining 
in English.  
 
All respondents were invited to participate in the interviews by email. The detailed research 
proposal was attached, setting out the purpose of the research. None of the respondents requested 
any questions beforehand and there were no rejections of the request for an interview. Interviews 
were semi-structured in that a series of guiding questions framed the discussion, but each interview 
was largely open-ended to allow for the probing of themes, opinions, ideas and recommendations 
as the interviewer and the respondent became more comfortable with each other and trust was 
developed. I probed where I felt they might be telling me what they thought I wanted to hear and 
where they appeared to be avoiding an issue that they considered might reflect badly on themselves 
or on a colleague.  I was conscious of and tried to avoid leading questions such as “Don’t you 
think…?” or “Perhaps…?”. Interviews were on average between 90 and 120mins in duration and 
started with me setting out the purpose and rationale for the study. The introduction served as a 
trust-establishment phase to put the participant at ease and reassure them about anonymity and 
research ethics. Because of my historical familiarity with the respondents, the interviews were 
generally conducted in a warm, non-threatening and non-confrontational atmosphere.  Interviews 
took place at the respondents’ convenience in their offices or at their businesses variously located 
in Langebaan, Cape Town, Pretoria and Knysna. The venue of one interview in a coffee shop in 
Cape Town along a busy street affected the quality of the recording and made transcribing difficult. 
Another had to be halted and continued the following day due to the respondent’s prior 
engagement. All interviews were one-on-one; there were no group interviews. The 16 individuals 
were interviewed over the course of 11 months. All respondents were asked their permission for 
recording the interview and recording took place on my iPhone 8.  However, I was unaware that a 
feature of the iPhone 8 is the automatic stopping of the recording when a call is received, even 
when the call is rejected. This resulted in two interviews being terminated prematurely and I had 
to capture the exchange from a combination of memory and the written notes.  (Interviews with 
Officials 6 and 8). 
Secondary data in the form of documents, reports, minutes, emails, financial reports and 
photographs were obtained from respondents in electronic or hard copy, either on the day or 
subsequently. In maintaining ethical research standards, I ensured that no confidential information 
was passed on to me that I would not be permitted to reference.  
3.7.2. Timeframe for interviews:  
The interviews took place between: 25 April 2018 and 13 May 2019.  
3.7.3. List of respondents interviewed 
The following respondents were interviewed for their specialist insights into the research question: 
 
Table 2 : List of interviewees  
Interviewee Institution 
/Title 
Reason why interviewed 
Official 1 National 
Treasury  
Responsible to Tourism PPPs and SANParks 
liaison   
Official 2 SANParks  Responsible for strategy, contract negotiations 
and implementation 
Official 3 SANParks Project officer responsible for Toolkit 
implementation  
Official 4 SANParks Project officer responsible for Toolkit 
implementation 
Official 5 SANParks Project officer for oversight of the three PPP 
case studies, providing the developmental 
support and monitoring performance of contract 
terms 
Official 6 SANParks Responsible for financial administration of 
contracts 
Official 7 SANParks Project officer responsible for Toolkit 
implementation  
Official 8 Provincial 
Government 
Responsible for oversight and reporting on case 
study 1 
Official 9 SANParks Responsible for strategy and oversight 
Concessionaire 1 
(case study 3) 
Business 
owner  
Owner/manager for 13 years 
Concessionaire 2 















(case study 2) 
Business 
owner 





Developmental agency contracted to provide 
mentoring support to new business entity 
Business partner 1 Business 
Partner  
Business partner to concessionaire 5 
 
3.7.4. Quantitative data collection  
A quantitative desktop analysis of the business performance of all Small and Large-Cap PPPs in 
SANParks was done by the researcher for the period starting from when the Commercialisation 
Programme was introduced in 2002. The research data sources included: 
 SANParks policy and strategy documents 
 Annual audited income statements 
 SANParks annual reports and tourism performance statistics 
 Tender invitations and bid specifications 
 Annual audited income statements 
 SANParks annual reports and tourism performance statistics 
 
The research sources were all non-confidential public documents acquired either from the 
research subjects themselves or from desktop research.  
3.8. Data analysis procedures. 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and captured in Microsoft Word. Coding of the data 
followed the Gioia (2012) method. This started with first–order coding, capturing the participant’s 
verbatim quotes and verbal expressions as far as possible. The second step filtered first order codes 
into second order themes and distilled them into aggregated groups of terms, verbal expressions, 
attitudes or convictions that represented common themes. Each interview was then hand coded to 
extract common ideas and phrases used by the respondent and plotted on an Excel spreadsheet. 
This process was repeated through eight iterations that continuously contracted ideas and phrases 
into key themes. The themes were further contracted to aggregate the primary issues raised by all 
respondents across all the interviews.  
 
In deciding what to highlight, extract and contract, I studied the spontaneity and authenticity of 
responses, the tone of voice used, the accuracy and detail of the information and whether a 
comment or statement could be cross-referenced with details elsewhere in interviews responses or 
in reports. I distinguished statements on three levels where firstly, what were clearly reflections of 
their professional leanings with particular reference to organistional strategy or legislative 
compliance. Secondly, statements that spoke to their personal belief systems, values and ethics, 
and thirdly statements that reflected popular opinions from common reportage and that may or may 
not be heresay. I was conscious of the respondents who were not English first language speakers 
using turns of phrases that may include slang or jargon to convey either the same or different 
meaning to those conveyed in English. I was alert to the possiblity of respondents padding their 
views with non-relevant information to fill uncomfortable spaces and I allowed this if there was a 
consistent train of thought that I thought could lead to something interesting.   
Coding Process  
The coding process aggregated the broad list of concepts that emerged from the first round of 
coding and sequentially redefined the responses using recurrent words and phrases to reveal 
patterns in the responses to the key research questions.  After eight iterations the coding yielded 
four emergent themes. These themes can be said to be the distillation of all responses from the 
three subject groups into a holistic understanding of the Toolkit as experienced and perceived by 
the respondents, respectively the policy makers, implementers and entrepreneurs. The themes are 
concluded by the researcher to be the valid sum of the respondents’ priorities, concerns and 
proffered solutions to the research question.  
3.9. Summary of Results 















What was the 
origin and 
policy 
intention of the 
toolkit ? 
 Generate Revenue 
 Alternative to normal Supply 
Chain  
 Drive B-BBEE 
 Improve the Tourism Product  
 Develop Institutional Capacity 















Has the policy 
intention 
changed ? If 
so, how 
 Big business to take greater risk  
 Set-asides for small business  
 Reduce government risk  
 B-BBEE Strategy and Enterprise 
Development targets  
 Ring-fencing PPP opportunities 
for small business  
 Organisational strategy 
 
The responsibility 
of big business in 










been met ? 
 More focused on tourism 
 Stimulate Innovation  
 Risk Management  
 Boost tourism industry and 
reassure investors  
 Develop Implementers’ capacity 
and systems 
 Big Business role in the 
development of small business 
 Implementers’ priority setting – 













of top ten 
concession 
life to date  








life to date   





entry to small 
business in the 
toolkit? 
 Bureaucratic processes and Over-
regulation  
 Entrepreneurs Investment  costs  
 Organisational Transformation 
 Organisational Capacity  
 Domination by big business 
  
E 
If there are 
barriers to 
entry, how can 
they be 
mitigated ? 
 Leadership  
 Transformation of the sector  
 Organisational Transformation  
 Developmental Support for small 
business 
Risk management 






3.10. Research Limitations  
The researcher recognises that the research has a number of limitations that need to be factored 
into the degree to which conclusions can be drawn to be able to make universal statements about 
the findings.  
Race, together with disempowerment and dispossession, is particularly laden with historical layers 
of privilege and entitlement in South Africa. Out of the five business owners who participated in 
the research, four were ‘coloured’ and one was white. There were no representatives of black 
Africans who may have contributed a different cultural and social dynamic to the understanding 
of the socio-economic context and how this context affects the ecosystem in which one functions. 
The geographic range of the case study sites was limited to within a 120km radius of Cape Town. 
The Western Cape Province in which Cape Town is situated has a very distinct socio-economic 
demographic due to the history of apartheid spatial planning, racialised social stratification and the 
province’s history of being designated as a coloured labour preference area in 1955 (Black Sash, 
1993). This designation  promoted the active reduction of African families in the province with 
their gradual replacement by coloureds. The 2011 census recorded that the majority race group in 
the province was what was and is, classified as ‘coloured’ at 42.4% of the province’s population, 
followed by black African at 38.6%. Thus it cannot reasonably be generalised that the case studies 
are representative of the rest of the country, as the research into the historical, cultural, language 
and religious differences between the black and coloured communities have exhaustively 
concluded. (Adhikari, 2005; February, 2019; Salo, 2018) 
The sample size of the three cases could be considered as unrepresentative on a national scale, 
given that there are 50 active concessions, of which at least 40 are considered small cap 
concessions. The sample is therefore 7.9% of the total small concessions and could be considered 
small. 
Two of the case studies are located in a peri-urban national park and one in major city. There are 
limitations in projecting findings to remote parks located in entirely rural settings, such as for 
example, the Kgalagadi, Mapungubwe, Namaqua and Tankwa-Karoo National Parks, where 
agriculture is the primary economic activity and access to resources, supplies and skills is 
expensive and unreliable. 
All the entrepreneurs in the case studies were women. It is therefore not known how male 
respondents may have affected the findings. It needs to be considered that male respondents may 
have behaved differently to challenging situations or may have been received differently by the 
staff with whom they engaged. 
While women entrepreneurs were strongly represented, there was possibly a lack of youth 
representation. Of the five respondents two were in their twenties, while the others were in their 
forties and fifties. Given the importance of developing the capacity of young people and their 
different approaches to challenges, their under representation might have influenced the findings 
and the generalisability of the findings. 
As a SANParks staff member with a personal investment over the years in each of the projects and 
having existing working relationship with colleagues, there is caution about researcher bias. The 
researcher knew each of the respondents intimately. While this provided generous access, the 
relationship might have created wariness on the part of respondents about revealing their frailties, 
or a fear of being too critical of the organisation or colleagues. On the positive side the familiarity 
put no restrictions on time, access, location, cost, or ethical constraints and in some instances, made 
it possible to bypass some of the trust-building stages associated with interviewing strangers. 
The researcher did not interview any large-cap concessions owners. The prominance of the theme 
of big business was an unanticipated finding and was revealed as a critical element of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. On reflection large-cap concessions are obvious role players to have 
been included in the research design. Because the role of big business emerged as a major theme 
their commenary would have added a valuable dimension to the findings.  
 
 
3.11. Researcher’s role and reflexivity  
Maxwell (1993) suggested that experiential knowledge has become a recognised asset to the 
research process.  Where previously it was considered important to eliminate researcher bias, this 
can now be consciously employed and be considered a valuable source of intrinsic information. 
Maxwell (1993) however cautions about this bias being a licence to impose insights and values 
that are subjective and uncritical. (p. 225).  Therefore, in the interests of transparency and adding 
to the validity of the findings, I engage a first person narrative and disclose the following personal 
history with the research topic, as well as with the case study subjects and the SANParks 
implementers. 
 
My experience with tourism PPPs started in 1998 when SANParks took over the responsibility for 
the management of the two major concessions in Cape Town, namely the Table Mountain Aerial 
Cableway Company and the Cape Point Partnership (Concor) concession. Both these concessions 
were concluded long before the PPP Toolkit was designed and prescribed and without the 
‘safeguards’ that the State has to receive its dues in terms of the quality, risk transfer and financial 
return from concessions. In both cases, SANParks pursued extensive legal and consultative process 
in the early 2000’s to negotiate revised terms so that the agreements matched the real value of the 
concession rather than the ‘sweetheart’ terms that had been agreed to many years earlier. At that 
time, the purpose of concessions was not always clear. PPPs were often entered into in order to 
transfer a problem rather than to achieve joint solutions between private and state entities.  The 
transparency and value for money objectives that would ensure benefit-flow to the fiscus were not 
factored in. In one of these renegotiations in 2004 SANParks was successful, in the other the 
shareholders were steadfast in retaining the substantially favourable benefits that they had been 
accruing over the years. This process was a lesson in how a contract weighted in favour of one 
party can disempower the other. Similar cases were conveyed to me during my interview with a 
participant from the Treasury,  frustrated by PPP agreements that the government inherited from 
the Bantustans, where one-hundred-year leases were granted to companies to run casinos and 
resorts without transparent processes having been followed or sound contractual agreements 
entered into. 
When I moved to the West Coast National Park in 2004, SANParks was in the midst of a financial 
crisis that had it battling to pay salaries. The new government’s reprioritisation of the budget to 
critical areas, such as social development and infrastructure, meant that the organisation had to 
find new ways to sustain itself.     
The two concessions in the West Coast National Park were initiated during my time as Park 
Manager 2003 to 2007. In reflecting on this history, I am able to recognise a number of potential 
researcher biases. There is a ‘founder’s’ ownership that may cloud objectivity in that, over the 
course of their development, I could ensure that there was ongoing hands-on organisational support 
provided to the fledgling businesses. A few years later, on assuming the regional manager position, 
the concessions remained my responsibility via the park managers who reported to me. All three 
of the case study tenders were released during my tenure as park or regional manager and I was 
both part of developing the bid specifications and a member of the adjudication panels. In all three 
case studies, I am therefore personally acquainted and historically connected with the 
concessionaires. The direct relationship ended in 2013 when my responsibilities became more 
national and I was less involved in the day to day welfare of these businesses.  
In interviews I was conscious of and knowledgeable about the power dynamics within and between 
concessionaires, the hierarchical dynamics with colleagues, both senior and junior to me, and of 
the institutional dynamics between SANParks and National Treasury. I was also conscious of 
steering interviews and responses away from themes or topics that were not relevant to my research 
as discussion sometimes strayed into gossip because of the overlap between friends, acquaintances 









Chapter 4 – Research Findings. 
 
4.1. Case Study Findings  
 
SANParks annually makes public performance figures on the concession programme. The analysis 
of those figures are illustrative of the substantial economic reach tourism public private 
partnerships has in South Africa through this single implementer. However, the quantitative data 
provides a breadth rather than a depth analysis (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). Case studies provide 
the kind of contextual analysis that can provide a wealth of insight into problem-solving analysis 
and strategy solutions. The case studies used in the current research provided this research with the 
perspectives of the beneficiaries on which the research question focuses.  The data collected from 
the case studies allowed the researcher to explore meanings and concepts that would not be 
available through statistical analysis. The qualitative and quantitative data compliment each other 
in this study in that they constitute a process that combines ideas and data to allow balanced 
conclusions to be drawn (Dey, 1993). The case studies bring to the surface the subtleties of the 
lived history, culture, ethics, political, race, gender and socio-economic status of the participating 
entrepreneurs, all of which enrich  the findings and define the reality of the Toolkit entrepreneurial 
ecosystem for small business.  
4.2. The procurement processes followed by the participants in the three case studies in 
relation to the PPP Toolkit   
Table 4. below sets out the procurement steps followed by the three case studies. What emerged 
was that the requirement for making a success of a project was based on shared vision and shared 
risk among the parties. The case studies indicate that SANParks, by virtue of its exclusive position 
in the tourism market, was in each case able to create a product, and by mentoring the small 







Table 4 - Procurement processes of each case study  
2005 – National Treasury introduced the Tourism Toolkit 
2006  -SANParks Strategic Plan for Commercialisation 
   Project Cycle CASE STUDY 1 CASE STUDY 3 CASE STUDY 2 
Phase I 
Inception Apply for project registration 2003 2003 2009 
Pre-
Feasibility 
Pre-feasibility study; motivation for 
small or large cap route; possible 
application for exemption from 
Treasury approvals 
No exemption required 
as this was before the 
toolkit came into effect  
No exemption 
required as this was 
before the toolkit 
came into effect  
Exemption applied for 



















as there was no existing 
tourism product  
Issue-based feasibility 
as there was a limited 
existing tourism 
product that was 
heavily subsidised 
financially by the park 
and supplemented by 
park  operations 
Issue- based as there 
was an existing product 
but had limited access to 
historical business 
performance against 









Project had no bid 
documents. The project 
objectives were 
developed by the 
support NGO, 
Provincial and National 
Government and 
SANParks and formally 






was followed that 
awarded a contract 
with annual renewals 
and limited risk 
transfer  
Bid documents 
completed as required 
including RFP and 




approval IIA  










The business plan 
submissions were 
evaluated and the 
individual applicants  




panel was established 
and did the 
assessment according 
to supply chain 
principles 
Done along with 
external specialists and 
revised bid specs after 












Approval IIB  
CASE STUDY 1 CASE STUDY 3 CASE STUDY 2 
Negotiation Negotiation 
Granted 5 year 
development period 
under NGO mentorship 
with nominal rental  
Granted 3 year 
development period at 
nominal rental  
Granted 5 year term 
extended by further 5 
years 














After 5 years in 
operation  
After 3 years in 
operation  





Measure outputs, monitor and 
regulate performance; liaise 
effectively; settle disputes 
Done by park and 
project officer 
Done by park and 
project officer 
Done by park and 
project officer 
Phase V Operations Report progress in annual report  Yes Yes yes 
Phase 
VI 
Exit  Scrutiny by the AG Yes Yes yes 
 
4.3. CASE STUDY 1 - Restcamp in West Coast National Park Sustainable Coastal 
Livelihoods Project: Community-based PPP. 
Owners : (numbered as per interview schedule) 
Concessionaire #2 : 51% 
Concessionaire #3  : 27% 
Concessionaire #4  : 23% 
Why this case study? 
 “the project was set up where Black Economic Empowerment and job 
creation was weighted higher than income’ (Official 5 – interview, 2018).  
 
The project was funded by the Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Programme and employed 
innovative approaches to stakeholder engagement, transparency, inclusiveness, consultation 
and empowerment not described in the Toolkit process. The case study details the procurement 
process for the appointment  of an operator for the restcamp as an alternate, and arguably more 
inclusive process to the PPP Toolkit process that, in the words of the NPO project manager, 
was a ‘flagship project, ahead of its time’ (Project Manager interview, 2018). 
Background  
It is part of the history of the establishment of National Parks in South Africa that thousands 
of local men and women were brought to the parks from farms or continued to stay on the land 
allocated to parks to work as rangers, general workers or service staff. Most were housed in 
staff villages of varying quality and standards. In  larger parks the staff accommodation 
replicated the mining compounds (basic single-sex accommodation for men sharing 
rudimentary ablution facilities), while in smaller parks, this accommodation was in the form 
of a collection of rudimentary houses. Shortly after 1994 SANParks made a policy decision to 
reduce the number of staff who lived in park accommodation in order to reduce the large 
numbers of staff who retired without owning their own homes. The new government 
highlighted the vulnerability of labourers on farms, mines, national parks, army bases, forest 
villages and elsewhere who, because they had lived as tenants, were homeless when they 
retired. Many remote national parks and forest villages had hundreds of staff who, together 
with their families, were totally dependent on state entities for their well-being when they left 
service. The adoption of the Established Security of Tenure Act in 1997 prompted staff to lay 
claim to the properties they had lived  in all their working lives. The SANParks policy decision 
was made to both address its moral obligations to staff as well as to reduce the financial and 
social risk of a proliferation of homesteads. Housing allowances were introduced into salary 
packages to encourage staff to buy their own homes. In the West Coast National Park the staff 
who had been living in the staff village chose to relocate to Langebaan about 20 km away. 
Thus it was that in 2003 there was an abandoned staff village set in the bush at the foot of the 
Geelbek dunes in the West Coast National Park, with eight derelict houses that had been vacant 
for about five years. The preferred management option at the time was to contract a demolition 
company to flatten the buildings and rehabilitate the area.  
The Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Framework  
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach analyses the external environment in which people 
function and identifies the prevailing social, institutional and organisational resources available 
in an area to combat poverty. The framework defines five types of capital within this 
environment : 
 Human capital is made up of the skills, knowledge, health and ability to work. 
 Social capital refers to the social resources that enable the people in an area or community 
to co-operate with one another and deal with differences. 
 Natural capital is the stock of natural resources that sustain life.  
 Physical capital includes basic infrastructure and production  











Fig. 7 : Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (source O. Serrat, 2017) 
 
The Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Fund (SCLF) was established by the Department of 
Environment and Tourism (DEAT) with funding from Department For International 
Development (DFID) in response to the worsening economic situation of coastal communities 
affected by the withdrawal of fishing rights and extraction restrictions on traditional forms of 
sustenance. The key principles of the SCLF programme were inclusivity, redress, 
transparency, development, sustainability, consultation, sound business practices, context 
sensitivity and partnerships. In March 2003 a Non-Profit Organisation (NPO) submitted a 
proposal in response to a tender from the Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Fund, Tender E 871: 
“Appointment of a company /organisation for creating livelihood opportunities for poor 
coastal communities from coastal protected areas”. The NPO had previously worked with 
coastal communities. Their tender was submitted on 28 March 2003 and passed on 11 June 
2004.  It was titled ‘Community-Based Tourism Infrastructure Development and Management 
Project in the West Coast National Park’. The eight vacant staff houses were identified as an 
opportunity to develop much-needed visitor accommodation in the park and to establish a 
viable business entity drawing on the disadvantaged community of Langebaan. The idea for 
the development of the staff village was raised by staff who had lived and raised families there. 
They felt that there was a piece of their history that had been abandoned, that it was more than 
a staff village and that there was in fact a social identity associated with it. 
 
 The park was proclaimed in 1985 and before its establishment the area had consisted of a 
collection of farms. The area was particularly known for the Langebaan Lagoon, the whaling 
station on Malgas Island and the Special Forces counter-insurgency elite unit training facility 
at Donkergat. Agriculture and fishing had historically provided the largest source of 
employment in the region, although largely seasonal and temporary. Tourism was identified 
by government post-apartheid as an opportunity to address the growing unemployment. This 
project also created an opportunity to bridge the divide between the National Park and the 
Langebaan community who had historically not benefitted from the park’s existence. The 
population of Saldanha and Langebaan grew between 1994 and 1998 by 27%, with the 
increase ascribed to the Saldanha Steel industrial development being one of the first Industrial 
Development Zones in the country. At the same time the Department of Fisheries introduced 
fishing quotas in threatened areas to halt the uncontained exploitation of marine life. This 
impacted the ability of traditional subsistence line and net fishermen to continue their 
traditional way of life and livelihoods (Sunde, 2014; Sowman, 2001). Thus the restcamp 
project was seen by politicians and the community alike as a positive intervention in the 
disruptive social-economic changes taking place in Langebaan.  
 
In 2003 the PPP Toolkit had not yet been passed and government had not yet made the strategic 
decision to use its own management entities as preferred implementing agents. At this time 
any suitably constituted agency could bid. Therefore, with SANParks endorsement, the NPO 
was able to apply to be the implementing agent for the project. The NPO was appointed to 
negotiate the project objectives with multiple stakeholders and facilitate the process for them 
to agree on a vision of empowerment for local entrepreneurs who would develop and manage 
a new tourist facility inside the park. From inception the project was supported by key 
stakeholders including SANParks, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, West Coast District 
Municipality, Saldanha Bay Municipality, West Coast Business Development Centre and 
representatives from the Langebaan community. All these partners combined to form the 
Project Steering Committee (PSC) and were responsible for strategic guidance and oversight.   
The Value for Money Objective :  
The project aimed to establish a viable tourism business in the West Coast National Park that 
would be owned and managed by individuals from the Langebaan community to benefit the 
Park and the previously disadvantaged community of Langebaan as broadly as possible.  
The Project goals:  
 Social Benefit - to create a long-term sustainable project for the benefit of West Coast 
communities, 
 Economic Returns - to redevelop existing infrastructure in the form of additional tourist 
facilities in order to increase tourism awareness and associated economic benefits,  
 Skills Development - to provide training and skills development to selected PDIs in the 
areas of construction, tourism, hospitality, financial, safety and security and 
entrepreneurship. 
Procurement Process - 2003  
i. Call for applications 
An invitation was released in 2003 to all members of the Langebaan community to apply to 
be part of the Restcamp Project. The invitation was widely communicated using media and 
face-to-face meetings that included door-to-door visits to the residents of Langebaan. All 
individuals, organised groups, existing and new businesses and consortia were invited to 
apply. The application form was considered an ‘Expression of Interest’. The West Coast 
Business Development Centre was enlisted as a project partner to assist applicants with their 
submissions. A total of 39 applications were received. A 3-person selection panel, two from 
the NPO and one from SANParks, shortlisted ten persons to be interviewed. Of the ten 
individuals shortlisted and interviewed, the selection panel identified seven individuals to 
participate in an orientation workshop with the West Coast Development Centre whose 
responsibility it was to prepare candidates for the interview process, most of whom had never 
had the experience. This culminated in individual presentations by each if the seven candidates 
to the selection panel.  
 
The selection panel recommended three individuals to the Project Steering Committee (PSC). 
Of the three, two were youth and two were unemployed.  The three were recommended after 
a lengthy process based on various critera, including business plan presentations, personal and 
group interviews, knowledge, skills, social investment, enthusiasm, level of energy and 
commitment, creativity and willingness to take risks, dedication, respect for people and the 
environment, people skills,  commitment to customer service,  and the ability to function in a 
team. The PSC accepted the recommendations and feedback to the community on the outcome 
was made by the community representatives on the steering committee. 
ii. Stakeholder engagement  
  Two key features of the stakeholder engagement strategy were a) an analysis the socio-
economic factors affecting the community and designing an inclusive recruitment process 
around that, and b) identifying stakeholders and institutions active in the Langebaan 
community to include in the selection process. Local knowledge helped to formulate a 
consultative process that sought the buy-in of the community to a project that was expressly 
defined and presented as one aimed to benefit it. The process therefore included jointly 
identifying significant groups and individuals, holding group and one-on-one meetings and 
conducting door-to-door visits with residents to get their inputs and support. Meetings were 
convened with the local authorities including the Mayor and members of the mayoral 
committee of the Saldanha Bay Municipality, the Langebaan Ratepayers Association, tourism 
organisations, political party representatives and local NGOs and CBOs. These meetings were 
used to inform interested parties of the project objectives and processes. The inclusion of the 
community not only facilitated the transfer of information, but helped to formulate the 
selection criteria and enhance the transparency of the appointment of members to the Business 
Unit (BU). 
 
The funder, DEAT, permitted a large degree of flexibility in allowing the PSC to determine 
how the Business Unit would be established. This freedom allowed the stakeholders to 
determine the preferred concept for the BU. This investment in community participation made 
the acceptance and therefore the sustainability of the project more likely. 
 
iii. Training  
Understanding that the Business Unit members had little or no tourism or business experience, 
the key elements of the framework for training and development included practical 
applications, observations, internships and simulations. Partnerships were formed with 
business development training providers, for example, the West Coast Business Development 
Centre, SANParks, the Elands Bay SCLP Project and Robben Island. Aspects addressed 
included the development of business plans, exposure to other business initiatives, operating 
in a  team, roles and responsibilities, equity arrangements, registration of a business entity, 
accessing  funding, office simulation, business and tourism networks, labour legislation and 
processes, infrastructure maintenance and construction and understanding market competition. 
Partnerships were also set up with the Tourism Enterprise Programme (TEP) and the Red 
Door.  
 
iv. Ownership and management 
The process of choosing the legal structure of the business was influenced by the complexity 
of regulatory compliance, the tax obligations, the personal liability for debt incurred and 
considerations as to which financial institutions were more or less likely to provide finance. 
Options considered included a Close Corporation (CC); a Company; a Partnership/Joint 
Venture; a Non-profit organisation; a Co-operative and a Trust. Drawing on the experience of 
similar projects and arguing that a Section 21 Company is too complex to establish and run, 
the PSC opted for the formation of a CC.  The primary motivation for this decision was that 
the formation of a CC would allow the participants in the Business Unit to operate the business 
within a relatively simple business regulatory environment driven by a profit motive. The 
agreement stipulated that the Business Unit was contractually committed to contribute a 
percentage of their nett profit to community structures of their choice in Langebaan.  
 
A decision by the project committee to have a majority shareholder and split the company 
equity in a 51%; 27 % and 21 % ownership ratio according to functional responsibility later 
became the most contested issue between the owners. The rationale of the project committee 
for this decision was that there needed to be a primary decision-maker and one person 
designated as the accountable leader.  
v. Implementation  
Phase 1 – (May 2005 to May 2006) consisted of the restoration of the eight old houses, 
upgrading of service infrastructure and landscaping. The launch of the project took place on 
10 May 2005 in the Park.  The inauguration ceremony was attended by community 
representatives, the NGO’s, political representatives, senior officials from national, provincial 
and local government and corporate representatives. It was presided over by the Mayor of 
Saldanha and a keynote address was given by the   MEC of the Western Cape. The restcamp 
opened its doors to guests on 1 December 2006. The SCLP equipped the Business Unit with 
computers, telephone, a fax and an office, while the members received monthly stipends and 
petty cash for operations. The subsequent concession agreement with SANParks made 
provision for a renewable five-year concession period related to performance at a below-norm 
concession rate of 5% of turnover per annum, or a minimum rental of R5000 pm month. This 
arrangement became colloquially known a ‘honeymoon’ period to allow the Business Unit to 
establish itself.  
 
Phase 2 - (January to November 2007) further funding from DEAT’s Social Responsibility 
Programme allowed for the construction of an office and reception building, swimming pool, 
three new chalets and an upgrade of bulk infrastructure. The new buildings were constructed 
with sand bags to promote the use of affordable, local, renewable resources and to showcase 
labour-intensive work methods. The construction phase successfully employed 30 
unemployed young men and women from Langebaan. The project reopening was considered 
momentous enough to be launched on SABC2’s Morning Live by the then Minister of Tourism 
Marthinus van Schalkwyk.  
 
Conclusion 
 The restcamp project was acknowledged by government and development agencies as a 
uniquely inclusive concession project, starting as it did at grassroots level by going door-to-
door in the community to get residents’ inputs into what outcomes they would like to see. 
SANParks was recognised for its willingness to support this innovative approach and provide 
the necessary institutional training and mentoring.  
The NPO facilitated the Project Steering Committee and partners, the selection process of 
candidates, the training and development of candidates, the formal establishment of the entity 
and provided ongoing mentoring and conflict-management support. The concession 
agreement included a developmental period during which the BU operated with reduced 
financial risk because SANParks was prepared to negotiate a nominal minimal rental and a 
percentage turnover lower than the norm as its contribution to empowerment. The SCLF 
invested in infrastructure upgrades, furniture, fittings, mentorship and training, while 
SANParks took responsibility for the bulk infrastructure and external maintenance. The 
Business Unit was therefore freed to focus on operational efficiencies, service standards and 
target marketing. 
The business has grown to employ seven full-time staff and three extra staff in season. It has  
an asset value of R1,6m and has had an average occupancy of 55,6% over the last five years. 
It is intimately identified by the community of Langebaan as a community project run by its 
own. Thirteen years later the business is a feature in the tourism offering of the West Coast as 
a high quality product that has proven its financial and environmental sustainability and has 
made significant social investments in the local community. 
  
4.4. CASE STUDY 2 – Restaurant – Table Mountain National Park  
Owner : (numbered as per interview schedule) 
 
Concessionaire # 5 : 100%  ownership 
Why this case study ? 
The case study was unusual because the first round of tendering (March 2010) was in the form 
of an abridged version of the PPP Tourism Toolkit, based on Supply Chain principles but 
assessed on the principles of the Toolkit. No bidder was appointed in the first round as bidders 
indicated that the capital investment required did not make a three-year contract with option 
to renew for five years, viable. Observing the market’s response SANParks re-advertised the 
tender changing (a) the term to a minimum of five years with an option to renew for a further 
five years based on the capital invested, (b) a reduction of the functionality requirements and 
(c) increased the B-BBEE requirements. This saw the appointment of Concessionaire 5 in the 
second round, who is a black woman from the Cape Flats. 
Background 
With the establishment of the Table Mountain National Park in 1997, SANParks inherited the 
restaurant (then known as a teagarden) operated by a sole proprietor who for more than twenty 
years had had no legal agreement other than a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with the Rotary Club 
of South Africa through whom he had acquired the rights. Before 1997 the Rotary Club of 
South Africa was designated to manage the Groote Schuur Estate via the Rhodes Trust.  
The teagarden had developed as a commercial extension of the Cecil John Rhodes Memorial 
on the slopes of Devils Peak, a popular tourist attraction with expansive views across the City. 
It is not surprising that the aesthetics and ambience of the space were seen as an opportunity 
to explore its potential as a refreshment and recreation option. It was originally branded as a 
‘Tea and Scones’ experience that, pre-1994, had addressed a very specific and elite clientele. 
The operator failed to invest in the necessary support infrastructure or to ensure responsible 
environmental and health and safety practices. When the land was proclaimed as part of a 
national park, new mandatory legislative obligations came into play for contract holders. The 
legal process to regularise the relationship with the operator took more than ten years. With a 
recalcitrant operator who had never subscribed to compliance elements such as Health and 
Safety, environmental emissions, labour relations and financial transparency, negotiations 
were strained and confrontational.  SANParks finally negotiated an interim agreement in July 
2003 that expired in May 2009. During this period the infrastructure was severely run down 
and the operator had almost completely withdrawn communication with SANParks. Thus 
when the tender for a new operator was released in 2009, SANParks was unable to do any 
feasibility studies as the operator did not provide statistics that could inform profitability or 
visitor trends.  
In 2008 National Treasury granted permission for a ten year concession. However, because 
there was insufficient history to suggest that the opportunity was viable, SANParks tentatively 
put out the tender for three years with an option to extend it to five years subject to business 
performance.  
 
Value for Money objectives  
 
The concession opportunity sought the effective management, infrastructure upgrade and 
black empowerment for the restaurant while rendering high-quality standards in food and 
beverages.  
 
1. The Procurement process  
 
1.1.  Call for Applications  
The procurement process was unusual as the proposal call and adjudication process required 
two rounds, with each round following a different format.  
The first tender (6 March 2010) required the bidder’s submission to be in an abridged Tourism 
Toolkit format and simply asked the bidders for their Curriclum Vitae, experience and a 
business proposal. These were used in the evaluation of the bidders according to PPP 
principles. The adjudication panel included external specialists who were brought in to add 
the restaurant expertise SANParks did not possess.  However, none of the applications were 
considered fully adequate and no appointment was made.  SANParks decided to revise the 
specifications based on feedback gained from bidders. The new tender extended the contract 
period to five years, reduced the functionality requirements and increased the B-BEEE 
component.  It was with these revised specifications, formulated around bidder inputs that 
Concessionaire 5 won the tender. It is significant in respect of the value objectives that the 
second highest scoring bid, an established Cape Town restaurant, scored higher on both 
functionality and financial elements, but scored 12 out of 20 for B-BBEE compared to 
Business Owner 2’s 16 out of 20. This was the factor that gave her the edge and thereby the 
tender. The revamped restaurant opened on the 6th of October 2010, with a newly landscaped 
garden, children’s playground and jungle gym, new menu and in-house bakery, as well as 
increased seating from the original 50 to 120. 
 
1.2.  Developmental Support 
Unlike in Case Study 1 the operator in this case received no developmental support from 
SANParks or external support from developmental agencies. She was supported financially 
and developmentally by her business partner, who played a significant role in strengthening 
her ability to manage such a substantial operation. While SANParks was prepared to take the 
risk of granting the opportunity to a single black woman, it did not follow up with 
developmental support and integration into SANParks systems and operations that would have  
enhanced her chances of success. By her account there was only one line of business support 
and that was through the project officer who was responsible for managing the terms of the 
contract. The business continues to flourish and provides SANParks with an average return of 
R600 000 per annum, compared to the R240 000 provided by the previous operator. The 
contract has been extended by a further five years and the present operator has invested further 
capital amounting to R200 000. 
Conclusion   
 
It required two rounds of tendering to find a suitable operator who could deliver the 
empowerment objective, including the functionality and the capital investment. The cost 
drivers of her business were exaggerated by the restrictions of the site. These included daytime 
only gate hours, heritage restrictions, aging infrastructure, travel costs and weather. The 
operator indicated that many of the inhibiters could have been overcome if there was a 
connection between operational staff and the SANParks Supply Chain to help reduce negative 
impacts on profitability.  The operator has shown herself to have a mature approach to the 
complexities of working with an organisation like SANParks and has voluntarily accepted 
extra cost and risks to ensure the efficient functioning of her business. The historical 
performance of the operation predicts a continuing profitable growth path for the business.  
 
4.5. CASE STUDY 3 - Restaurant – West Coast National Park 
Owner : (numbered as per interview schedule) 
 
Concessionaire : # 1 : 100% ownership 
 
Why this case study ?  
 
This case study was awarded in 2003 before the introduction of the Toolkit.  Instead of following 
the process designed for the Toolkit, procurement followed an abridged version of a PPP based 
on supply chain processes. The tender was for one year and was renewed for a further two years. 
In 2007 SANParks put out a second proposal call to regularize the tender according to the 
Toolkit prescripts and awarded the contract for ten years. Prior to the release of the opportunity 
in 2003 the facility was run as a teagarden by SANParks comprising of a cook, a waitress and 
a cleaner. The menu consisted of tea, scones, sandwiches, fried chips and factory-baked pies. It 
ran at a financial loss and was subsidized by the park budget. Service levels were poor and the 
the building, kitchens, furniture and grounds were sub-standard. 
 
Background   
 
The restaurant is situated in the West Coast National Park just inland from Saldanha Bay. 
Langebaan, Saldanha Bay, Vredenburg, Hopefield, Darling and Yzerfontein are urban and 
semi-urban towns situated around the park, along with several smaller farming communities 
and informal settlements. The park is bounded in the North and West by the Langebaan Lagoon 
and by the Atlantic Ocean in the South. It is renowned for the seabirds that roost on the islands 
of Malgas, Marcus and Schaapen and home to concentrations of migrant waders from the 
northern hemisphere. The restaurant is located on the water’s edge with exquisite views of the 
lagoon and surrounding hills.    
 
The Langebaan area features as an important area in the early history of European settlers in 
South Africa. The restaurant reflects this history, operating out of a Cape Dutch style national 
monument built in 1744 that is both well preserved and functional. The building has been 
restored three times since it was built in the 18th century, the most recent restoration being in 
the mid 1990s. It is centrally situated in the park and is frequently the first stop for visitors to 
the park. Concessionaire #1, the successful applicant, a local white woman, had up to the time 
of the awarding of the concession in July 2003 been a caterer and event organizer in Langebaan, 
running a moderate operation. With an intense love for history and culture she felt that she could 
use the combination of the building’s 200 year heritage and local cuisine as a valuable attraction 
for the region. With very little turnaround time from being awarded the concession in August, 
she started operations in the August flower season of 2003.  As part of the concession agreement 
the operator was given an adjacent house to rent so that she could have 24-hour access and 
manage her business more effectively. The section ranger who had been living in this house 
was accommodated elsewhere for this reason. It was considered essential that the operator was 
on-site and could oversee the business at all times. The rental at the time was very moderate for 
a large three-bedroom house with garage and extensive grounds. This background is significant 
as it later became a factor that affected her financial and legal status. Within three years the 
operator had successfully turned the restaurant into a vibrant tourist hub. She had invested over 
R300 000, used traditional furniture and décor to accent the history and culture of the building 
and had created a menu that reflected traditional West Coast food. This menu was accompanied 
by a range of locally produced wine from the region. She extended the seating from 30 to 70, 
established a website, opened a curio shop that sold crafts produced by the local community, 
appointed and trained 22 full-time staff and five casuals, created a play area for children, 
established  a wedding venue and hosted over 40 weddings in the first year. She also established 
a relationship with the Anglican Church, ferrying brides across the lagoon as part of their 
wedding ceremony that served to provide an income to the poor fishing community. Factors 
negatively affecting her profitability included the conservation (entrance) fee that her guests 
had to pay over and above what they spent at the restaurant, the distance from suppliers (120km 
from Cape Town), seasonality that consisted of only two high seasons, the lack of 
accommodation in the park that meant most visitors were day visitors, and the cost of 
transporting staff.  
 
In 2007 SANParks put out a new tender call to regularize the concession according to the 
Toolkit prescripts. The scope of activities included the provision of quality food and wine, a 
functions venue for catering of large groups, an outlet for local crafts, and capturing the unique 
cultural heritage of the West Coast.  At this point the investment and assets that had been made 
by the operator were at risk because in an open bidding process she had no guarantee of being 
the successful bidder. She would have had to remove all movable property, restore any part of 
the area to its original condition, terminate staff, move out of the park house, shut down or 
transfer the rights to the website and cancel planned events and weddings. 
Value for Money Objectives 
Outsourcing the management of the restaurant sought to improve service levels, expand the 
range of refreshment options, free SANParks staff to concentrate on core business and  realise 
greater financial returns.  
Procurement process 
The initial tender process followed an abridged version of the PPP process based on Supply 
Chain principles. In June 2003 SANParks placed the Expressions of Interest in local newspapers 
(Die Weslander, Cape Argus, Die Burger). A compulsory on-site briefing session was held with 
prospective tenderers at which the terms of reference were explained.  The PPP process for 
evaluating bidders for the concession followed these steps and incorporated specific critera: 
 Call for expression of interest – June 2003 
 Briefing session July 2003 
 The Selection Panel comprised representatives of WCNP. The following evaluation 
criteria were used : 
The experience of the operator in managing similar business (score out of 15). 
 The commitment of the operator to environmental principles (score out of 5)  
The promotion of economic empowerment  (score out of 10).  
 The first contract was awarded in August 2003 for one year. 
 
Conclusion  
In 2003 the Toolkit had not yet been released and SANParks was still in the process of 
formulating  what the organisation  envisioned for  its commercialisation strategy. The conditions 
therefore existed for a strong measure of developmental support from SANParks. The 
procurement process was structured around the supply chain process as this is what SANParks 
was familiar with. It allowed flexibility at park level to develop the bid specifications, to manage 
the adjudication process and to negotiate the contract terms. It also allowed  the organisation to 
be particularly responsive to the needs of the entrepreneur. The value objectives were 
concentrated around the creation of a new product with a unique product offering that could be 
sustainable within the restrictions of a national park. With little historical performance statistics 
to go by it was necessary that SANParks grant the entrepreneur the freedom to be creative and 
take risks.  
The contract ended in December 2017. The operator left with a lot of negativity towards 
SANParks as it culminated with the business being invoiced for over R500 000 for a combination 
of unpaid rental for housing and CPIX that had not been invoiced for eight years.  This matter 
led to a legal stalemate that badly soured the partnership.   
4.6. Summary of Case Studies. 
Table 5: Activities timeline: Summary of developmental paths followed by each  
case study (format adapted from World Food Programme and International Fund  
for Agricultural Development 2006). 
 
 Case Study 1 
 
Case Study 2  Case Study 3 
 March 2003 to June 2004  
 
March 2010 to June 2010 Aug 2003 to Dec 2007  
Procurement 
Timeline 
Tender submitted to 
DEAT Sustainable 
Livelihoods Programme 
by development agency 
in March 2003 and 
approved June 2004 
Initial abridged tender 
released in March 2010 
for 3 years with option of 
5 years. A revised tender 
released in June 2010 for 
five years with an option 
of a further 5 years  
Tender released for 1 year in 
Aug 2003 and renewed for a 
further 2 years. Full Toolkit 
tender process released in Dec 
2007 and awarded the contract 
for 10 years.  
Objective 
To establish a business 
entity from the local 
Langebaan community 
who would run a 
converted staff village 
into a tourist 
accommodation facility 
To rebrand an entry-level 
tea garden into a  
restaurant that could 
serve multiple target 
groups  
To rebrand what was a tea-
and-scones facility managed 
by the Park into a restaurant 
that emphasised the unique 






released by Department 
of Environmental 
Affairs. Awarded to a 
development agency to 
establish and support a 
new business  
SANParks released an 
abridged version of the 
Toolkit. A second tender 
followed in which the 
concession period was 
changed.  
Used normal SANParks supply 
chain process to award for 1 
year, extended annually to 3 
years. Toolkit process 
followed in 2007 to regularise 
the process.  
Strategy 
Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach, overseen by 
national and provincial 
government. Funded by 
DFID, strategy was to 
provide hands-on 
developmental support 
by an NPO to a new 
business entity for 5 
years 
Developed an abridged 
tender using SCM format 
and assessed according 
to PPP Toolkit format. 
Following feedback from 
bidders the functionality 
requirements were 
reduced and B-BBEE 
increased in the second 
tender.  Awarded for 5 
years with the option for 
5 year renewal based on 
capital investment  
With no history to do a 
feasibility assessment the 
tender was an experiment to 
test the market. The operator 
was assisted through nominal 
concession fee and minimum 
risk transfer. Appointed for 1 
year extended by 2 years that 
served as a developmental 
period. This allowed her to 
win a 10- year contract 
following a full Toolkit tender 
in 2007.   
Sequence of 
activities 
DEAT advertised the 
tender in 2003.NPO 
awarded the contract 
2004. 
 
Tender released using   
supply chain format 
March 2009 but assessed 
by  Toolkit rules  
In 2003 Supply Chain process 
was used to appoint for 1 year. 
This was before the toolkit 
regulations  
 Selection of the three 
business partners through 
a community 
participation process 
overseen by a Steering 





strong resistance came 
from bidders on the short 
term being offered  
Based on performance the 
contract was extended for a 
further 2 years 
 
 Partners given extensive 
entrepreneurial and 
sector-specific training. 
Business operated for a 
period of 3 years on a 
nominal rental that 
served as a 
developmental period    
SANParks re-advertised 
offered a longer term and 
increased B-BBEE 
requirements that  
solicited greater number 
of bids  
 
As a functioning product 
yielding profits the opportunity 
was released following the full 
Toolkit process in 2007 for 10 
years. The operator competed 
in  open tender 
 Converted to 10-year 
contract in 2008 on 
recommendation of 
SANParks and approval 




Consisted of 5 year 




owned Business. No pre- 
or post- support provided.  
The 3-year development 
period was awarded with 
majority risk absorbed by 
SANParks to allow her to 
establish the business. No pre- 
or post- support offered after 
full tender 
 
4.7. Utilisation of the Toolkit: Summary of Coding interview responses 
Table 6 shows how each of the five key questions were coded. The recurring words, terms and 
phrases used by respondents in their interviews reveal the first-order concepts. These concepts 
were aggregated into second-order concepts based on dynamic or logical relationships between 
the concepts. These were then crystallised into themes (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & 












Questions  Key initial responses in first round of 
coding  
Aggregated themes that 
emerged from first round of 
coding 
Aggregated themes that 
emerged from second 
round of coding 













the Toolkit ? 
Policy Intention :  
 to boost industry & investment 
 to utilise government assets 
 to cross-subsidise conservation;  to 
generate revenue to subsidise 
conservation; to provide government 
services through cross subsidisation  
 an ‘idiots’ guide enabling PPPs in South 
Africa's tourism industry. 
 to develop organisational skills sets in 
organisations for them to be able to roll 
out PPPs  
 to learn how to determine tourism 
projects that are feasible and geared for 
PPPs  
 to access the skills of the private sector  
 to use the conservation sector as vehicle 


















 based on DTI Infrastructure PPPs  
 taken from UK Partnership and USAID 
 an alternative to management agreements  
and  North West’s 99 year leases  
 alternative to normal supply chain 
allocated funds 
 written by local and international 
specialists 
Policy Intention  
 Conservation 
sustainability 
 Generate revenue 
 Release government 
assets 
 Encourage investment  
 
 Simplification of 
processes  
 Alternative to normal 




 Drive B-BBEE 
 
 
 Create new tourism 
products  
 Identify new markets 
 Tourism benefits 
 
 
 Develop institutional 
capacity 





 International support for 
the process  
 International benchmarks 
 Organisational  capacity 













 Alternative to normal 






























 SANParks received support from 
International Finance Corporation part of 
the World bank in 2000 and 2001 which 
resulted in permanent  skills transfer to 
SANParks 
 was left to the institutions to use the Toolkit 
for empowerment   
 
 















B) Has the 
policy 
intention 
changed ? If 
so, how? 
Has the policy changed :  
 No, process was taken from UK 
Partnership and IFC. Theirs has changed 
so many times, ours still based on what 
was developed 2000 
 No, was designed based on large 
infrastructure projects experience  no 
small projects that has led to money 
revolving around the same businesses 
 No, large and small cap measure is still 
1. Capital investment 2. Risk profile 3. 
Turnover of the business  
 Problem of inconsistency of contract 
terms and process as exposed by North 
West apartheid legacy. Contracts signed 
in for 99years based on 3 to 4 page 
agreements, so a  need to reduce high 
risk because government has to buy 
them out at the end of term, but they run 





How ?  
 Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act 2000 Regulations of 
2017 changes the way that the evaluation 
is done. Functionality scoring no longer 
goes through to the final determination 
of the award. It is a minimum threshold 
that everyone who achieves goes through 
to the final determination of the scores 
being 80/20 or 90/10, depending on the 
value of the contract. 
 Emphasis on enterprise development as 
part of the B-BBEE scoring  
 
• Big Business to take 
shareholding and greater 
risk in small business   
 
  Reserve opportunities for 
specific  target groups, 
companies with  
 less than Rx turnover   
 Implementer  can exclude  
big companies from bidding 
 







 Preferential procurement 
policy framework act 
Regulations of 2017 
 
 Equity to transfer to black 
owners as term of contract 
goes on, preceded  
by enterprise development 





 SANParks ring-fencing  
 
 
 Big business to take 













































been met ? 
Success measures  
 aim was to not be as elaborate or complicated 
as the standard provisions; to  create 
templates that were simpler; to make process 
and documents less onerous; - to short-circuit 
the Infrastructure PPP process 
 to create set guidelines 
 to be a mechanism to source funding  
 to give security to investors 
 to generate new ideas 
 to improve service delivery  
 to develop and improve tourism 
infrastructure facilities  
 to minimise the risk on treasury; to regularise 
the process and reduce ‘loose cannons’;  to 
cover government from getting ‘whiplash’; 
opens up government for scrutiny if 
something goes wrong; to minimise risk on 
both sides ; good model because we share 
risk;  mitigate risks because if they go bust 
we are at a major disadvantage: how do we 
provide the service ? 
 to give control to implementers without 
taking full control 
 investment in small business is part of the 
national transformation agenda;  mentoring, 
coaching, enterprise development is part of 
this mandate  
 our contract is not that rigid, have not had 
many failures ; contracts have worked for us 
in the past,  might be too onerous but it has 
also saved us  
 private sector and us started off very badly 
but  staff became more comfortable; it  took 
a while but it is changing 
 are we prepared to take the risk as part of 
empowerment? How much is SANParks 
 
 A simplified application 
process different to Large 
Infrastructure PPPs 
  Standard templates and 
documents  
 Set release and 
management guidelines  
 
 
 Create new ideas 
 
 
 Reduced risk on both sides  
 Cover government if 
something goes wrong 
  
 Improved service delivery  
 Improve tourism 
infrastructure and facilities  
 Security to investors 
 Source funding  
 
 Empower implementers to 











 Stimulate Innovation  
 
 





 Boost tourism industry 





 it is about a long-term strategy in the 
organisation. 
 about the people coming in afterwards 
and supporting the long-term strategy 
because you go into 20-30 year long-
term agreements. 
 You cannot have people changing the 
organisational strategies every time there 
is a new bunch of people coming in 
 Transparency of the process is a large 





  Organisational Long term 
PPP strategy  
 
 Transparency of the process  
 
 Leadership changes that 
influence policy  
 Ring-fencing PPP 




 Organisational strategy  
prepared to invest in the entrepreneur? Is it 
part of the implementer’s mandate to 
‘babysit small business’; what is big business 















 no targets were set in the toolkit; Do not 
have Toolkit targets, use existing B-BBEE 
Charter targets the existing charters but 
institutions can increase the % as they see 
fit  
 SANParks placed high environmental 
target on operators; targets set for 
operators are much higher than what we 
practise internally;  
 
 Quality and content of 
contracts  
  Building the partnership  
 Mandate for developing 
small business  
 Role of big business in 
empowerment  
 Babysitting small business 




 Reliance on B-BBEE 
Framework and Sector 
Charter for targets  
 Implementer’s 
Environmental targets vs 
tourism and empowerment 
targets  
 Develop implementer’s 






 Big Business role in the 





 Implementer’s priority 























 access to funding  
 access to markets  
 poor accessibility 
 intended to be easy and simple but 
instead is complex and time 
consuming 
 high transaction costs, expensive,  
 difficult to understand, it is 
complicated, onerous to complete 
 requires capital, transaction advisors 
 risk transfer and risk absorption 
 upfront capital requirements 
 long term strategies and decision-
making 
 owner’s equity 
 difficulties in making changes to the 
agreement 
 long bureaucratic processes delays 
complex regulatory permitting and 
compliance rules 
 a lack of understanding by 
implementers; poor capacity and skill 
set of implementers 
 
 Toolkit tendering process 
 Over-regulation 
 Long bureaucratic processes  
 difficulties of changing the 
agreement 




 Transaction costs 
 Limited access to funding 
 Internal Resistance, own interests 
power and control 
 Internal sabotage 



















 Internal resistance to 
commercialization, 
 lack of implementation knowledge; 
lack of provincial and organisational 
support, 
 System allows for a specifying that an 
opportunity is reserved for specific 
target group – ‘can switch off big 
companies’; -who participates ‘is 
entirely our decision ‘; able to set limits 
so that big companies cannot bid. Those 
who are dominating the sector, come up 
with a creative way to stop them;   What 
role can SANParks play in changing? 
We must say that we do not want these 
big companies i.e. specify who it is for 
– identify size of projects and indicate 
who it is open to and not open to – on 
large projects increase empowerment 
component; operator’s arrogance  not a 
genuine transformation, just doing it to 





 Lack of capacity  
 Lack of knowledge of the toolkit 
 Lack of leadership continuity 
 
 
 Limited entry points for SMEs 









 Domination by 
















 improved development support, 
including training, mentoring, advice, 
partnerships,  support 
 innovation 
 improved management and operational 
systems; internal systems and 
processes; management integration; 
systems and payment term policies do 
not provide for SMMEs 
 better leadership, inclusivity, decision-
making 
 better marketing; knowing the existing 
and the  new  target markets 
 introduction of a  honeymoon period; 
define the development period   
 access to funding;  loans   
 economic empowerment and benefits to  
communities including shared profits 
and equity shareholding 
 B-BBEE, Transformation,  
 capital investment risk  
 ring-fencing opportunities for small 
business  
 provide bid submission workshops;  
develop SMMEs; provide further 







 Preferential procurement 
 Ring-fencing 
 Enterprise development 
 Honeymoon period 
 contractual obligations for big 
business 
 transformation  





 Institution’s financial and 
administration systems   
 enabling environment  
 SANParks invoicing 
 



















support to SMMEs ; identifying 
sustainability needs 
 preferential procurement is not 
auditable, not a  contractual 
requirement  
 land claimants receive 10% free equity 
increasing to 80% at the end of the term.  
 force Enterprise Development on big 
business; bring in Enterprise 
Development obligations for 
developers to report contractually 
 micro PPP is still too complicated.  
 clarify the grey area of whose 
responsibility enterprise development 
is in the institution  
 target black companies directly 
 advertise in different languages 
 make it easier to change contract; we 
are not changing the terms to make 
someone rich, trying to make them 
survive  
 SMEs need special payment terms in 
order to cope with the environment. 
 research  established small enterprises 
surrounding parks; feed them into ED 
program 
 non-exclusive commercial permits;  
provide diversity of tourism 
opportunities;  not a revenue generating 
opportunity like  bigger PPP’s  
 clarifying institutional roles and 
responsibilities  
 create enabling processes – short 
term payments  
 distinguish between a Commercial 
PPP and  Socio-economic Benefit 
PPP 
 Communication with black 
companies  
 Researching existing small black 
enterprises 







 Developmental support 
 Mentoring and coaching 
 Pre-submission training  
 Capital outlay and risk  
 Commercial permitting 
 Marketing 





















small business  
 
The second order emergent themes presented in Table 5 above are the result of the aggregation of 
a myriad of data, themes, concepts, categories and sub-categories, with multiple conceptual 
linkages. These were aggregated into four final themes or 2nd Order aggregated dimensions (Gioia, 
2004). Table 7 shows the four aggregated themes and provides a condensed definition of each 




Table 7: Definitions of Themes  
  
AGGREGATED  DIMENSIONS  FOLLOWING SUBSEQUENT WORD AND THEMATIC ANALYSES 
 2nd Order Aggregated  
Dimensions (Gioia) 
Definition  
  Definition  
Theme 1 
 
 Organisational Change that 
institutionalises the support 
for,  and development of,  
small business  
Includes the professionalism with which government and the 
contracting agency clarifies, administers, allocates resources, 
supports, monitors and implements the conditions of the contract. 
This includes organisational decision-making, operational delays, 
invoicing, facilitating changes to the agreement, efficient 
administrative systems, providing mentoring support, equipping 
staff with contract knowledge, creating an enabling environment, 
ensuring transparency of the process,  expanding the economic entry 
points for SMMEs, negating internal sabotage, and innovative 
product development  
Theme 2  
 
The role of big business in 
the development of SMMEs 
Includes the facilitation of big business of access to funding, skills 
development, legal expertise, financial management and HR 
professional support. And provides contract negotiation support; 
mentoring and coaching; training in tendering procedures and bid 
submissions; administration and compliance, marketing strategies,  





advances small black 
business  
Includes B-BBEE advancement, preferential procurement; ring-
fenced opportunities for SMMEs; expanding community investment 
partnerships; measurable  financial and  infrastructure gains; 
development and support of community trusts and innovative 
investments models; introduction of a honeymoon period; mentoring 
and coaching; enterprise development; breaking cartels; over-








Theme  4 
 
Risk Management that 
Shares the Risk between 




For government :  
payment default, shifts in policy, leadership changes,  shareholder 
demands, international market forces, lack of continuity in strategy  
 
For small business: 
Increased competition, changes in demand and supply,  critical skills 
shortages, increased labour demands, technological expansion and 







4.8. Quantitative findings  
PPP concessions in SANParks (Appendix A - List of concessions in SANParks) have four 
categories: lodge concessions, shops and restaurants, facilities rental and activities. 
 
In 2018 the cumulative total number of concessions awarded since 2002 was 50.  A breakdown of 
ratio of large to small-cap concessions reveals that the ten largest concessions contributed 83.1% 
of the just over R1billion concession income over the 16 years since the commercialisation 
programme was introduced (Table 8). These ten concessions include lodges, retail and activities.  
 
Table 8 - SANParks the sum life-to-date concession income  
 South African 
Rand’s 
Average per concession  
Revenue from top ten PPPs life-
to-date 
886, 931, 958 (83,1%) 5, 543, 324 per large 
concession pa (95%) 
Revenue from remaining 40 PPP 
concessions life-to-date  
180, 141, 472 (16,8%) 281, 471 per small 
concession pa (5% )  
SANParks Total PPP concession 
income life-to-date 2002-2018 
















Figure 9 : SANParks PPP income by concession type  (SANParks Annual Report 2019 ) 
The SANParks commercialisation programme and the Toolkit both emphasised that their primary 
objective was to generate revenue for conservation. While at the time no quantifiable targets were 
set against which to measure the success of the commercialisation programme, SANParks annually 
provides statistics that allow for interpretations to be made. An analysis of concession performance 
since the introduction of the Toolkit shows impressive trends that confirm the value of  PPPs. 
(SANParks, 2019). 
Table 8 presents a summary of concession performance for the eleven years from 2009 to 2019. 
This period is used as it captures the concessions that were awarded  since the Toolkit. The analysis 
shows the growth in the total number of concessions awarded in the period, the number growing 
from 28 in 2009 to 50 in 2018/9. This is testament to the long-term commitment of the organisation 
to the PPP strategy. It also reflects the growth in competency and skills in the organisation to 
release and manage PPPs. Over this period the number of full-time staff members employed by the 
Business Development Unit on whom the responsibilities for PPPs devolve, grew from 8 in 2009 
to 10 in 2019. Concession income for the period grew by 232%, from R63m in 2009 to R146m in 
2019. However, the concession income as a percentage of total SANParks revenue fell from 10% 
in 2009 to 7% in 2019. The total revenue collected from concessions for the total life to date from 
2002 to 2019 stands at R1,06 billion. 
The PPP programme has created 2016 permanent jobs and through the B-BBEE obligations has 
realised local SMME procurement spend that has grown from R58 million per annum in 2016 to 
R75 million per annum in 2019.  
The statistics provide valuable leads to interpret how commercialisation has benefited SANParks, 
and, by association, may do the same for provincial and municipal protected areas that are also 
subject to the Toolkit but are currently not utilising it .  






Growth in concession income 
(facilities rentals, concession 





2009 28 63 215 760 10% 
2012 34 64 650 214 7% 
2015 39 85 502 951 6% 
2019 50 146 513 000 7% 
 
 
4.9. Analysis of Findings  
From the interview responses and the analysis of the case studies, four themes were identified in the 
Toolkit ecosystem. These indicated the factors that respondents believe determine the success and 
sustainability of small cap concessions.  In the Analysis of Findings section below each of the four 
themes is expanded on individually. Each theme is analysed in order to understand it within the 
context of the research question and each is related to examples from the three case studies. The 
themes are aggregations of all interview responses.  The individual theme analysis is therefore not 
exclusive to the theme but is to be read as linked findings that constitute the beliefs, feelings and 






Theme 1 : Organisational Change to institutionalise the support for, and development of, 
small business  
 
This theme established as a fundamental condition for the sustainability of small businesses in a 
Tourism PPP that the institution that receives the enterprise be oriented in attitude, policy and 
structure to provide a nurturing and supportive element to the partnership. 
 
Administrative Systems/Invoicing. 
In traditionally bureaucratic organisations the functional decentralisation of roles contrives to 
negate the vital concept of mutual benefit and success (Polidano, 2001; Hood, 1995; Manning, 
2001). One Parks official commented on the ‘silo’ aspect of the process as  mitigating against 
collaborative working: 
 
“because we are departmentalized everything is reliant on another department. It's not like 
everyone works together as a true multidisciplinary team” (Official 5 – interview, 2018) 
 
Each concessionaire raised strongly their experience with SANParks administration systems as 
being unprofessional and ineffective and according to them, a critical weakness:  
 
“Invoicing is one of my pet hates with SANParks. Why is it so difficult? If the set rental is the 
same every month, why is it so difficult to pay? I want to cry. I said please can I just pay you?” 
(Concessionaire 5 – interview, 2018).  
In particular, the issue of inconsistent invoicing was identified as a matter generating undue stress 
and elevating the fear of a cash flow crisis that threatened long-term financial planning. The 
concessionaires described how not being able to predict the annual reconciliation payment put their 
business at risk and added unnecessary pressure to cash flow management. They reported that their 
request to pay upfront through the course of the year was rejected by SANParks as the organisation’s 
system was not designed to collect upfront payments. Where invoicing needs to be consistent and 
precise, it is unreliable in both the timing and accuracy.  This compromises the entrepreneur’s ability 
to manage risk, or as was the case with the two concessionaires who received backdated invoices, 
threatens the existence of the business. In the case of Concessionaire 1, the single invoice she 
received of more than half a million rand for rent that had not been paid for eight years, along with 
CPI that had not been updated annually, proved to be financially crippling for the business and broke 
her entrepreneurial spirit. Concessionaire 2 fortunately had the R120 000 avaiable that she was 
invoiced :  
“The amount for our annual fee increase… no one monitored it… so one year we had 
to pay R120 000” (Concessionaire 2- interview, 2018). 
 
Integration with Park Operations  
Due to the fact that the three case studies served different target markets and offered different 
products, they also required different responses and strategies from SANParks in order for them to 
function within the organisation’s regulatory and operational restrictions. Restaurants, for 
example, have more immediate waste removal demands than a lodge, while lodges have more 
extensive risk management concerns.  
 
“Why does it take so long to get anything done? For me it’s a nightmare to work here, 
to get things done. ?” (Concessionaire 5 –interview, 2018). 
 
Concessionaires relayed stories of frustration about inflexible gate times that meant deliveries were 
turned back, infrastructure emergencies that went unattended, poor or no signage, parking 
congestion that lost them custom, little or no marketing support, poor communication about 
decisions that affect them, slow turnaround in decision-making, consistent infrastructure damage 
by animals and excessive procurement delays. All three reported experiencing a lack of 
understanding and sympathy from SANParks’ operational staff towards the unique challenges that 
entrepreneurs face:  
 
“Everyone needs to be on same page and have the same vision. The park has a vision, the 
entrepreneur has a vision – if it’s not the same then we’re doomed to fail” (Concessionaire 
1 – interview, 2018). 
 
A common complaint was that concessionaires are treated as outsiders rather than partners and that 
there is little sympathy from park staff when it comes to fundamental or emergency operational 
issues that impact concessionaires’ profitability. Operational staff do not seem to subscribe to or 
understand the spirit of partnership required in a PPP : 
 
“What needs to change is the ‘them and us’ mentality. We need to see it as a partnership, 
a relationship. Often as scared as the operator is, so are our staff” (Official 6 – 
interview, 2018). 
 
The organisation’s strategic plan for commercialisation sets out to “generate revenue, create jobs, 
alleviate poverty, include Black-owned enterprises, optimise the value of underperforming assets, 
reduce the cost of delivery, improve service levels, bring in private capital and expertise to expand 
and improve SANParks’ tourism products”(SANParks, 2018). However, these deliverables are not 
included in performance contracts of operational staff. It would seem a key starting point in 
organisational change that staff members are made to understand that supporting the 
concessionaire in delivering a quality product is a performance deliverable as much as any other.  
 
Contract management  
In all cases the concessionaires called for more extensive developmental support, highlighting the 
lack of a mentoring culture in SANParks and a lack of empathy for their business health.  
 
“The contract was put out there and then I was left alone”.  (Concessionaire 5- 
interview, 2018). 
 
The contract negotiation and contract management phase is critical. Although Case Study 1 had 
the NPO as mentor and a legal advisor on retainer, everyone, including SANParks, missed the fact 
that the contract stated that maintenance lies with the concessionaire and not with SANParks. This 
was not conveyed to Park Operations who were happy to fulfil the maintenance role for years prior 
to the obligation being noted.  
 
“If you only hear in the 9th year that maintenance is your responsibility, where does 
the problem lie ?” (Concessionaire 2 – interview, 2018). 
 
Respondents called for the contract amendment process to be less restrictive in ways that allow for 
interpretations to be clarified or amended where market conditions have changed significantly over 
time. Contract negotiations happen before contract signature but there is not enough follow up to 
ensure the terms remain appropriate to changing trends and economic conditions : 
 
“Why is contract amendment so difficult? Why does it have to go to Treasury ? We could 
call it risk mitigation or empowerment or more efficient operations.” (Official 6). 
 
It was emphasised by the concessionaires and by SANParks officials in the interviews that an 
annual review is required to agree joint objectives that can be accommodated within the contract 
terms and if amendments are required that they be done timeously so as not to prejudice either 
party.  
 
“We’re not changing the terms to make someone rich; we’re trying to make them survive. We 
change sometimes; it’s not easy and takes time, but it’s worth it.  ” (Official 4). 
 
The Toolkit requires that a Project Officer be assigned to provide post-contract monitoring and 
support. In each case this was the Regional Business Manager. In  this, SANParks was meeting the 
minimum Toolkit obligation. However, because the support was not integrated with Operations, 
the support was inadequate. Concessionaires felt that it was not enough that the Business Manager 
was their only support; they expected all staff to be familiar with their business, with the conditions 
of their contracts and to be sensitized to the implications of operational decisions. To formalise 
this they requested frequent and more inclusive meetings with staff from departments other than 
Business Development.  
 
Theme 2. The role of big business to provide development support to  SMMEs  
“What happens is the same people get the business all the time; it only moves 
around the top; it doesn’t filter down; this is the old story. So the person who’s 
going to get it is the guy who has a million rand, two million rand business [of] 
which he spends R100, 000 on a tender. That’s not going to bother him,  that kind 
of person will get the tender again.” (Concessionaire 5 – interview, 2018) 
“When the Toolkit was developed that requirement, enterprise development, wasn’t 
there. What changed is that transformation wasn’t enough. Bringing in black 
companies hasn’t happened enough” (Official 4- interview, 2018). 
 
The question was often raised during interviews about where the support for these businesses 
should come from.  While Theme 1 dealt extensively with the need for the receiving organisation 
to develop a mentoring culture, it was not expected by the ecosystem partners that the organisation 
should be entirely responsible for the developmental needs of the enterprise. As highlighted in the 
literature, government has invested heavily in capacity building through the Department of Small 
Business Development and its implementing agencies. Similarly, the NGO sector and international 
donors have made substantial commitments. It was, however, noted by the DBSA that the co-
ordination of this support is considered disparate and often wasteful (DBSA, 2017). 
 
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act No. 53 of 2003 has as its 
objective to promote the entry of previously disadvantaged entrepreneurs into the mainstream of 
economic activity. The Tourism B-BEEE Charter Sector Codes were developed to provide a 
framework for the tourism sector to champion the support of black business and monitor the 
transformation of the sector. The Charter was amended in 2015 to create more opportunities for 
black enterprise, create more jobs, and address the imbalances in ownership (NDT Baseline Study, 
2018). In their research into the state of transformation in the sector the National Department of 
Tourism (NDT) found there to be three key areas of transformation in the tourism sector that are 
performing poorly, these are Skills Development, Preferential Procurement and Enterprise 
Development. Table 10. reflects the NDT findings that highlight the areas of underperformance 
that need to be addressed. The findings indicate that the substantive areas of change relating to 
incorporation into value chains, access to funding, women-empowerment, lack of training, access 




Table 10. The state of transformation in Tourism in South Africa (NDT 2018) 
 
 
 Large Enterprises (LEs) 
Qualifying Small Enterprises 
(QSEs) 
Exempted Micro Enterprises (EMEs) 
Ownership 
Facilitators 
 Limited promotion of black 




 No need to conform as 
they attract the 
international market 
 Status of black-owned 
businesses unknown 
 SMMEs are struggling with funding 
and access to market 
 Difficult to reach maturity in the 
market 
 Black-owned SMMEs not part of the 
supply chain for LEs 




 Hospitality sub- sector not 
promoting Black women in 
management structures 
 Ceiling created for black 
women in 
management 




 Do not get BEE 
certified 
 Unmonitored on their 
performance in the sector 
 Regulatory constraints relating to
 applications for funding. 
Capacity 
Building 
 Lack of training in 
hospitality sub- sector 
 Do not have 100% 
absorption of interns 
 A sole mandate with 
international travel/events 
companies 
 Lack of training in 
accommodation sub- 
sector and travel 
sub-sector 
 Scarce skills like 
language diversity, 
travel consultants, field 
rangers and guides 
 Lack of training in travel sub-
sector 
 Access to market and 
knowledge 
 Lack of skills in management 
and finance 
 Social media and distribution 
channel skills 





 Lack of compliance with 
preferential procurement 
targets 
 Travel related sub- sector 
procures from out the 
country 
 Procurement from large 
established companies 
 Does not promote Black-
owned companies in value- 
chain/supply chain 
 Opportunity to 
promote sharing 
economy 
 Willing to provide 
mentorship to 
individuals 
 Lack of concession opportunities 
or abilities 




 Hospitality sub- sector 
lacks in this area 
compared to other sub-
sectors 
 Low contribution to 
Socio-Economic 
Empowerment 
 Implement youth 
and women 
programmes in QSEs 
 No funds or capacity 
Interviews with officials from Treasury and SANParks made strong cases for large concessions to 
be contractually bound to deliver enterprise development targets as a condition of the award. The 
Treasury official commented on the difficulty of setting targets :  
 
“We have not set any targets. It is difficult to set targets…because you have your B-
BBEE policies.We leave it to the institution to determine the empowerment levels ...there 
is flexibility within institutions to develop their own targets.”  
(Official 1 –interview, 2018). 
 
It was acknowledged by these officials that while empowerment was included in the concession 
programme, not enough focus has been put on it. This has been recognised by SANParks and the 
organisation has recently made advances in policy to enforce and measure enterprise development 
of large concessions. 
 
“The gap is in Enterprise Development… the obligation is on them to take on small 
enterprises, to develop them from scratch or 2 years or whatever, use them for 
preferential procurement and report on that as part of their contractual 
obligations”. (Official 2 – interview, 2018) 
 
 
Theme 3 - Transformation that advances small business  
Empowerment  
“ …that’s unfortunately the mentality of our people who didn’t grow up in business, 
not like white people. We didn’t have that.” (Concessionaire 2 – interview, 2018) 
 
Of the three case studies, Case Study 1 was the only one to have a formalised mentoring 
programme. The Sustainable Livelihoods Programme Approach provided a support programme 
that invested intensively in both hard and soft skills. This took the form of a targeted developmental 
plan that included ongoing legal, operational and psychological support. Their 5-year ‘honeymoon’ 
period during which they received organisational support and financial leniency in respect of a 
below-norm concession payment, was instrumental in the establishment of the business. The 
security of having market-based financial obligations absorbed by SANParks meant that they could 
focus on developing the critical areas for success. These included establishing quality standards, 
developing staff competency, formulating marketing strategies and capital build-up. This model 
begins to define a template under which emerging black business that are awarded concessions can 
be supported towards sustainability. One official pointed out the impact of the change in 
government strategy : 
 
‘Government chose to shift from Sustainable Livelihoods Programme to an Expanded 
Public Works Strategy, from independent to dependent, coupled with training that is 
limited to survivalist. The aim was to employ numbers to address unemployment, but it 
sacrificed the developmental aspects of the programme’. (Official 8 – interview 2018) 
 
Case Study 1 was successful in growing its marketing networks and expanding its product offering 
to include catering and events. Scaling meant an increase in staff from seven to twelve persons. 
Case Study 1 never waivered in their obligation to give back and was recognised by the community 
for the contributions the owners made even while internally the owners were in conflict. One owner  
remarked thus:  
“We got by ‘by hak en tak’. I would say we’ve learned a lot from each other, from each 
other’s weaknesses and strengths and faults.” (Concessionaire 3 – interview, 2018).  
Case Study 3 had the confidence to explore an expansion of her business. She was able to access 
loan finance and to take on the payment demands. During the three years of financial leniency from 
SANParks she concentrated on establishing her brand through staff training, target marketing and 
developing a service culture on the standard of five-star restaurants. The support given to Case 
Study 3 by SANParks was less structured than what would be required by the Toolkit concession 
contract. It was more intuitively driven by the objective of creating a viable addition to the visitor 
experience and becoming an asset to the community. The first three years of the concession were 
thus not aligned with what became the prescripts of the Toolkit. This period allowed for the 
spontaneous progression of the concession relationship during which the park provided ad hoc 
business and operational support. The Toolkit process would consider this prejudicial to other 
bidders as it would be seen as presenting an unquantified advantage to the concessionaire. The 
argument is that if this support had been declared up front, bidders’ appetite for the concession 
might have been different. This seems to be easily avoided if the organisation is prepared to declare 
its mentoring principles and methodology upfront. In this way the organisation could negate the 
suggestion of unfairness.   
Community benefits   
The concessionaires were enthusiastic contributors to community projects. They made strong 
recommendations that small concessions should be contractually bound to committing a 
percentage of their annual profits, or a variation thereof, to social legacy projects. It was felt that 
the opportunity to operate a concession in a national park is a privilege that should be shared with 
the community. A number of examples of them giving back were provided. These included 
providing study bursaries and the funding of local crèches, community centres and old age homes.  
Case Studies 1 and 2 had clear strategies to ensure that an extension of benefits flowed from the 
existence of their businesses into the community. Included in Case Study 1’s contract was an 
undertaking to invest 10 % of their annual net profit into community projects. This was considered 
reasonable given that the capital costs were covered by government through the SCLP. Over the 
years significant investments were made in the Langebaan Primary school, Langebaan Multi-
purpose Centre and Langebaan Old Age Home, with their contributions being audited as part of 
the contractual agreement. An innovation of the case study included the empowerment approach 
used in phase 2 when the business extended to include three new chalets, a swimming pool and a 
boma. They chose environmentally sensitive sandbag construction and trained 26 unemployed 
youth from the local community to manage the construction. The project included business skills 
training with the aim of establishing their own construction teams and access local tender 
opportunities in the construction of sandbag infrastructure. Unfortunately there was not enough 
funding to extend the mentoring of these teams beyond the construction phase. 
 
The Case Study 2 operator annually hosts dinners to raise funds for a number of community 
beneficiaries. These include her alma-mater, a school in a depressed Cape Flats neighbourhood, 
the Baxter Theatre Benevolent Fund for retired actors and for St Luke’s Hospice. This is not a 
contractual obligation. The concessionaire stated firmly that she believes the aspect of contributing 
to community projects should be made a contractual obligation: “give back to where you come 
from… you should put that in the contract”.’ (concessionaire 5 – interview, 2018). 
The operator of the business in Case study 3 focussed on establishing a Workers’ Trust aimed at 
sharing benefits with staff and creating a succession plan for the next round of tendering for the 
concession. The Workers’ Trust was based on the equity-share empowerment model used by 
Solms-Delta, the wine estate near Franshoek.  Her beneficiation plan was more ambitious than the 
other two case studies and had it worked, would have been a positive transformation story. 
However none of the staff developed a sense of ownership and will not contest for the concession 
when the bid is released. Concessionaire 1 reflected that : “They didn’t see the Worker’s Trust as 
an investment. It was difficult to get them to understand it’s not always about money, that profit 
isn’t overnight”. (Concessionaire 1 –interview 2018) indicating that unfortunately “Too many of 
my staff were in survival mode and couldn’t take risks”. (Concessionaire 1 –interview 2018). 
 
Theme 4. Risk Management that shares the risk between government and small business  
As noted previously, the Toolkit’s position on contract amendment is that changing the contract 
conditions post-award disadvantages other bidders who may have tendered had they known these  
options were available.   
Case Study 1 assumed the least start-up risk as the refurbishment of buildings, staff costs and 
financing that would normally require substantial owner’s equity or loans was not an inhibiting 
factor. The traditional capital outlay that entrepreneurs have to make was grant funded. This 
support was critical for the establishment of the business. Official 4 remarked on the merits of risk 
sharing: “It’s a good model because we share risk. With Micro PPPs if it goes haywire, it’s not a 
train smash.” (Official 4 – interview, 2018), while Official 5 remarked on the realities of risk in a 
volatile emerging market: “ …if you want to be an entrepreneur there is an element of risk. There 
are risks whether you like it or not …because we are an emerging market and there is a hell of a 
lot of volatility and risk. And that is just the reality.”(Official 5 – interview, 2018). 
The business operator in Case Study 2 relied on the financial support of her business partner who 
was cash flow positive. She invested R500 000 in start-up of her own capital and assumed the full 
range of risks immediately. The contract assumed that she had the financial reserves to provide a 
buffer during her establishment phase and that she would in fact make a success of the business. 
Failing would have meant significant financial loss, a risk not many start-up entrepreneurs are able 
to take.   
Official 3 remarked on the unwillingness of many small entrepreneurs to take this kind of risk: 
Our contracts expect them to pay from day 1 when they don’t know yet [if] it’s going 
to work. A lot of what the small entrepreneur does is calculated risk, many don’t 
because they’re can’t be sure, so they rather don’t tender, it’s a barrier to entry. 
(Official 3 – interview, 2018). 
 
The Case Study 2 business operator received no development support and was expected to meet 
all contractual obligations from day 1 of the contract. While SANParks acknowledged the 
infrastructure defects that she had inherited and that could retard her growth (aging infrastructure, 
restricted operating hours, weather seasonality, limitations on physical space, cultural heritage 
regulations), she was not afforded a cohesive developmental programme nor payment leniency.   
 
The Case Study 3 business operator committed her own equity, secured bank loans and invested 
R300 000 in the first three years.   SANParks provided risk-buffering by retaining a large degree 
of the maintenance and operational risk during the three-year developmental period (refuse 
removal, landscaping, provision of staff accommodation, servicing public toilets, security and 
parking areas). This allowed the operator to invest in the development of her brand and diversify 
her product. The willingness of SANParks to absorb risk during the establishment phase to allow 
the entrepreneur to focus on building the business is significant, a discussion that is taken up in the 
analysis later in chapter 5. It is important to note that this operator subsequently spent R120 000 in 
2009 on specialists to complete her tender submission when the tender was formally released 
through the Toolkit process to win the 10-year contract.  
 
Official 4 remarked on the value of the Toolkit in helping to insure both government and 
investors against risk: “Without it (the Toolkit) you get a lot of loose cannons. It covers 
government from getting whiplash. It opens up government for scrutiny if something goes 
wrong, gives security to investors, minimises risk on both sides” (Official 4 –interview, 2018). 
Significantly, both Case Study 1 and Case Study 2 retained the services of accounting, legal and 
labour relation’s specialists throughout the duration of their contract terms. Both treated the process 
as a critical investment and a necessary expense. Case Study 3 did not have a fulltime accountant 
to manage her books and while SANParks was remiss in its invoicing, it may have been an 
omission identified earlier by a professional. The invoicing debacle highlighted the fact that the 
prerogative remains with the entrepreneur to ensure that they have the resources and systems to 
contain their risk.  
4.10. Why the poor adoption of the Toolkit ?  
In the tourism sector in South Africa only SANParks, CapeNature (De Hoop PPP) and the Gauteng 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs (Cradle of Humankind 
PPP) have used the Tourism Toolkit. SANParks currently has 50 active PPP projects and is the 
only conservation agency to have established a specialist PPP Unit (SANParks, 2019). It was 
revealed in the interviews that no provincial or municipal agency has engaged with the Toolkit to 
release assets in its parks or nature reserves. Many have indicated interest from SANParks as also 
revealed in the interviews. Ezemvelo KZN, Mpumalanga Parks Board, Eastern Cape Parks and 
Tourism Agency, Limpopo Tourism and Parks have all been hosted by SANParks, at their request, 
to learn about tourism concessioning. However no projects have progressed beyond executive 
approval in these organisations (Official 2- interview, 2018). Interviewed respondents expressed 
their opinions on the possible reasons for this. Suggestions included that the complexity of the 
process and the capacity demands are a disincentive for  struggling agencies that do not have the 
funds to appoint Transaction Advisors. Respondents pointed out that these agencies also do not 
have the expertise internally to establish a team with the sole mandate of managing PPPs. A 
counter-opinion was that in the organisational culture of these agencies, officials prefer to retain 
internal control over budgets  and  the ability to influence  the awarding of tenders (Binza, 2009; 
Officials No: 1; 2; 5; 4 – interviews, 2018). One example :  
“PPPs take all decisions and access to tenders away from officials” (Official 1- 
interview, 2018) 
 
The literature showed the Toolkit PPP process to be a transparent process that demands high levels 
of accountability and disclosure from all participants. Adopting a PPP strategy requires that 
organisations adopt a partnership mindset that looks outwards and gives stakeholders access to 
how decisions are made.  Officials interviewed raised the issue of a reluctance of organisations to 
adopt PPPs as a long-term organisational strategy as it binds successive managers to PPP contracts 
that may stretch over 30 years or more: “Where facility managers used to be procuring all these 
things, they suddenly don’t have access.” (Official 2 -interview 2018).  
 
Arguments in the literature also referred to provincial and municipal competencies that are 
presented as possible reasons for the poor take up. The governing legislation framework for PPPs 
in South Africa includes the Public Finance Management Act, PFMA Treasury Regulation 16, the 
Municipal Finance Management Act, the Local Government Act, the Municipal Systems Act and 
Municipal PPP Regulations and the National Treasury Municipal Guidelines of Municipal Service 
Partnerships of 2006. The Public Finance Management Act (1999) regulates national and 
provincial PPPs, while the Municipal Finance Management Act regulates municipal PPPs. All 
institutions undertaking PPPs require approval from the National Treasury in four phases (the 
feasibility study, procurement, value for money and the final PPP agreement). These institutions 
go through regulatory tests that assess value for money, affordability and risk transfer before they 
are implemented. With municipalities the Municipal Council grants the approval while the 
National Treasury only issues their views and recommendations (Treasury Budget Review, 2019). 
The implication of this multi-level approvals route is that it causes impasses in decision-making.  
 
In 2006 the government announced a R320 billion public sector infrastructure investment 
programme as part of the Accelerated And Shared Growth Initiative For South Africa (ASGISA). 
This prompted the establishment of SPAID (Support Programme for Accelerated Infrastructure 
Development) that embarked on researching the challenges that impede delivery. They focused on 
four initial areas, each comprising a sub‐programme (SPAID , 2007).  
 
The results provide valuable indicators of the reasons for poor take up by other agencies.  For Sub 
Programme 2, “Support to Municipalities and Provinces”, the research found capacity constraints 
in municipalities in terms of implementing infrastructure projects together with a lack of 
coordination between support programmes seeking to address these constraints. The support 
programmes “have diverse objectives, are uncoordinated and are mostly short term….have limited 
capacity to spend their infrastructure budgets…lack alignment of funding instruments and do not 
have the ability to procure long term technical skills” (SPAID, 2008, p.3).  
 
For Sub-Programme 3 “Public Private Partnerships” SPAID (2007) found a lack of resources in 
municipalities. These included skills, time, transaction costs and ambiguity in respect of laws 
affecting municipal government. They also noted internal institutional barriers such as the 
extensive planning and analysis required when applying a PPP (SPAID Report #1 -2007). 
 
The report concluded that there are three interrelated areas of contention that remain unresolved 
that hinder the rollout of PPPs at provincial and municipal level: 
 
What policy objectives should PPPs achieve in South Africa?  
Does government favour the use of PPPs in general or only in specific circumstances or 
specific sectors? For example, Treasury’s view is that PPPs should be used to achieve value 
for money, optimal risk transfer and improvement of long term planning. However, many 
implementing agencies view PPPs as a vehicle for financing rather than for service delivery. 
 
What are PPPs in South Africa?  
Following from the first question, the operational definition of PPPs remains unclear.  Into 
the future the definition will determine which transactions fall within the ambit of the 
National PPP Unit vs those of provinces and municipalities. 
 
What is the role of the National PPP Unit?  
The answer to the second question will define the scope and responsibilities of the PPP Unit. 
The research found that while the National Treasury PPP Unit provides a strong legal 
framework for how to operationalise PPPs, they believe that South Africa needs higher level 
leadership on why, and under what circumstances, PPPs could or should be used to achieve 
policy goals.  
 
Relevant to objective of this research it is noted from the SPAID Report that the potential for the 
scaling of benefits from tourism PPPs via provinces and municipalities is hindered by what appears 
to be a combination of lack of national strategy, organisational culture and inadequate resource 
alignment.  
  
Two other sources offered explanations for the poor take-up by conservation agencies :  
Foremost was a senior SANParks official who felt, firstly that the problem lies with poor skill sets 
at local level. The argument in support of this view was that because SANParks was involved in 
PPPs from the start and had the International Finance Corporation as transaction advisors to guide 
the process, skills were developed and transferred in the organisation. Secondly, it requires that 
organisations invest in long-term strategies that ensures continuity when senior management 
changes. The fact that concessions may be awarded for extended periods requires a transparent 
organisational strategy that is not subject to the whim of individuals when leadership changes.  
Thirdly, the transparency that is inherent in the Toolkit process has established confidence in the 
concession programme for both internal and external stakeholders.  
 
Poor skills sets and inadequate capacity was a recurring inference from both the research 
participants and from the literature. The depth of knowledge and experience that SANParks has 
gained over 16 years cannot easily be replicated by new implementers who wish to initiate PPPs. 
It thus befits government and SANParks to be lead agents in a national drive to capacitate other 
agencies if government believes that increasing PPP rollout in protected areas has the potential to 
bring vital growth and investment opportunities to rural areas. 
 
4.11.  Conclusion  
The research examined the effectiveness of the Toolkit in creating benefit for local communities 
near or adjacent to national parks. The case studies provided nuanced accounts of the 
concessionaires’ experiences and allowed the researcher to gather insights to understand more 
clearly the barriers and constraints that they experience.  
The principles of fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost- effectiveness are set  out 
in the Constitution of South Africa as fundamentals of public procurement. While the literature 
review suggested that the constraints associated with the Toolkit bidding process might lie in the 
complexity of the language, the transaction costs, the time, resource demands and financial risk, 
the interview responses and the case studies hint at elements of the procurement process that may 
encourage greater small business participation and ensure long term success. For example : 
 
Case Study 1 took the most radically different path from the Toolkit’s prescripts, starting with the 
inclusiveness with which the project specifications were developed. The project employed 
interviewers to go door-to-door to present the community-PPP proposal and get inputs into the 
project’s desired objectives and outcomes. The level of transparency in this case study is a lesson 
in inclusiveness that could be factored in as a principle, if not in the methodology employed. 
Transparency was aided by community representatives being part of the selection process as well 
as part of the performance assessments of both the project managers and the business unit. The 
process followed in Case Study 1 suggests that there are a number of conventions associated with 
the early phase of the Toolkit process that could be revisited. Transparency definitions could be 
revised to go beyond the assumption that the implementer is the sole determiner of the project 
objectives and the only adjudicator involved in the awarding of the concession. The process could 
shed the anonymity associated with a paper-based application process without compromising 
competitiveness. It could, for example, engage with SMME applicants allowing them to make  
representations in person. This could reduce the potential bias that comes with assumptions about 
the proponent when a bid is received that has not had the benefit of extensive resource investment.   
Developmental support was formalised in the form of  appointing a third party to train and mentor 
members of the business unit in Case Study 1. This support was funded by government through a 
poverty relief programme using the sustainable livelihoods approach and was a significant factor 
in the success of the venture.  
 
In Case Study 2 the concessionaire received no financial or developmental support, pre- or post 
awarding of the contract. The bid specifications were revised because bidders felt that there was 
too much financial risk in the capital investment required for a three-year contract.  SANParks 
increased the black empowerment component that effectively tipped the scores in favour of a 
single-owner black female. Here the organisation was responsive to bidder’s feedback and was 
proactive in reasserting the transformation element as a primary value objective.    
 
In Case Study 3 SANParks created a support network at park level that included financial leniency 
and operational support. This allowed the operator to focus on building a brand and improving 
service standards, and less on concerns about rental and maintenance obligations. The agreement 
set a nominal rental so that the owner’s capital was invested in establishing the fundamentals of 
the product. 
 
However, in interviews a number of SANParks officials raised the concern that the low returns on 
small-cap concessions do not justify the resources required to release them. The financial review 
confirms this contention. Quantitative data was collected that presented the number of concessions 
awarded and the total revenue collected since the Strategic Plan for Commercialisation was 
introduced by SANParks in 2002. The figures show that the financial gains to the organisation are 
overwhelmingly from large concessions. Out of a total revenue of about a billion rand since 2002, 
the top ten earning concessions make up 83%. What does this mean for the PPP contribution of 
small businesses? Why should implementers even bother with small-cap PPP’s if the financial 
returns are so low? As National Treasury did not set targets and has no numerical gauge against 
which to assess achievements, can we say that the Toolkit has been effective? Since the 
Standardised PPP Provisions were introduced in 1998, a total of 31 projects have been signed off 
by National Treasury as completed. This is an average of less than two per year. These include 
hospitals, transport, roads, tourism and head office accommodation (PPP Unit Report, 2017). 
Comparatively, Public Finance Initiative in Britain on which the Toolkit was based, signed 450 
contracts between 1992 and 2001 (Allen, 2001) averaging about 50 per year. Of the BRICS 
countries India has more than 1300 PPP projects in different stages of implementation  and China 
has 11 260. These figures are not comparative as they do not describe the capital investment, the 
complexity of the processes, or the resource capacity in these countries but they highlight the 
inability of South Africa to measure performance against global standards due to the lack of initial 
targets. 
 
Tourism by definintion cannot dissociate itself from the communities or the ecosystems within 
which it operates. If the original objective of the Toolkit was a “revenue generating mechanism to 
subsidise conservation” (Official 1- Interview, 2018), then an implementer would be justified in 
allocating all its resources to ensure the best return on that primary measure. However, as the real 
world challenges and the literature review suggest, SANParks has a higher-level principled 
obligation to social redress with a bias to ensuring economic benefits to the poor. This obligation 
challenges the organisation to show how it will entrench social redress in its culture so that it is 
tangibly and sustainably experienced by the poor. While the Toolkit has proven its  ability to attract 
investment and improve tourism products and assets, it has yet to show how it is able to change 






























In this chapter the theoretical frameworks that were identified in the literature review are 
referenced to frame an understanding of the research findings. The four key themes that emerged 
are individually analysed within their socio-political contexts to suggest an interpretation of the 
findings within established theories.  
The themes of organisational and corporate change are framed within the neoliberal 
macroeconomic environment that was adopted by the new government and the public service that 
accompanied it. Corporate Change is specifically framed with the recognition that economic 
redistribution needs to be accelerated in South Africa and that corporate South Africa needs to 
commit to the highest form of ethical business practices. The theme of Transformation is framed 
within the legacy of apartheid that stratified society according to race and denied the socio-
economic advancement of black South Africans. The theme of Risk is framed within the context 
of the entrepreneurial ecosystem that determines the potential for a business to succeed. The 
chapter ends with suggestions for praxis that responds to the research findings. It outlines a series 
of policy and practical initiatives that could improve the Toolkit as a vehicle for economic 
transformation.  
Theoretical links between the literature and the research findings. 
 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 identified institutional and legal challenges to small businesses 
that include among others the cost of transacting, lack of resource capacity, inadequate training, 
limited funding, poor developmental support, and high costs of compliance and registration 
(SPAID, 2007; UNESCAP 2012; Rankin 2006; Woodward et al., 2011). There has been evolution 
in the legislative and policy environment around the Toolkit, in particular in the Tourism Sector 
Codes and the Preferential Procurement Regulations, but no change in its design or its orientation 
(DTI, 2017; NDT, 2016). 
Figure 9. below represents the Toolkit’s entrepreneurial ecosystem as perceived by the four major 
stakeholders in South Africa.  The themes illustrate the absence of, or the call for, greater 
empowerment measures to be included in the Toolkit and reflect the desire for commitment by the 
parties to agree a common shared stakeholder value position.   
 
Figure 10 : Schematic of interrelatedness of global themes (source : author) 
 
5.2. Theme 1: Organisational Change and the Neoliberal macro-economic environment  
Why has transformation not happened more extensively? Chapter 2 presented a detailed 
description of how the South African government’s post-apartheid macroeconomic framework 
determined the orientation of national policy and the strategic objectives that underpinned them. 
The rejection of RDP for GEAR shifted the policy orientation towards the corporatization of the 
state and the promotion of economic growth through the liberation of the economy and private 
sector investment. (Bhorat et al., 2014; Lemon, 2004; Habib, 1997; Marais, 1998; Bond, 2000; 
Khoza 2001). The literature identified ‘Asian Tiger’ countries that followed an aggressive 
developmental route with notorious success and offered alternative scenarios to South Africa’s 
economic path (Saad-filho, 2010). As described in Chapter 2, the original intention of the Toolkit 
was to develop a procurement mechanism that would seduce local and international investment 
capital to enter into partnership agreements that would generate revenue for government. (National 
Treasury, 2005; Official 1- interview 2018; Fearnhead, 2003; Maguranyanga, 2009). Theme 1 
revealed respondents’ perceptions and views of the strong ideological link between the post-
apartheid macroeconomic orientation and the reasons why many organisations, in the  case of the 
current study, SANParks, did not institutionalise their responsibility to develop and support small 
business.  
Part of the explanation lies in New Public Management that took hold in the late nineties. NPM 
corporatised the state and included the introduction of management elements such as target setting, 
monitoring and evaluation, administrative efficiency and performance management. The 
corporatisation of the public sector was modelled on neoliberal western governments and driven 
by international management consultants who promoted the global investment agenda through 
sophisticated restructuring models that promised increased revenue through business efficiencies 
(Cameron, 2005). This corporatization represented an attempt to professionalise an inefficient 
South African civil service. International funding agencies and management consultancies like the 
World Bank, IMF, OECD, Mckinsey and PWC spread their influence across ANC policy 
formulation that included the development of the PPP Toolkit. The Toolkit was largely a 
reproduction of what had been implemented in countries such as New Zealand, the USA and the 
UK (Hall, 2015; Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; McCourt, 2001; Hughes, 2003; Minoque, 
1998; Pollitt, 1993; Haque, 2000). Institutional isomorphism and corporatisation became more 
entrenched as the public sector became more conforming, less diverse and less innovative. 
The research findings of the current study elevate the responsibility of government to transform 
the economy to advance black entrepreneurial growth. For this, government and its agencies need 
to employ the legislative tools that it has at its disposal. It is clear that although the public sector 
was given the legislative tools, it did not enforce them (NDT, 2018). This can be explained in large 
part by the pervasiveness of neo-liberalism that seduces developing nations with investment only 
to control the way profits are disbursed (Koelble, 2004; Schilcher, 2007). It also was confirmed in 
the literature that big business avoided its transformation obligations, instead finding willing black 
partners to circumvent the real transfer of ownership. Therefore, notwithstanding the SANParks 
pro-empowerment ambitions in the early 2000s, the organisation was not in a position to take on 
big business with the bold policy positions it has recently taken, being that investment capital lay 
in white hands and without whom there would have been no concessions. Official 2 (interview 
2018) confirmed that institutions were left to make their own decisions about empowerment but in 
fact did not  “because it’s difficult for black business to raise capital and this would exclude them”. 
As indication of how the transformation imperative has been elevated SANParks has recently 
committed itself to an aggressive programme to ensure that transformation in the concessioning 
programme is accelerated. This programme includes: 
 
Enterprise Development 
SANParks has adopted the component of the Tourism Charter that allows it to impose 
contractual obligations on large concessionaires to commit to enterprise development targets. 
Recent PPP contracts have introduced enforced sub-contracting of PPP Projects of 30% 
partnership with 51% black owned EME or QSE and a contractual obligation to develop no 
fewer than seven new SMMEs over the course of the contract period.  
Ring-fencing  
In April 2018, the organisation adopted a policy that ring-fences SMME PPPs. This is 
intended to enable categories of enterprises to compete against like-sized entrepreneurs. Table 
10 indicates the turnover thresholds for companies wanting to tender for PPPs in SANParks.   
Table 11 – Ring-fenced value of PPP opportunities for Small Business: 
Required Capital Investment of 
Project 
Maximum Existing Turnover of Bidder 
< R2,5 million R 5 million 
R2.5 million to R5 million R10 million 
R5 million to R10 million R20 million 
>R10 million Unlimited 
 
In terms of the ring-fencing protocol, when small opportunities are advertised, bidders are 
invited to a training session to assist them with the submission of a tender. Tender 
requirements are adapted to allow for entrepreneurial participation but that does not  
compromise on the technical requirements to undertake the project (SANParks, 2019 
unpublished).  
 
SANParks introduced this policy in response to the argument that white businesses dominate 
the sector and retard transformation due to their historical economic advantage (Rogerson 
2004; 2008). This is an encouraging advancement and is consistent with the organisation’s 
strategic goal to strive for “progressive, equitable and fair socio-economic transformation”  
(SANParks Annual Report, 2019:27).   
 
“our investments in small business is part of the national transformation agenda. 
Our mentoring, coaching, enterprise development is part of this mandate’ (Official 
2 -interview 2018). 
 
5.3. Theme 2: Corporate Change, economic redistribution and ethical business practices 
The most recent B-BBEE Tourism Charter (2016) set new targets for Enterprise Development for 
big business and for equity shareholding to black partners. During interviews with research 
respondents, Treasury and SANParks officials made the case that big business should be made 
more responsible for the development of small business. The transformation agenda is multi-
layered and includes development support initiatives from government agencies, NGOs, DFIs and 
from countries outside South Africa. Alongside this, the Sustainable Development Goals 
internationally and National Development Plan locally, set bold targets for the reversal of 
economic imbalances. Both place strong emphasis on systemic change in how government and 
business approach sustainable development and economic growth. These targets demand that 
business incorporate a wider set of economic, environmental and social impact measures over and 
above the bottom line. The setting of these targets requires a change of attitude towards ethical 
business behaviour that business has to, preferably willingly, commit to as a development agent. 
These programmes and their methodologies are based on the principle that the interests of business 
and society are integrally entwined and that due to divisive historical relationships, institutional 
change and enabling legislation are required to advance social and economic growth (Agarwal et 
al., 2017).  
Other than the three key measures (value for money, affordability and risk transfer), there were no 
transformation or developmental goals included as part of the Toolkit. The literature confirmed 
that transformation in the sector has been severely lacking (NDT Report, 2013; 2018). In 
interviews, the implementation of B-BBEE surfaced as a recurring theme. Official 1 confirmed 
that no targets were set, only that it was meant to “boost the industry and inspire investment” 
(Official 1 – interview 2018). The emergence of the lack of transformation as a dominant theme 
was driven by the feelings of respondents that big business has continued to benefit from historical 
privilege without delivering on its obligation to share economic benefits. Respondents made 
reference to big business as “cartels” and as “arrogant” (Official 1 – interview 2018). Elsewhere 
respondents acknowledged that “transformation hasn’t happened fast enough” and “we should 
have started earlier” (Official 4-  interview 2018) and another suggested the need to distinguish 
between a ‘a Commercial PPP and a Socio-economic benefit PPP, with special payment terms’ 
(Official 2 – interview 2018).  
  
The only reference to socio-economic development in the Toolkit is to the B-BBEE Charter. It was 
left to implementers of the original Toolkit to decide on the degree of transformation they would 
apply under the B-BBEE and Preferential Procurement Act legislation. The Treasury official 
commented on the difficulty of setting targets : “We have not set any targets. It is difficult to set 
targets…because you have your BBB-EE policies. We leave it to the institution to determine the 
empowerment levels ...there is flexibility within institutions to develop their own targets.” (Official 
1 –interview, 2018). 
 
The B-BBEE Tourism Charter Council, government’s authority to facilitate transformation of the 
sector, concluded in its 2018 State of Transformation Report that transformation in the sector is 
poor and identified a lack of access to concession opportunities for Small Business as one of the 
problems. In its presentation to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Tourism (2017), the Charter 
Council reported that the majority of tourism enterprises were failing to meet transformation targets 
across all the elements of the B-BBEE scorecard (PMG, 9 June 2017). 
 
The State of Transformation report noted that:  
 The vast majority of tourism enterprises have no black female shareholding. 
 Exempted Micro Enterprises (EMEs) and Qualifying Small Enterprises (QSEs) have not 
introduced any full black shareholding into their organisations.  
 There is a very low level of black female absorption of tourism enterprises at directorship 
level. 
 The recruitment and retention of black skilled staff is poor. 
 Access to funding remains a challenge. 
 Awareness of the tourism sector specific code is lowest amongst EME’s. 
 
On the B-BBEE Recognition Level of EMEs only 3% of enterprises rated as Level 1, 4% as Level 
2 and 8% as Level 3, indicating that the small business component remains majority non-Black. 
For QSEs the hospitality and travel-related sub-sectors still have a majority of enterprises that 
scored as Level 4, indicating little transformation in its organisational structures. For Large 
Enterprise, the majority of large tourism enterprises have not transformed as per their sector 
scorecards (NDT Baseline Study - 12 March 2018 - Powerpoint).  
 
In the last three decades the parameters have shifted in terms of what constitutes acceptable 
corporate behaviour. The Tourism PPP Toolkit (2005) was developed before the global shift that 
redefined the concept of benefit and forced businesses to consider their environmental, social and 
governance impacts. Interestingly “South Africa is the only country worldwide with a Constitution 
that recognizes sustainable development as a human right, with publicly listed companies 
obligated to report on their sustainability activities and performance” (Du Plooy, 2006 cited in 
Ludeke-Freund, et al 2016, p. 16). The design of the Toolkit reflects the utilitarian mindset of 
business at the time, where shareholder value was prioritised over the developmental interests of 
society (Porter & Kramer, 2011; Schwartz, 2012; UNEP, 2013). Balance sheet measures began to 
be integrated with Environment, Social and Governance performance measures (ESG) that shifted 
the ‘social obligation’ and ‘payback’ expected from corporates to multi-dimensional levels that 
required mainstreaming of business ethics around sustainability, healthy ecosystems, job creation 
and public health. Elkington (1998) referred to this as the “people, planet and profit” orientation 
(Elkington 1998, cited in Breuer & Lüdeke-Freund, 2016 p. 13) where the emphasis shifts from 
solely financial shareholders to include non-financial stakeholders. It also takes into consideration 
the importance of distinguishing value between shareholders and stakeholders. More differentiated 
notions of value and values reveals two facets: firstly, “value as a form of expected output and 
outcome, such as financial revenues or reduced social and environmental impacts” and secondly, 
value as a subjective notion of the desirables “expressed as beliefs, attitudes and behaviours” 
(Ludeke-Freund, et al, 2016, p.16).  
Offical 3 posed this question about the two different kinds of value: 
‘What is the Toolkit’s value for money proposition?  Is it about financial gain or social 
benefit? And have we been using the wrong measure? (Official 3- interview 2018) 
Notwithstanding that it was designed in post-apartheid South Africa with a population that was 
seeking healing and justice, the Toolkit was designed with only financial and asset-gain measures 
related to value for money, risk transfer and affordability. Official 1 said that the Toolkit can be 
used to breakup “cartels, where the money revolves around the same guys” and in that way “share 
benefits” (Official 1- interview 2018). However, the Toolkit was not designed to do that. The 
Toolkit was primarily designed to generate revenue, ensure operational compliance and reduce 
financial risk; it was not designed as a mechanism for transformation. Sources confirmed that the 
Toolkit was developed without empowerment targets and with a strong emphasis on its technical 
and auditing robustness [DTI; National Treasury, 2005). 
5.4. Theme 3: Transformation and the legacy of Apartheid 
 
5.4.1. Social transformation. 
The National Planning Commission, taking its cue from the National Development Plan, defined 
transformation as a “fairer balance in ownership, production, distribution and consumption as well 
as of opportunities” (Vision2030). Marais (1998) unpacks transformation further and separates 
deep transformation from shallow transformation (Marias 1998, in Poonan 2004). Shallow 
transformation calls for deracialised neo-capitalism with privatisation and a degree of poverty 
alleviation. Deep transformation involves the establishment of a social democracy that is grounded 
in human rights with the aim of transforming the entire society and economy through state 
intervention to create a developmental state. As the literature review in Chapter 2 indicated, the 
new democratic government chose the former path.  
 
Transformation and SANParks  
With the transition to democracy in 1994 the National Parks Board was confronted for the first 
time in its history with having to justify the existence of a National Park system and was challenged 
to explain its position on inclusivity and redress (Poonan, 2004).  The organisation’s biodiversity 
mandate had suddenly morphed into multiple conflicting mandates for which the organisation was 
not prepared. SANParks has since 1994 sought to reposition itself, moving away from its apartheid 
image as a conservation body that existed for the exclusive preserve of white people. The forced 
removal of black people from their land, the alienation of indigenous cultures and traditions and 
their loss of access to the productive capacity of the soil, are some of the organisation’s most 
painful legacies.  
 
The path the organisation took to redefine its conservation mandate and move it towards social 
inclusivity was met with resistance by both the internal and external ‘old guard’ who believed that 
the conservation of biodiversity is defined solely in terms of nature preservation and that social 
justice is not the concern of conservation (Khan, 2000). Institutionally SANParks inherited a legacy 
of environmental racism from the National Parks Board, one that was entrenched in many corners 
of the organisation. This was supported by the historical beneficiaries of the exclusionist policies 
and buttressed by the anti-black and anti-poor legislation prevailing at the time.  
 
Poonan (2004) described the transitional history of the organisation as it contested these 
challenges. The early approach to transformation in SANParks targeted four areas that the 
organisation felt required urgent change, namely land restitution, representativity, nation building 
and relations with neighbouring communities (Poonan, 2004). The responsibility for implementing 
the transformation fell to the newly established Social Ecology department, with its broad mandate 
to find constructive ways to link biodiversity conservation with social justice. For its delivery it 
defined four core areas, namely, environmental education, economic empowerment, cultural 
heritage and community outreach. What is telling is that, since its establishment, the Social 
Ecology Department has itself transitioned through different name changes and focus areas, name-
changes that reflect the internal challenges that the organisation went through over the period. 
From ‘Social Ecology’ in 1995 it became known as ‘People and Conservation’ in 2004, ‘Socio-
Economic Development” in 2014 and has been ‘Socio-Economic Transformation’ since 2019, with 
additional mandates that include the wildlife economy and enterprise development.   
 
The benefits of the transition from an exclusionary to an inclusive organisation have seemingly 
only moderately been experienced by the respondents in the study. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to deeply explore the reasons for this, but Poonan (2004) concluded that in the early years of 
transition, from 1994 to 2004, “the ideas formulated as social ecology and the social ecology 
department structures established to drive the transformation of SANParks - neither the ideas or 
the structures….were strong or coherent enough to do so” (Poonan, 2004, p. 212). 
 
Maguranyanga (2009) argued that, faced with the need to establish legitimacy in the new South 
Africa, SANParks chose the route of ‘enlightened pragmatism’ that involved aligning the 
organization with the  broader government goals of transformation, black empowerment and local 
socio-economic development “while keeping a big part of its conservation agenda and structure 
more or less intact” (Maguranyanga, 2009, p. X). This was a self-preservation strategy rather than 
a deeply internalised and transformative restructuring. Many positives are noted at the time about 
the organisation’s ability to adapt to the political change and gain the confidence of government. 
This allowed it to leverage government funded socio-economic programmes such as the Expanded 
Public Works Programme (EPWP), Working for Water and Infrastructure Development 
Programme funding. Maguranyanga (2009) however, descries this period as a “rigidity in 
organizational practice…and failure to integrate People and Conservation with core functions”. 
(Maguranyanga, 2009, p. 184 ). 
 
5.4.2. Economic transformation 
The NDP (2012) defines economic transformation as a need to address the ownership of economic 
assets, access to economic opportunities, income and wealth distribution, access to public goods 
and the structure of the economy and polity. It says the country needs to move: 
–   away from extractive sectors to more inclusive approaches  
–  away from extraction of super profits towards a more equitable distribution of 
income  
–  away from low wage labour relations to a high wage, inclusive and participatory 
labour relations system. 
 
Mabuza (2016) advocates for governments to recognise the value of PPPs in boosting job creation: 
 
“…debates in the PPP arena are about finding the best way of using the private sector to 
deliver public infrastructure, but little is said about using PPPs to develop SMEs and create 
jobs for the poor. This is the missing link that governments should use to boost job creation 
through SME development” (Mabuza, 2016, p. 28).  
 
South Africa’s development path indicates unsustainable patterns, environmentally, socially and 
economically (DEA and UNEP, 2013) which makes it important to record substantive changes that 
take place in businesses that experience benefit-flow from concessions. A wide range of 
assessments of these changes could be employed, such as capital investment, turnover, jobs 
created, black shareholding, new businesses created, or other variations of social impacts.   
 
5.5. Theme 4: Risk management and the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 
 
5.5.1. Enterprise Risk Management 
In its definition of risk the Toolkit identifies seven categories, namely market, demand or volume 
risk; construction risk; operating risk; political risk; environmental risk; financial risk and 
regulatory risk.  Agawal et al. (2017), in a 2014 company-community conflict study, identified the 
need to “tie cost-benefit calculations to values and not only risks” (Agarwal 2017, p.12).  This 
theme emerges in the study because the respondents, officials and concessionaires, believe 
government and business should redefine the concept of risk to include that greater risk be absorbed 
by big business and the State. This is a broader, more inclusive definition of risk than that in the 
Toolkit that sets the public entity implementer up to define the ‘substantial transfer’ of financial, 
technical and operational risk to the private entity (Treasury 2005). The Toolkit includes the caveat 
that risk should be borne by the party ‘best able manage that particular risk’. This gives rise to 
ambiguity in the interpretation as the ‘substantial transfer’ mandate is, or can be interpreted as the 
overriding dictate by officials in that the ‘substantial’ transfer of risk is considered by the 
implementer to be the success measure. Fombard (2013) highlights the need for clarification of the 
definition of risk in PPPs in concluding that “the bottom line is to ensure that defined risk is 
allocated optimally, rather than maximising risk transfer’ (2013, p. 21).  
 
This interpretation of risk in the Toolkit is understandable when negotiations are held with big 
industry players, but cannot be the same for small business that do not have the same collateral or 
asset base to buffer risk. We are reminded that two of the case studies in the current research 
deviated from this Toolkit prescript and SANParks absorbed a large part of the risk during the 
honeymoon period to enable the businesses to successfully establish themselves (Case Study 1 and 
Case Study 3).  
 
The research findings show the transfer of risk (financial, technical and operational) to be a critical 
factor influencing the success of small concessions. However, the assessment of small business 
risk in South Africa follows a frustratingly circular narrative because SMMEs tend to be generally 
poor at financial record-keeping. Traditional banks and financial institutions working from a risk-
minimization premise, report that they are forced to downgrade the credit status of small business 
due to a lack of financial and administrative information. Establishment banks are therefore rarely 
seen as favourable when profiling small business (Smit, 2012; Berry et al (2002).; Mutezo, 2013).  
 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) presents a strategic approach for business owners to employ 
to optimise opportunities associated with risks. ERM is an inclusive assessment of risk that values 
the entrepreneur’s understanding of exposure across the span of enterprise risks that include 
“strategic risks, operational risks, financial risks and regulatory compliance risks” (Engle, 2009, p. 
20), to develop a holistic impression of the business. ERM presents the argument that financial 
data alone does not describe the health and potential of a small business, yet it is the most 
commonly employed method. Financial analysis without strategic information, such as quality, 
client satisfaction and innovation ignores essential factors that determine a business’s ability to 
respond to the environment in which it operates. Non-financial factors, such as client loyalty, 
employee satisfaction and effective internal processes are essential determinants not allowed for 
in the accounting data. Incorporation of intangible assets in a risk assessment should in theory 
broaden the chances that an SME’s risk will be favorably assessed than it would if assessed solely 
via financial statements (Hofmann, 2009; Engle, 2009; St Pierre & Bahri, 2006;  Cumby & Conrod, 
2001; Ittner & Larcker, 1998 in Smit & Watkins, 2012). To mitigate the high failure rate and 
promote the sustainability of small business that access opportunities through the Toolkit, policy 
makers need to revisit the specific ways in which risk is assessed and apportioned in the PPP 
contract. 
 
The Value for Money assessment is premised on the New Public Management belief that the 
private sector is more efficient and better able to absorb risk. The efficiency of the private sector 
would therefore negate the inefficiency of the state, resulting in a positive return to the taxpayer. 
The need for implementers of the Toolkit to achieve ‘substantial’ transfer of risk to the private 
sector is intended as a cost-saving to government. The private sector efficiencies are meant to be 
in time and cost estimates, procurement process and labour provisions (Allen, 2001, p.27).  
However, the private sector has been exposed for its commercial greed and lack of commitment to 
the public good.  Official 3 (interview, 2018) indicated that in his opinion the value for money 
aspect of the Toolkit is often a moving target based on the  intuition of officials, or the ability of 
proponents to sell a convincing business model.    
5.5.2. Risk and social impact measures for small business  
The findings of the current study suggest that the value contribution of small businesses do not lie 
in the financial returns expected by the Toolkit. These findings suggest that the measures that are 
used to gauge success need to be different for small and large cap PPPs. The revenue that small 
businesses make is barely significant in comparison with large concessions. Thus, if the Toolkit is 
to take a transformative developmental approach it needs to redefine the value contribution of  
small business in being able to penetrate the economy at grassroots where innovation is 
encouraged, new businesses are established, jobs are created and new talents are discovered. While 
large-cap PPPs should rightfully be measured on their financial returns and on their ability to 
propagate new business,  small-cap PPPs should be measured on the social impacts in communities 
at household level. Meaning not solely on economic measures, but on their ability to positively 
respond to deficiencies in the social development network. Big business needs to subscribe to these 
impact measures for small business so that small businesses are not assumed to have failed when 
their profitability is not immediate.  
5.6. Recommendations for Praxis -Innovations that could to expand entry options for small 
business 
Discussion is presented here on opportunities for SANParks to innovate and expand on the entry 
points for small business. Understanding that SANParks is a proxy of government, it is reasonable 
to extend the recommendations to government when reconceptualising the Toolkit. Recently 
Treasury indicated that there has been a more than 55% decline in the value of PPPs since 2012 
(National Treasury Budget Review, 2019).  
The praxis question is “How does SANParks implement the change that is actionable and 
affordable ?” A suggestion for praxis is presented below in the form of four complementary 
initiatives.  
 
5.6.1. Commercial Permitting 
Commercial permitting refers to the issuing of short-term (up to three years) commercial permits 
to entry-level entrepreneurs. This period should be used as a mentored developmental stage during 
which support organisations combine to develop the entrepreneurial capacity of the small business. 
This would include practical business and operational skills, facilitating the acquisition of capital 
assets and getting to understand the target market.  
 
The Protected Areas Act gives SANParks the right to license commercial activities in National 
Parks under Section 50 NEMA:PAA with Section 20 of the Regulations specifying that a person 
may not undertake any of the following activities in a special nature reserve, national park or world 
heritage site, except pursuant to a license, permit or agreement and subject to the payment of the 
appropriate fees : 
 
(a) the filming and simultaneous transmitting of photographic images by the use of a 
webcam or other image recording or transmitting device; or (b) conducting tours; or (c) 
conducting any kind of competition; or (d) selling or hiring goods or offering goods for 
sale or hire; or (e) providing, or offering to provide, any service for a fee or reward; or 
(f) conducting speed trials; or (g) the conducting of research; or (h) an activity of any 
kind for the purpose of fund raising, personal gain or making a profit; or (i) undertake 
any organized or special event, including sporting or cultural events without permission 
of management authority; or (j) visual imaging of animals for the purposes of any virtual 
hunting or other such activity without permission from management authority. 
 
This means that SANParks, following a simplified public process, can grant non-exclusive 
permission for entry-level small businesses to use state assets to generate income along the same 
principles as the Toolkit. This would include a competitive public process; submission of a 
business plan, a viability and risk analysis, and a permit fee. To effect this the institution would 
need to train and capacitate staff down to the lowest operational level so that permit holders and 
their businesses are integrated into operations. 
5.6.2. Honeymoon Period 
Many small businesses do not have cash reserves and are most vulnerable in the first year. (Berger 
& Udell, 2001; Reynolds & Lancaster, 2006 in Smit et al., 2012). Commercial permitting could 
be combined with  a ‘honeymoon’ period that exempts small business from paying the minimal 
rental or concession fee while they are establishing their business as in Case Studies 1 and 3. In 
this way SANParks will be able to assess the quality, skills and commitment of the entrepreneur; 
the viability and value-add of the product; coach, train and support the SMME to deliver to the 
quality standard; meet legal compliance requirements and subsequently be able to prepare a full 
PPP using real statistics and institutional insights. The honeymoon period allows the SMME to 
gain the necessary experience to train staff, manage the product, understand the customer, establish 
administrative systems, accumulate capital and innovate, all with minimum risk.   
 
5.6.3. Sustainable Livelihoods Programme Approach  
“I think we were a bit ahead of our time actually” (NPO project manager –interview,  
2018) 
 
The support provided by the NPO through the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach presented a 
developmental methodology that takes the deep transformation approach to the development of 
small black business in PPPs. Acknowledging that there is financial outlay to the approach, it needs 
to be considered in relation to the opportunity costs that come with small businesses that fail and  
the real return-on-investment of existing government small business support programmes. As the 
official responsible for the Sustainable Livelihoods Programme explained, the SLP was discarded 
by government for the Expanded Public Works Programme approach that chose task-based work 
and daily wage as job-creation success measures. While the importance of the EPWPs in providing 
relief to the poor is not questioned, it remains a short-term solution, generating sporadic work and 
often unpredictable income and with very little in the way of empowerment for the beneficiaries. 
 
SANParks could consider an agency approach to the nurturing of small business, as described in 
Case Study 1, as it does not as yet have the resources to do it in-house. As one official suggested: 
“The Sustainable Livelihoods methodology can’t be restricted by annual budgets. It’s 
an ongoing, long term investment, up to five years at least.” (Official 8 – interview, 
2018)  
The SLP investment in the sustainability of the enterprise would be made with the confidence that 
the investment is secured in a concession contract with a state agency. The NPO project manager 
described the aims of the SCLP project that are equally relevant to SANParks today: 
 
“…it was trying to translate the policy statements and political rhetoric, what people 
were promising and trying to translate it into action”  (NPO project manager –
interview,  2018) 
5.6.4. Training and Development  
Official 6 gave his views on the usefulness and implementation of an improved Toolkit: 
“Give staff our own Toolkit and empower them to manage small business”.  
‘Small PPPs must be run at park level. Staff need to be re-orientated but we need to give 
them the template’. 
‘The on-the-ground contact person needs to be whole team” (Official 6-  interview, 2018) 
The official made a strong motivation for a staff toolkit to guide SANParks staff on how to manage 
small businesses in a park. If we were to conceptualise the framework of a ‘Staff Toolkit’, what 
could that look like ? The praxis suggests the following as a broad framework :  
 Framework for Business Support Toolkit for Operational staff : 
Course Structure 
i. Introduction  
ii. Training 
iii. Monitoring and  evaluation 
iv. Risk assessment  
v. Partners 
 
Each of the elements of this framework are discussed below. 
 
i. Introduction  
A framework to release small-cap business opportunities is provided in the SANParks 
SPfC (Annexure B - SANParks, 2013). The proposed internal decision-making process 
describes three levels of delegation that includes a) process b) institutional 
responsibility and c) institutional approval. The methodology is aimed at assisting park 
managers to implement Micro PPPs that have commercial potential and is accompanied 
by abridged versions of the Toolkit templates. These include the PPP pre-feasibility 
requirements, feasibility template, advert, the RFP and abridged PPP agreement. The 
resource deficit in skills and competencies that was identified by the research can be 
addressed by harnessing the capacity that exists throughout the organisation rather than 
PPP’s being restricted to a specialist business unit. The corporate business development 
unit would then focus entirely on the large-cap concessions. 
 
ii. Training  
Training is essential in order to build the capacity for staff to do pre-feasibilities and 
assessments so that small-cap PPPs can be rolled out at park level. This has the potential 
to improve the turnaround times for decision-making, contract management and 
monitoring, and to distribute accountability more widely. Park operations need to 
oversee the six-phase PPP process that accompanies the introduction of new PPPs and 
be responsible for reporting on the impact of new products across the triple bottom line. 
Table 12 below shows  the suggested attendees of the programme, together with the 
resources that would be required. 
 
 
Table 12 – Outline for staff training programme:  
  
ATTENDEES  COURSE CONTENT  
 








Section Rangers,  
Tourism Officers   
Admin Assistants, 
Project managers    
 
 1.  Regulations and key policy 
issues  
AN       2. Commercialisation Strategy 
  3. Process checklist 
a. Micro PPPs  (including 
ROI feasibility training) 
b. Commercial Permitting   
c. Community PPPs 
 4.  Contract and Risk 
management  
Trainers required skills set :  
o Business (including financial 
feasibilities, SCM)  
o Legal (including contract 
management) 
o Project management (including 
operations, technical) 
o Change management (including skills 
development) 
o Communications (including report 
writing)  
 
   
iii. Monitoring and evaluation  
The responsibility for monitoring and evaluation needs to lie at operational level so that 
standards can be managed and additional resources deployed as required. The 
monitoring and evaluation of new products across the triple bottom line should be 
incorporated into the Key Performance Areas and reporting formats of relevant staff. 
The following aspects and criteria should be included in the monitoring and evaluation 
plan: 
  
1. Relevant and reliable research, particularly with respect to the demand 
analysis, visitor trends, visitor demographics and pricing.   
2. Measuring operational efficiencies, including staffing capacity, energy usage, 
transport costs, carbon footprint, eco-friendliness of materials, purchasing 
processes and SMME empowerment  
3. Measuring community beneficiation that includes enterprise development, job 




iv. Risk assessment  
Risk is assessed as part of the feasibility and due diligence studies and needs to be 
constantly monitored and revised as required. The risk matrix framework for small-
cap PPPs is summarised in Table 13 below.  It should contain the headings as shown 
in the table (three examples of risk are provided) :  
Table 13: Risk matrix framework 
Risk Risk Description (example) 
Risk Implication 
(example) 
Risk Mitigation (example) 
Inefficient 
operations  
Ineffective administrative controls 
allow for wastage and theft.  
Retaining regular suppliers that are not 
the best value for money option.  
Revenue is lost 
through subsidised 
budgeting, causing a 




 Controls need to be in place 
and actively monitored to 
minimise wastage. 
 Management needs to be 
capacitated to do financial 
and operational diagnosis of 





The business does not have adequate 
information about its visitors/target 
group to make  properly informed 
decisions. 
Inaccurate or limited 




supply  or 
marketing.  
Develop a reliable market 
research protocol that provides 
accurate information.  
Lack of a 
willingness 
to change  
Owners develop attachments to 
products and are reluctant to 
acknowledge failure. Resources are 
continually allocate to sustain the 
product. 
 Valuable operating 
funds are wasted.  
The product viability 
assessment needs to be 
objective so that the bottom-
line is  accurate. 
 
 vi. Partnerships  
Simultaneously there is a need to develop the capacity of local entrepreneurs to effectively 
benefit from opportunities in the value chain. A formalised training programme needs to be 
introduced, assisted by partner organisations in which not only the Toolkit knowledge is 
transferred, but networks are established for the support and mentoring of local 
entrepreneurs.  The Training Plan requires key internal and external partnerships be in 








Table 14 -  Key internal and external partners  
 
 
Internal Partner  Responsibility 
Park Management   Ownership of the training plan lies with park management. The 
responsibility of park management is to discover and drive new PPPs 
and ensure that park resources are appropriately allocated.  
Human Resources  Department HRD assists new concessionaires with orientation to the organisation 
and with change management where new products are introduced or 
when PPPs are exiting 
Legal Department Legal department assists with formulating contracts, reviewing  existing 
contracts and advising management on amendments.  
Marketing Department Marketing assists with branding, merchandising, promotions, public 
relations and integration with SANParks marketing strategy.  
Technical Services Department Technical Services provides project management and infrastructure 
expertise. 
Conservation and Scientific 
Services Division   
CSD provides guidance on SEA’s, EIA’s, sensitivity analysis, carrying 
capacities. 
Tourism operations Corporate Tourism Operations assists with Tourism strategy 
formulation, policy development, standards setting. 
Regional Business Managers  RBM’s assist with pre-feasibility assessments, contract negotiations,  
staff training, contract management. 
Socio-economic 
Transformation 
SET provides guidance on the beneficiation strategy and measurement, 
enterprise development, partnerships and training.  
Corporate IT  IT ensures that systems are streamlined to ensure optimum technological 
integration and efficiency.  
Fundraising Department  Fundraising Department  assists with sourcing internal and external 
financial support for entrepreneurial development  
Infrastructure Development 
Programme   
IDP provides Infrastructure Funding for delivery of support 
infrastructure that allow new PPPs to be released  
Biodiversity Social Projects  BSP assists with community liaison, beneficiation rollout, training and 




Department of Treasury Provides authorisations, advice and support. 
National Department of 
Tourism  




Regional Departments of 
Tourism and/or Economic 
Development 
Corporate business partners   
Department of Small Business 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the research findings in context of some of the dominant theoretical 
frameworks to assess the consistency and logic of the findings.  
The neoliberal macro-economic framework recurred throughout the chapter as an ideological link 
that determined how institutions responded to the post-apartheid transition. Institutions were 
subject to institutional isomorphism that limited independent approaches to change and innovation. 
In the case of SANParks it was identified that the organisation struggled in the post-apartheid era 
to shed its identity as a traditional preservationist conservation agency. Respondents indicated that 
they felt that the organisation had not yet institutionalised a mentoring and support culture for 
small business. While transformation has been slow, interesting new initiatives are being 
implemented in the organisation to facilitate the necessary change by, for example, ring fencing 
opportunities for small business. Social and economic transformation was discussed as an 
overarching theme that contextualised the respondents’ perspectives on the effectiveness of the 
Toolkit. The distinction between deep transformation and shallow transformation highlighted how 
the route chosen by the ANC post-apartheid, resulted in a regression in economic growth for the 
majority of the population.  
The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem model located the responsibilities of each of the parties in the 
concessionaire ecosystem and emphasised the importance of their coordination for small 
businesses to be sustainable. The criteria for risk assessment for small businesses was discussed 
within the Enterprise Risk Management framework and concluded that the traditional one-
dimensional financial measure that is used by establishment financial institutions disadvantages 
small business and that it is more useful to measure small business on their social impacts at 
grassroots level.  
The chapter ended with four areas of recommendation for praxis in SANParks that the researcher 
believes would promote access of small businesses into the Toolkit process and lead to greater 
distribution of benefits and opportunities. 
 
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
6.1. Future Research Areas 
 
Each of the four themes that emerged raised questions that could be considered for future research. 
The questions cut across policy, legislation, resource allocation and implementation and should be 
approached holistically within the context of the research question.   
 
Organisational change   
Why have other agencies not adopted the Toolkit?  
Future research could investigate why the Toolkit has not been enthusiastically adopted as an 
investment mechanism by provincial and municipal conservation agencies. The perceptions of 
respondents, as well as the literature, suggest the need for a comprehensive investigation. 
 
Corporate change  
How effective is the developmental support that government invests into small business and 
are their opportunities for redirection of funds to small-cap concessionaires? 
The literature revealed an acknowledgement by government that there are substantial funds 
allocated to the development and support of small businesses across sectors. However, the 
deployment of these funds is poorly coordinated. It is therefore not clear how effective an 
investment this is and how these funds could be more efficiently utilised. It is also not clear if the 
problem is at the legislative or implementation level. Focussed research may advance the 
distribution of this funding to more effectively benefit the target groups, in particular reference to 
small-cap PPP Tourism concessionaires. 
 
Transformation  
What is the real return on investment of Expanded Public Works Programmes versus a 
Sustainable Livelihoods approach? Can they work side by side and can mentoring support 
be formalised as part of the Toolkit process?  
A strong recommendation from respondents was that big business should be made contractually 
responsible for enterprise development, with performance targets being set. The mentoring role 
played by the NPO in case study 1 suggest an option of appointing a mentoring support agency to 
assist fledgling concessions. One funding source could be government’s EPWP that has grant-
funded SANParks billions of Rands for various restoration programmes. These include Working 
for Water, Working on Fire and Working for the Coast. These programmes have the financial and 
logistical reach to implement sustainable livelihood developmental programmes across the country 
where SANParks has reach. Future research could explore the option that the EPWP need not only 
be a short-term, task-based, job-creation strategy but could simultaneously adopt a more long-term 
developmental approach that invests in sustainable enterprise development solutions.  
Risk  
What are the intangible social value contributions that small businesses make? 
Enterprise Risk Management refers to the holistic assessment of risk beyond traditional 
assessments that focus primarily on financial health and viability. Future research into risk for 
small-cap concessions based on non-financial factors, that are appropriate to local environments, 
would add value to the debate about shared risk. This research would extend our understanding of 
the intangible and unmeasured value contributions that small businesses make.   
6.2 Conclusion  
The research presented insights into the entrepreneurial ecosystem of small-cap concessions in 
SANParks. The inductive nature of the research allowed for conclusions to be drawn from the 
findings, and recommendations to be made. The research revealed that possibilities exist for lasting 
economic and social impacts in local communities if the parties in the ecosystem revisit current 
policies and processes and effect institutional changes.  
 
What can government do? 
South Africa has over 400 terrestrial and 23 marine protected areas, of which SANParks manages 
21. The potential exists to spread the beneficiation from PPPs into all corners of the country, 
penetrating deep into rural areas. The Toolkit presents an opportunity to scale beneficiation to 
communities throughout South Africa, provided that the legislative issues that are paralysing the 
rollout of PPPs in provinces and municipalities are resolved. While the study examined some of 
the potential reasons for the impasse, a concerted effort on the part of all tiers of government is 
needed to resolve the deadlock. The lead agency has to be the National Treasury that engages with 
provinces and municipalities, gathers inputs and, if necessary, amends policy or drives legislative 
change. This process is likely to be a long and legally formidable one given that there are many 
conflicting political and economic interests. However, this effort should be weighed against the 
potential significant social and economic returns.  
 
What can SANParks do?  
SANParks has in the last two years introduced policies designed to fast-track transformation that 
benefit small business. The ring-fencing of small capital projects begins to reduce the dominance 
that big business has on concessions. However, SANParks need to back this up with four key 
strategies:  
a. The organisation needs to clarify its position on the mentoring of small businesses. This 
means a clear definition of its definition of risk in its enterprise development strategy. This 
should include how risk will be institutionalised in the organisation, communicated to the 
public, how beneficiaries will be defined and how the enterprise development programme 
will be measured. The strategy needs to indicate exactly how the benefits will reach the 
most vulnerable.   
b. The organisation needs to embark on a comprehensive training programme to develop staff 
competency in dealing with small business concessions. Staff across departments need to 
be assessed and rewarded for their roles in facilitating the partnership aspect of PPPs. To 
this end Park Operations needs to integrate their operational planning with that of the 
concessionaire and allocate resources accordingly. Decision-making needs to be more 
responsive with quick turnaround times so as not to affect the quality of customer service. 
c. The organisation needs to fast-track the option of entry into concessions through 
commercial permitting. This carries the need to simplify the application process and 
broaden the qualifying criteria. Operator risk needs to be reduced by agreeing a honeymoon 
period that allows the small-cap concessionaire to establish themselves. As more than one 
interviewed SANParks official noted, this is not a risk for the organisation if the aim is not 
revenue generation. Relatedly, managers need to be empowered at park level to make 
decisions that have the potential to unlock new opportunities.  
d. The organisation needs to proposition existing government, corporate, grant and NGO 
enterprise support agencies to invest in the mentoring of its small concessions. This is to 
ensure that small businesses have the development support they need that SANParks is not 
yet able to provide,   
 
What can big business do?  
 
Big business needs to align itself with the social context in which it finds itself. This requires that 
it commits to advanced enterprise development targets and provides adequate resources to support 
small business. It needs to show its commitment to transformation through equity share and 
through the integration of small business into its value chain. It needs to adopt a long-term deep 
transformation perspective of enterprise development rather than approach transformation on a 
project-to-project basis. It also needs to accept that small businesses need to be measured on social 
impact criteria and not purely on financial returns.  
What can concessionaires do?  
 
Concessionaires need to understand that they have agency in the process and are not passive 
recipients of government’s, implementer’s or funder’s goodwill. Their responsibility within the 
ecosystem is to capacitate themselves and their staff with the skills necessary for their business to 
be sustainable. This entails researching their competitors, understanding the market, and instituting 
developing robust administrative, monitoring and review systems. Concessionaires must 
understand the terms of their contracts and be able to predict its implications for their business. 
They need to be committed to social value with an internalised belief in, and commitment to, the 
sharing of benefits in their community.   
 
General conclusion  
The country’s pressing social and economic challenges have been magnified by the COVID-19 
pandemic. In the face of the reality of millions of South Africans either experiencing or facing 
unemployment, the need to open avenues of growth for small businesses across all sectors of the 
economy is more pressing than ever. The opportunity exists to expand the role of Protected Areas 
as vehicles for enterprise development and job creation through the PPP Tourism Toolkit. The 
research highlighted the advantages of adopting a long-term Sustainable Livelihoods Approach to 
small business development, while the praxis suggested that commercial permitting could be a 
low-risk entry point for new entrepreneurs. The economic crisis could catalyse provincial and 
municipal Protected Areas to utilise the Toolkit as an avenue to deliver on their responsibilities as 
agents of regional economic growth.  
The research confirmed that the Tourism PPP Toolkit is effective in releasing private capital and 
attracting infrastructure investment through large-cap PPPs. However, big business has been slow 
to internalise the B-BBEE principles of redress, in particular in the areas of ownership and 
enterprise development. Small-cap PPPs financial returns are not considered lucrative enough for 
the resource investment required and therefore require alternate entry routes into the PPP process 
as well as different success measures. 
Finally, the entrepreneurial ecosystem partners need to intensify their co-ordination efforts so that 
small business are assured that they have the support of both government and business and 


















Lodge Concession  Retail & restaurant  Activities 
 
Addo  Gorah Elephant Camp; 
Riverbend Country Lodge 
(Nyati); Kuzuko Lodge 
Cattle Baron Restaurant  
Augrabies  Augrabies Shop and Restaurant  
Karoo  Salt and Pepper Restaurant  
Kgalagadi  Ixhaus Lodge    
Knysna  Quay 4 Knysna   
Kruger  Mutlumuvi ;  
Jock of the Bushveld;  
Lwakahle ;  
Mpanamana ; Jakkalsbessie ;  
Mluwati ;  
Nwanetsi 
The Park Shop;  
Tindlovu JV cc;  
Cattle Baron Restaurant Skukuza;  
Select Events and Venues cc;  
Mugg and Bean – Olifants,  
Pretoriuskop, Lower Sabie, Letaba, 
Satara);  
Tshokwane Picnic Site ; Afsaal Picnic 
site  
Skukuza Airport;  
Skukuza Spa 
Marakele  Marataba Safari Lodge   
Table 
Mountain  
Tintswalo Koeel Bay Roundhouse Restaurant; Rhodes 
Memorial Restaurant and Tearoom; 
Cape Point Restaurant and Shops 








 Cattle Baron Restaurant  Storms River Tree Top 
Adventures; Mild2Wild; 
Tours and Woodcutter Trail 
; Cadeau Hiking Trail; 
Segway Bikes – 
Tsitsikamma; Wilderness 
West Coast  Kraalbaai Houseboats ; 
Duinepos Chalets 








Annexure B – Flow chart describing the delegation framework for approval for Micro Cap 
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